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Abstract  
 
This thesis offers an original and comprehensive philosophical approach to the 
understanding of Christian art. It draws on a range of sources, from analytic and 
theological aesthetics, philosophy and theology, to interpret and articulate a vision of the 
aims and prerogatives of Christian art.      
Works by William Blake, David Jones, and R. S. Thomas are among those 
receiving close attention; works which yield a picture of art and creative labour as deeply 
implicated in the central mysteries and practices of the Christian faith.        
In five chapters, the thesis addresses the nature and the implications of the Form, 
the Beauty, the Good, the Ontology, and the Love of Christian art.      
It is the aim of Christian art to manifest God under the particular forms and 
beauty of the artwork. These forms are realised and discerned in the context of a 
Christian life. The artwork’s beauty invites a response of delight, gratitude, and the 
reorientation of our desires and dispositions towards the infinite beauty of God.      
As a sacramental object, the Christian artwork is positioned in a Christian 
ontological narrative, in which we humans are entrusted with transformative stewardship 
of the world. Outside this conceptual and ontological context, the work will not be 
experienced as what it is.     
Ultimately, the Christian artwork begs to be perceived and engaged with – as 
indeed it is created – as an object of love. Thus the artwork finds its place within an 
understanding of Christian faith as the striving for a personal union with God. Above all, 
Christian art is made, received and loved as part of our calling to grow in the divine 
likeness.       
In presenting this vision, the thesis breaks new ground, and not only makes 
significant contributions to analytic and theological aesthetics, but also offers material 
with implications for philosophy and theology more widely.    
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Preface 
 
It has been my aim here to give an account of Christian art on its own terms; that is, not 
in terms imported and imposed from a remote philosophical discourse, but in terms 
consonant with the beliefs and conceptions of those who make this art and of those who 
receive it.     
The reader should expect a work, strictly speaking, neither of analytic nor 
theological aesthetics; while I borrow, widely, from both philosophy and theology, I 
engage with these disciplines insofar as they may serve to interpret, and re-articulate, the 
visions and presuppositions of Christian artworks and artists themselves. It is my hope 
that the confluence of different approaches will not confuse and obscure matters, but 
rather illuminate both the art in question and the ways of engaging with the forms, the 
meanings, and the beauty of this art.     
I am wary, in general, of philosophy’s presumption of a vantage from which to 
pronounce sentence on all things according to its own criteria. This apprehension is most 
keenly felt, perhaps, in the application of philosophy to the practice and experience of art; 
hence I feel with Robert Bridges,  
 
How in its naked self  
Reason wer powerless showeth when philosophers 
Wil treat of art, the which they are full ready to do, 
Having good intuition that their master-key 
May lie therein: but since they must lack vision of Art 
(for else they had been artists, not philosophers) 
They will miss the way (Bridges 1934, pp.69-70).    
 
Philosophy, I believe, is bound to more severely misconstrue art the more 
reluctant it is to allow its own methods to be informed by the languages of art and those 
who love it. I am acutely aware of Blake’s indictment of certain brands of  
 
Abstract Philosophy warring in enmity against Imagination 
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Which is the Divine Body of the Lord Jesus (Blake 2000, p.302).    
  
I have been at pains, therefore, to articulate the hopes and assumptions of 
Christian art as I have found them, implicit or explicit, in the artworks themselves. I have 
eschewed – as far as is permissible in an academic philosophical work – undue 
abstractions and technicalities, for the sake of an idiom more fluently dialogic between 
the various disciplines and, crucially, more pliantly responsive to the artworks under 
discussion. In particular, I have sought to take seriously the very original visions and 
proposals of the art that has most deeply moved and inspired me, such as the work of 
Blake, of David Jones, and the tradition of icon painting.         
Work on this thesis has confirmed my initial intuition that to engage with 
Christian art is not to attend to one category of art among others, but to engage an 
original tradition with its own prerogatives and aims, both aesthetic and ontological.              
What should concern us, in an exploration of Christian art, is the nature and role of art 
within the life of man as understood by Christianity. We should ask, with David Jones, 
“What is the nature of the thing called art? What sort of thing is it [and] how does this 
activity stand vis-à-vis the creature said by Christians to be a rational animal with a 
supernatural end?” (Jones 1959, p.145).  
If indeed this life is properly understood from the start as that of man-the-artist, 
no less than that of man the communicant with God, we may find some commanding 
reasons why a Christian conception of art should give us cause, not only for serious 
enquiry, but for confident exposition. From the contributions of Jones, Blake and others, 
what we get is an account of art’s essential implication in the central practices of 
Christianity. For Jones writes that “the Christian religion is committed to Ars in the most 
explicit, compelling, and integral manner” (p.167); while Blake, with poetic licence, 
exclaims that   
 
A Poet a Painter a Musician an Architect: the Man 
Or Woman who is not one of these is not a Christian (Blake 2000, p.403)  
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Thus I propose a model of understanding Christian art as deeply committed to the 
regeneration of the material and spiritual world; I hold that the Christian artwork is, 
ultimately, an object of love, the aim of which object – and the aim of which love – is the 
manifestation of the form and beauty of God.             
I have proceeded in the conviction that Christian art addresses us as an invitation, 
not to enquiry or speculation, but to worship and praise; indeed, that all Christian art 
speaks to us in some variation on these words of T. S. Eliot’s from “Little Gidding”:  
 
You are not here to verify, 
Instruct yourself, or inform curiosity 
Or carry report. You are here to kneel 
Where prayer has been valid (Eliot 1944, p.36).   
    
A philosophical account of Christian art may only be justified, it seems to me, if it 
manages to re-issue this invitation in such a way as to guide the reader to a transformative 
encounter with the artworks themselves. Thus the mode of presentation of this thesis may 
perhaps be described as more discursive than dialectical; though opponents are identified 
and engaged, it has been my aim here to present a personal, but comprehensive – and I 
hope persuasive – vision of Christian art. The motivation governing this work has been 
my love of the art and beauty under discussion; and it is my hope in presenting this thesis 
that it may serve, in some small measure, to return the reader to the treasures of Christian 
art with renewed perceptions and, above all, with a new readiness for love.        
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Synopsis 
 
Chapter 1: The Form of Christian Art 
 
We may understand Christian art to answer to David Jones’ succinct aesthetic-ontological 
thesis that “This is not a representation of a mountain, it is ‘mountain’ under the form of 
paint” (Jones 1959, p.170); for Christian art should be understood as granting a 
manifestation of the form and beauty of God ‘under the form’ of icon, sonnet, cathedral 
or sonata.      
 
As an artwork’s ‘significant form’ is always contextually realised and discerned, 
Christian art is a matter of Christian form giving a Christian experience in the context of 
Christian concepts and practices, ultimately granting an experience of the real presence of 
God.  
 
1.1 Form and appearance  
 
We can’t tell a Christian artwork from other artworks by the way it looks or what 
appears to be its subject, but by the way we are asked to look at it and, crucially, 
by its likeness to God. This likeness may come in a multitude of forms, for the 
Christ-form admits of endless re-imaginings and re-presentations; but every 
Christian artwork invites a Christian experience, by raising the eyes, minds and 
hearts of the perceiver to a vision of what God is like.    
 
1.1.1 Recognising Christian art  
 
As so-called representational content is neither sufficient nor necessary to 
make something a work of art, ostensibly Christian representation is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to make a Christian work of art. We 
recognise Christian art by its contextually embedded invitation to a 
Christian experience.      
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1.1.2 Negative icons 
 
While all Christian art is iconic, in the broad sense of manifesting the form 
and beauty of God, not all Christian art is iconic in a ‘positive’ sense; 
there is also scope in Christian art for an apophatic artistic method. The 
poetry of R. S. Thomas is exemplary for being Christian art which, for 
theological and artistic reasons, does not offer us God as representation or 
content but invites profound experiences of God’s disclosure.   
 
1.2 Form and life 
 
It is vital to engage with Christian art in the context of a Christian life; while 
significant form is contextually discerned, the pursuit of significant form is a 
purpose, not only of Christian art, but indeed of Christian life. Christian art is both 
expressive of and indissolubly embedded in the religious pursuit of a valid form 
of life.  
 
1.2.1 Form in context 
 
It is especially important for Christian art that ‘form’ is understood as 
involving the experience of the work’s intrinsic and relational 
qualities. The experience of Christian art unfolds within a tradition of 
Christian making and within the communal life of the Church.  
 
1.2.2 The Christian pursuit of form 
 
Christian life is the perpetual effort at achieving form. Formlessness is 
a failing of love and discipline, and a falling away from the likeness of 
God. Creative labour may be fully integrated into – and may be a valid 
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manifestation of – the religious life. Christian art works with ‘the 
materials of life’ to realise the form and beauty of God.     
 
1.3 Form and reality 
 
If, as Clive Bell argues, significant forms disclose the real, then the significant 
forms of Christian art should be taken as disclosing the real as understood by 
Christianity. Thus the significant forms of Christian art aim to manifest the 
particulars and the patterns of God’s creation and revelation.     
 
1.3.1 Communicating the real 
 
Art is not, as Tolstoy thought, a means for the communication of 
emotion. Christian art aims to reveal divine realities, communal and 
extra-personal in nature. Indeed, Christian art labours with and against 
the limitations of language to render God present under the forms of 
our making.    
 
1.3.2 Form and presence 
 
For the Christian, significant form – the uniqueness and integrity of a 
thing – is significant of God’s presence in all things. The forms and 
symbols of Christian art are understood to instantiate the thing there 
re-presented; as, in the theology of icons, the form and beauty of the 
image makes the saint really present to the perceiver.    
 
Chapter 2: The Beauty of Christian Art 
 
Beauty is the central aim, and a necessary criterion, of Christian art. An artwork that is 
not beautiful would fall short of granting an experience – aesthetic and religious in one – 
of God’s manifested glory and goodness.   
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Irreducible to material or formal properties, beauty is experienced as ineffable and 
gratuitous. Christian art always understands the beauty of a particular work to be a gift 
from the Trinitarian God; a gift which gives delight, but which also makes a claim upon 
us as spiritual beings and asks of us, not only that we make beautiful works, but also that 
we reorient our desires and dispositions to grow beautiful in the divine likeness.      
 
2.1 Delight and gratitude 
 
To argue that beauty is delightful is not to define beauty as pleasure. Beauty 
does not only delight, but also makes a claim upon us. The appropriate 
Christian response to beauty is gratitude; a response which may encompass 
the attitudes of reverence and veneration. Ultimately, the beautiful object 
should so train and transform our desire so as to become an object of love.       
 
2.1.1 The pleasure given 
 
Beauty cannot be dismissed as a subjective sensation of pleasure. The 
delight that beauty gives should lead us to recognise its objectivity; for 
our grateful response to beauty’s gratuity entails the acknowledgement 
both of a quality and reality to beauty exterior to our senses and 
faculties, as well as suggesting a giver wholly other than ourselves.    
 
2.1.2 The acceptance of the gift 
 
Beauty engages our moral responsibilities as well as our aesthetic 
responses. The perception of beauty is an invitation to spiritual growth. 
Thus beauty as manifested in the particular thing or artwork raises our 
vision, and directs our desires, towards the infinite beauty of God.    
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2.2 Discernment and desire 
 
The perception of beauty demands a discerning effort of understanding the 
forms and meanings where beauty is found, embedded in the material and 
cultural world. At the same time, we must embody a real receptiveness to 
beauty, by seeking to be conformed to and transformed by the beauty we see – 
and so to become beautiful ourselves. 
 
2.2.1 The trained and luminous eye 
 
The engagement required by beautiful works of Christian art may ask 
a great deal of us; we may be expected, not only to be literate in the 
forms of the art in question, but also to have some lived familiarity 
with profound human and Christian experiences. Our task is not only 
to train our perceptions, but also to purify our hearts in receptiveness 
to the divine light.  
  
2.2.2 Becoming what we see 
 
Beauty itself asks of us that, in order that we may see it more fully, we 
become like it. The appropriate response to the beautiful is therefore to 
grow, through love, ever more receptive and ever nearer to it. The 
Christian artist, pursuing his work within the cultivation of a Christian 
life, must conform fully to the end he hopes to realise.  
 
2.3 The gift not made by hands 
 
In the words of David Bentley Hart, “The Christian use of the word ‘beauty’ 
refers most properly to a relationship of donation and transfiguration, a handing 
over and return of the riches of being” (Hart 2004, p.18). I draw on this 
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understanding to suggest some crucial ontological implications of the beauty of 
Christian art.   
 
2.3.1 Beauty’s gratuity  
 
The Christian artist works in the hope and vision of beauty; but beauty 
is not of his provenance. Nor, importantly, is there anything necessary 
or law-governed about beauty’s manifestation; it is not reducible to 
such formal properties as integrity, proportion and clarity, but remains 
ineffable and gratuitous.  
 
2.3.2 In the likeness of God 
 
For something to be beautiful means for that thing to be in the likeness 
of God, to partake of the gifted beauty of God. It is in response to 
beauty’s original gifts that the Christian artist wants to produce 
something worthy of being a beautiful gift in return. Beauty, even the 
beauty of our created forms, is itself uncreated.    
 
2.3.3 A Trinitarian model  
 
I support this model of bestowal by suggesting a Trinitarian 
understanding of beauty; in which beauty belongs to the dynamic 
perichoresis of the Three Persons. I argue further that beauty – being 
gift, and not a formal property – is best identified with the Spirit, and 
not, as is common in Scholastic thought, with the Son.      
    
Chapter 3: The Good of Christian Art 
 
On an iconic model of the good, that is good which partakes of and manifests the Good, 
where this good is Beautiful. I argue that beauty is the relevant and decisive good of 
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Christian art, as the Beauty of God is the good above others towards which our lives 
should be oriented.        
  
Christian art requires that we challenge some familiar dichotomies of aesthetic discourse 
– between the ‘good for’ and the ‘good in itself’; and between particular and transcendent 
goods – under a concern for what transfigures the world and manifests divine realities.    
 
3.1 Ends and instruments of the good  
 
Like all other art, Christian art should be appreciated and evaluated for its 
‘intrinsic’ qualities. At the same time, this art is both created and engaged 
with in the hope that it may enrich – and be good for – the Christian life.    
 
3.1.1 Good ‘in itself’ and good for 
 
The work of Christian art could not be good ‘in itself’ without also 
being ‘good for’. The work of Christian art is such that, ‘in itself’ (but 
not of itself) it manifest the glory of God.    
 
3.1.2 Doing and making good  
 
Art is an activity. To make a good work of art, therefore, is a good 
thing to do. This doing is integral to Christian life. The artist, whatever 
his other ‘moral’ qualities, is iconic in his making of beautiful things.     
 
3.2 Particular and transcendent goods   
 
Christian art is committed to an objective, transcendent, and divine Good. As 
such, Christian art cannot be good as Christian art if it does not partake of and 
manifest the Good of God.   
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3.2.1 The good and the real 
 
To be good, Christian art does not simply have to communicate ‘good 
feelings’ or present reality in a good way, but more precisely to 
manifest a good reality; indeed, to manifest the reality of the Good. 
 
3.2.2 Integrity and openness  
 
An artwork that is entirely self-contained will fail to delight and to 
invite a profound spiritual experience. On the iconic model of the 
good, the goodness of a thing, its likeness to God, is grounded in a 
relation – an openness, a reaching out towards God – and in the 
reciprocal attitude of God towards the thing in question.   
 
3.3 The Good and the Beautiful  
 
The experience of Christian art may fruitfully be placed within an account, 
like Gregory of Nyssa’s, of the spiritual life and the growth in virtue as a 
journey in and towards the infinite beauty of God.     
 
3.3.1 Resemblance and likeness 
 
A thing is good, says Robert Adams, insofar as it resembles God in 
some respect. A thing is only truly good, and in the likeness of God, I 
say, if it manifests the beauty of God.  
  
3.3.2 God as co-appreciator and co-creator 
 
On my account of the beauty of an artwork as a divine gift, it would 
seem to follow that this artwork is good, not simply by its relation to 
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the Good and the Beauty of God, but by God having a hand in its 
making.  
 
3.3.3 Love of the good  
 
The Christian is called to love the beautiful. This is also the motivating 
force behind the work of Christian art, which is most good when most 
beautiful; and which is offered as a particular object of love for that 
eros which leads us, ultimately, to the Beauty of God.    
 
Chapter 4: The Ontology of Christian Art 
 
A consistent engagement with Christian art demands that the artwork is positioned firmly 
in the context, not only of a Christian culture, but of a Christian ontological narrative; for 
in dealing with Christian art, the Christian and the non-Christian will be seen to be 
talking, not only about two completely different things, but about two different (possible) 
worlds.   
 
Christian art itself yields a comprehensive vision of the Christian artwork as a 
sacramental object deeply implicated in the regeneration of the world.   
  
4.1 Christian art for the Christian imagination 
 
Contrary to the assumptions of Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley, the Christian 
artwork asks to be seen – to be an object of vision and appreciation, as indeed 
of love – within a Christian apprehension of the world.   
 
4.1.1 Ontological context 
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The Christian nature of the Christian artwork is to be located, from the 
very first, in the realm of ontology; not in pedagogy or didacticism. 
The work aspires to be a redeemed part of creation.     
 
4.1.2 Beliefs in and about the work  
 
The beliefs found in the work are to a great extent beliefs about the 
work, about what kind of thing this work is. The atheist, unable to 
adopt the Christian view of the world, will subject the Christian 
artwork to categorical and conceptual imprisonment and thus fail to 
see it as what it is.  
 
4.1.3 Psychological and ontological transformation   
 
Rilke’s Duino Elegies is used to elucidate diverging understandings of 
creative transformation; and to illustrate how two diverging readings, 
one Christian and one non-Christian, may not simply yield two sets of 
meaning, but indeed two different kinds of works.       
 
4.2 Making other and making new 
 
The transformative ambitions of the Christian artwork are only intelligible – 
indeed, are only possible – in a world in which God may become man and wine 
may become blood. The Christian artwork begs to be seen as really altering the 
world to become more assimilated to God. This transformative ambition is 
integral to the nature of man as well as to the nature of his artistic making.   
   
4.2.1 Man the artist 
 
Christian art suggests a picture of man as essentially a creative and 
imaginative being whose practices of making new and making other 
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are inextricably entwined with his pursuit of communion with the 
divine.  
 
4.2.2 Art and sacrament 
 
For David Jones, our creative works are sacramental in nature; all our 
thing- and sign-making is understood in relation to the supreme 
‘making other’ of the Eucharist. Thus Christian artists seek to make 
God present under the forms of their making; language and metaphor, 
line and colour, tone and harmony.     
  
4.2.3 Golgonooza  
 
Christian art envisions the transfiguration of the cosmos. William 
Blake’s ‘Golgonooza’ provides an ambitious and compelling model of 
how humankind’s artistic labours seek their fruition in a communal 
work of art which constitute the eternal city and true home for our 
creative and divinely inspired natures.     
 
Chapter 5: The Love of Christian art 
 
Love pertains to all that has previously been argued in this thesis. Indeed, unless we 
apprehend the Christian artwork as an invitation to love, we can be said not to have seen 
or engaged with it at all. Fundamentally, also the making of the Christian artwork should 
be seen as a labour of love.  
 
Christian art is implicated in an understanding of Christian faith which holds that love is 
a requisite for the vision and knowledge of God, and that the life of faith takes the form 
of a loving second-person relation between the believer and God. We may also apply the 
experience of Christian art to consider our loving prerogatives more widely, as creative 
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beings entrusted – not only with the making and keeping of art – but indeed with 
stewardship of the world 
 
5.1 Works of love 
 
Love is a requisite condition of the experience of Christian art; this 
understanding is anchored both in the nature of the artwork, understood as 
dialogic and second-personal, and in Christian life and theology at large, 
where any knowledge and experience of God takes the form of an encounter 
with, and in, love.  
 
5.1.1 We love therefore we see 
 
It is a crucial theological point that love is integral to right perception 
and right belief. We need love to also inform our making, perception 
and experience of Christian art; as the ‘purpose’ of this art is to bring 
us closer to God.  
 
5.1.2 Dialogue and metanoia 
 
The Christian artwork invites us to a lived and transformative 
dialogue, and further invites the conversion of our perceptions and 
dispositions. One who does not acknowledge the work’s address – one 
who does not feel answerable to the work, and to God, and who is not 
willing to change his life in responsiveness to the work’s meanings – 
does not really experience the work at all as what it is.   
  
5.1.3 Union and communion  
 
For all Christians, the aim is union with God. A right engagement with 
the Christian artwork is dependent upon our effort at such a relation. 
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Ultimately, the Christian artwork asks to be experienced in the first-
person plural, the communal we, of the Church.     
 
5.2 Imaginative custodians   
 
This final part of the thesis offers an approach to the love of art more 
generally, drawing upon the arguments above, but also further explores the 
implications of the love that Christian art cultivates. As microcosms, we 
humans are the custodians of the created world, entrusted with its imaginative 
care and cultivation in the light and likeness of God. The love of art may 
intelligibly find its purposes within such a picture; in particular, the love of 
artworks may finds it place within the wider practices of oikophilia, the 
cultural love of home, and philokalia, the theological love of beauty.   
 
5.2.1 Art and oikophilia 
 
Oikophilia, used by Roger Scruton in seeking to characterise a proper 
care for the natural and human environment, is a concept wonderfully 
suited to our love of art. On this view, the work of art is loved for its 
capacity to render the world emotionally and spiritually our home. Our 
artworks do not simply speak about, but indeed constitute, the oikos 
we inhabit as cultural beings.  
 
5.2.2 Conservation and transfiguration  
 
As a weapon against social and spiritual entropy, the work of art has a 
great role to play in cultural conservation, but its purpose and power is 
also one of transfiguration. On a Christian model, our stewardship is 
inseparable from our calling to also beautify the world through works 
of art; the motivations of oikophilia thus find themselves transmuted 
into our cultivation of philokalia.   
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5.2.3 Love against the machine 
 
Christian art provides emphatic support for critiques of the impersonal 
and de-humanising, as well as ecologically harmful, implications of 
mechanisation and industrialisation. The misuse of the sacramental 
potentials of art, labour and language constitute a threat to divine 
communication.      
  
5.2.4 The challenges of love 
 
Under pressure of modern tendencies in art and art criticism, as well as 
in morals and religion, the aims of oikophilia and philokalia may be 
difficult to maintain. But our greatest artworks reaffirm the love of 
home and beauty, precisely by engaging with their perennial 
challenges.  
     
5.2.5 A home in but not of the world  
 
Confirming the tensions between oikophilia and philokalia, Christian 
art proclaims that, while the earth is entrusted to our care, we have no 
abiding home here, but are perennially pilgrims for God’s glory. While 
our iconic works may manifest this glory here and now, the love and 
the creative labour of Christian art are always cultivated in response to 
a beauty not of this world.    
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CHAPTER 1: THE FORM OF CHRISTIAN ART  
 
Only by the form, the pattern, 
Can words or music reach 
The stillness (Eliot 1944, p.8).   
 
Thus writes T. S. Eliot in “Burnt Norton”. The concept of form, here suggested, is crucial 
to an understanding of the nature and ambitions of Christian art, as indeed of art in 
general.     
It is the central tenet of the formalism of Clive Bell, to which approach I am 
rather sympathetic, that what makes for art is a matter not of ‘content’ or mimetic 
‘representation’ but of the achievement of significant form; I believe, however, that this 
needs to be complemented by an institutional approach, such as that proposed by Peter 
Lamarque, according to which an artwork must be understood, appreciated and engaged 
with, as culturally and contextually embedded.   
Christian art is a matter of Christian form yielding a Christian experience in the 
context of Christian concepts and practices. It is my hope that the account given here will 
go some way towards intelligibly placing the Christian artwork is relation to what Hans 
Urs von Balthasar calls the ‘Christ-form’; that is, I hope we may begin to see how the 
Christian artwork both draws its significance from, and significantly contributes to, the 
manifestation of the form of Christ.            
Though Bell is a worthy interlocutor, his theory is for several reasons insufficient 
to characterise the special nature of Christian art. My own position is more closely 
aligned with the formulations of David Jones; who, in his art-practice as well as in his 
art-philosophical pronouncements, sought a fusion between the insights of a Bell-like 
formalism and the various demands posed, of an aesthetic, anthropological and 
ontological nature, by the Christian culture to which he belonged and to which he hoped 
to contribute.     
Jones, importantly, stresses that an artwork is a “’thing’ and not (necessarily) the 
impression of some other thing” (Jones 1959, p.172); something he learned from what he 
calls Post-Impressionist theory, and which we also find articulated, with a theological 
28 
 
emphasis, in Jacques Maritain. This makes for an understanding of art which holds that, 
even if a painting is ostensibly ‘representational’, in that is presents or depicts something 
that is recognisably a goat or a mountain, this should not be misunderstood as 
characterising the nature of the artwork or granting its status as art. For the painting does 
much more than give us an image, resemblance or reflection of something else; indeed, 
its success as art depends upon its ability to give us something new, and to give us 
something real, in a much more radical sense. As Jones puts it, “the painter may say to 
himself: ‘This is not a representation of a mountain, it is “mountain” under the form of 
paint: Indeed, unless he says this unconsciously or consciously he will not be a painter 
worth a candle” (Jones 1959, p.170). This is the kind of formalism I endorse; what Jones 
would call, in contrast to ‘representation’, re-presentation.      
I will argue in this chapter that a Christian work of art does not need to have any 
Christian representational content, so called, but that its forms need to invite a Christian 
perspective and a Christian experience. We can’t tell a Christian artwork from other 
artworks by the way it looks or what it looks like, but by the way we are asked to look at 
it and, crucially, by its likeness to God.  I will argue further that the Christian artwork 
begs to be engaged with in the context of the forms of Christian life; and, finally, that the 
Christian artwork harbours the ambition that its significant forms disclose and give us the 
real, understood as the revelation and the presence of God.   
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1.1 FORM & APPEARANCE    
 
It seems appropriate to begin by considering what a Christian work of art may look like 
and what we may look for in it. A brief enquiry along these lines will provide us with 
some basic criteria upon which, in what follows, to build a fuller account of the forms 
and meanings of Christian art.       
The first thing to say is that Christian art may look like anything and everything. 
The Christ-form admits of endless re-imaginings and re-presentations; God cannot be 
paraphrased, but there are infinite variations on the theme of his glory. There are, 
therefore, inexhaustible ways of responding to God. Each Christian artwork constitutes 
such a response; and for the Christian artist, as David Jones observes, “There is only one 
tale to tell even though the telling is patient of endless development and ingenuity and 
can take on a million variant forms” (Jones 1959, p.130). Crucially, not only may 
Christian artworks come in a multitude of guises, they also may not be identified as 
Christian from their appearance.          
Christian art is recognised by its ability to manipulate an artistic medium in such a 
way that we may there behold and encounter the form and beauty of God; such work, we 
say, is in the likeness of God. Likeness to God, of course, does not mean that something 
‘looks like’ God; it means rather that the work raises the eyes, minds and hearts of the 
perceiver, by artistic and aesthetic means, to a vision of what God is like.  
While beauty is a necessary aim for the attainment of this likeness1 – under a 
conception of beauty to be defended in the following chapter – it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for a Christian work of art to have Christian representational content in any 
literal sense of that term. Crucially, though the content and the appearance of the work 
need not be ostensibly Christian, the form of the work must be, and the work must issue 
an invitation to a Christian experience2.    
                                                 
1 While beauty is not sufficient to make an artwork Christian, because this beauty needs to attend a 
Christian form (in order to invite a Christian experience), we should affirm that – when it comes to 
recognising or identifying whether an artwork is Christian or not – beauty is one thing we look for.    
 
2 Form, for the purposes of this study, should not be taken to denote only the narrowly formal properties of 
an artwork (such as the metre of a poem, for example), but rather to signify what we may call its gestalt, its 
‘thing-ness’ and, via Pavel Florensky, its ‘countenance’. My adaptation of Bell’s ‘significant form’ will, I 
hope, become clear in the course of this chapter.     
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1.1.1 Recognising Christian art  
 
Let us start with the claim, supported by formalist as well as institutional theories, that 
so-called representational content is neither sufficient nor necessary to make something a 
work of art.3    
The formalist, like Clive Bell, would say that to hold representational content as 
either the aim of a particular work of art or as the defining criterion of art in general 
would be to miss the point entirely; it is rather the aim of a painting, or a poem, to 
achieve what we might call ‘significant form,’ or what we might characterise as an 
internally successful manipulation of materials – using line and colour, for example, to 
produce something that has integrity and consonance, that is an end in itself as an object 
of aesthetic attention and appreciation. “Significant form”, so Bell argues, is “the one 
quality common to all works of visual art” – from “Sta. Sophia and the windows at 
Chartres” to “the masterpieces of Poussin, Piero della Francesca, and Cezanne” – as in 
each of these “lines and colours combined in a particular way, certain forms and relations 
of forms, stir our aesthetic emotions” (Bell 1914, p.8).    
Even for the portrait-painter, in so far as he seeks to make art and not just deliver 
a physical or photographic likeness, it is something over and above the accomplishment 
of representation that really counts. Far from trying to achieve a visual resemblance 
alone, the painter will seek to give us an image of and insight into the real character or 
quality of the person portrayed. Thus David Jones’ painter will seek to reveal to us, 
through the form of paint, something true about ‘mountain’ or mountain-ness. The 
success of the work, as art, is conditional upon its ability to make us share in the artist’s 
way of seeing, his apprehension of the real or true quality of a subject – what Bell calls, 
rather unfortunately I think, the artist’s ‘aesthetic emotion’– and this can only be 
communicated to us through significant form. If he succeeds, he has not simply 
represented the appearance of a thing but has rather re-presented it, given us the reality of 
it anew, under a new form.      
                                                 
3 As the definitions of both ‘representational’ and ‘content’ are fiercely contested in analytic aesthetics, we 
do best to sidestep those snares as far as is permissible; it is all the same to my account, I believe, if by 
representative content we mean the mimetic, the figurative or symbolic, the visceral or the cognitive.   
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The institutional theorist, like Arthur Danto or Peter Lamarque, can amplify our 
position. This theorist would say that even though representational content is a salient 
feature of much art, and often a source of interest and value to the viewer or reader, it is 
not this aspect of a work which defines that work as being art; rather, if we want to 
explain what makes something a work of art, we must make reference to the cultural 
context and practice in which the work is embedded and in which it may be produced, 
received and appreciated as art. Only within certain conventions, of creation as well as 
evaluation, will an abstract painting or a piece of nonsense verse, no less than a 
representational work, be granted the distinction of ‘art’, whether this is construed as an 
honorific or simply a classificatory term.           
While each of the above approaches are deserving of a far more in-depth 
engagement, there are certainly enough strong arguments between the two to allow for 
and augment the position I have adopted. Thus, having claimed that not every painting or 
narrative which has representational content is a work of art, we can also affirm that 
something that is not art in the first place cannot possibly be Christian art. It follows that 
no amount of ostensibly Christian representation in a painting or a narrative can ensure 
that this piece is necessarily a Christian work of art.   
 
Christian art offers and invites a Christian experience. We may think of many reasons 
why artworks with ostensibly Christian content do not invite such an experience, and do 
not seek to glorify God. There are cases of artworks where the representational content 
happens to be of a seemingly Christian kind, and where the artwork manifestly makes 
appeal to the viewer’s familiarity with the Christian story – a painting of the Crucifixion, 
for example, or an image of Salomé holding the severed head of John the Baptist – but 
where the artwork may well belong in a ‘secular’ category such as history painting, epic 
or even satire. It may be that the work is simply exploiting a motif from a universally 
known narrative, or it may even be a critique of the subject and its attendant beliefs.      
Such works which either are not meant to, or which fail to be, iconic of the form and 
beauty of God, are not Christian.  
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At the same time as there are artworks with Christian content that do not give a 
Christian experience, there are also works without such content that nevertheless seek to 
do precisely that; as we shall see from examples below.     
However, if it’s clear that Christian representational content is not sufficient for a 
Christian artwork, it might seem far more problematic to argue that no such content at all 
is necessary; for it seems true that in order to respond properly to a Christian work of art, 
we must first identify it as such – and how, if there were no representational clues as to 
the character of the artwork, would we know that such an experience and such an 
interpretation are invited?  It looks as if there needs to be some aspect of the work which 
really lets the viewer, at least the perceptive viewer, know what kind of engagement is 
expected of him. Still, this aspect does not need to be strictly speaking representative; nor 
does it need to be internal to the work.      
I will therefore argue at greater length below, not only that the Christian artwork 
should be experienced in a Christian context, but indeed that the artwork’s significant 
form is indivisible from its context; where context may be understood in several ways – 
as being the setting of an artwork or performance, for example, or as being constituted by 
requisite knowledge about the conditions of an artwork’s conception and reception. 
Ultimately, the context of the Christian artwork is the Christian life – its practices and 
culture, its meanings and beliefs.   
As examples of Christian art which seem to have no ‘content’ at all, we could 
offer instances of several kinds. For visual art, we may take the case of the paintings in 
the Rothko Chapel. Here are visual works with no representational or figurative content 
at all, simply fields of colour, which nevertheless – by virtue of the place they are in, the 
triptych-formats used, and so on – invite the viewer or visitor to a deeply inspiring 
aesthetic and religious experience; the paintings offer opportunities or intimations of 
consolation, gratitude, ecstasy, and peace, by asking to be seen in the light of religious 
conceptions. In a recent article, Florence Waters describes Rothko’s paintings as granting 
the viewer “a similar lofty experience that one gets in a place of worship, like a 
cathedral.” She notes the paintings’ non-representative and non-referential character – 
“their refusal to associate with language, or any period in art history” – as well as their 
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tactile and visceral thing-ness, claiming that “Physically, they rank among the most 
precious objects in contemporary art” (Waters, 2012).               
Then there is Christian music – purely instrumental music, without the 
accompaniment of words, where there is no content to speak of – which, partly by virtue 
of being embedded in a culture of worship, is capable of giving rise to some of our 
strongest and most profound religious experiences. Think of Arvo Pärt or of Bach; music 
powerful enough to move mountains, or at least to grant lasting moments of joy, resolve 
and repentance. There is also the significant case of Christian architecture; where no 
representational content, no figures or symbols are needed (even if these are often 
present), but simply the shapes, the space and the spirit of a place are capable of stirring 
our hearts or stilling our souls to reverence.         
It may be harder to find examples of literary art where figurative or symbolic 
content is irrelevant or non-existent, while there is certainly much poetry where we’d be 
hard pressed to specify what constitutes its content. However, there are significant cases 
in which we may not without contention speak of its content or its subject matter as 
Christian; some of William Blake’s symbolic poetry is one example, the fiction of 
Dostoevsky another, of writing whose Christian merits and meanings are perennially, 
divisively debated. In The Anathemata of David Jones, which we will encounter in more 
detail later, the Christian form of the work is discernible, not on the level of content (for 
the content in this poetic work is of a supremely elusive kind), but rather on the level of 
metaphysical and as it were meta-historical argument. The Christ-form, all but invisible 
in the ‘narrative’, is the centre around which – and the background before which – is spun 
a phenomenally ambitious account of human sacramental history. The Christ-form gives 
significance, gives meaning, to what may appear a loose fabric of the most cryptically 
antiquarian, etymological and symbolic associations. Though we may consider as more 
immediate contextual factors the acknowledged influences and the avowed intentions of 
its author, the Christ-form is ultimately the context in which Jones’ work asks to be read.        
We will turn shortly to the poetry of R. S. Thomas for an exemplary body of 
Christian art which, for theological no less than artistic reasons, does not offer us God as 
representation or content, which but invites profound contemplations upon, and 
experiences of, the nature of God’s disclosure.     
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1.1.2 Negative Icons   
 
We ask of all Christian art that it is iconic, in the broad sense of manifesting the form and 
beauty of God. Importantly, however, not all iconic works are so in the ‘positive’ sense of 
presenting us with a paradigm of spiritual perfection. Traditional icons do this, giving us 
the spiritual form of Christ and his saints as objects of veneration as well as models of 
emulation; and here, though I maintain that it is the form and beauty of the artwork – and 
indeed the form and beauty of the saint’s life – which is iconic, it is possible to speak of 
the representational ‘content’ of the work being integral to the work’s iconicity and value. 
But there are also, I would argue, what we may call negative icons, which offer no such 
exemplary content.         
Crucial aspects – perhaps entire novels – of the fiction of Graham Greene, Fyodor 
Dostoevsky and Flannery O’Connor would seem to fit this category; as, again, would the 
visual art of Rothko4. In these works there are no – or, seldom at best – positive 
exemplars of the Christian life or positive proclamations of God’s glory. Yet, in the 
absence of saints and doxologies, God’s glory is invoked precisely by this very absence.     
We may speak here of a kind of apophatic artistic method, of deliberate poetic 
and theological understatements, of analogy by negation, where the space left by the 
failings of character, and the lack of light and fruition, does somehow take the form of – 
and asks to be filled by – Christ’s revelation; and where this negative space does shed 
light on everything else. Though they seem to lack iconic ‘content’ – though there are no 
representations of saintliness as such, no real reassurances of the religious life – there is 
something about the form, as indeed the unconventional beauty, of these works, which 
invite real Christian experiences and encounters.         
 
The poems of R. S. Thomas, with their profound, piercing and consistent apophaticism, 
may not only stand as exemplars of such negative icons, but are indeed, to my mind, 
exemplary of the complexities of Christian art. The discussion below will owe much to 
D. Z. Phillips’s excellent study of the poet; a study which is judiciously and penetratingly 
                                                 
4 A recent paper in ASAGE, “Rothko’s Negative Theology” by Matthew Lovett, is on the right track; 
discussing Rothko’s visual art in relation to the theology of Dionysius the Areopagite.          
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conducted in the light of the works’ negative theology. Thomas, writes Phillips (1986), is 
“absorbed in the struggle of mediating the sense of a Deus absconditus, a hidden God, in 
language” (p.xv).    
We may take Iago Pryterch, Thomas’ recurring “adversary” (Phillips 1986, p.2) as 
a negative icon. We first meet him in “A Peasant”. Marred and marked by the earth he 
labours,  
sour with years of sweat 
And animal contact, 
 
he also seems to stand at times like a door (albeit a dark and narrow one) to a 
world beyond this one;   
 
enduring like a tree under the curious stars (Thomas 1993, p.4), 
 
he bears witness, perhaps, not just to an order of necessity, but an order of grace. Yet, as 
Phillips notes, the stars’ curiosity indicates an ambivalence, an uneasy relation between 
the two worlds: “There is no neat fit, no ready intelligibility” (Phillips 1986, p.4), and so 
Pryterch, insofar as he speaks at all of realities beyond his lot, remains an ambiguous 
symbol; never comforting, never easily conforming to our preconceptions, he remains a 
stumbling block for complacent pieties and a challenge for poet and priest alike.  
Another example of such an ambivalent gesture is provided in “Peasant 
Greeting”:  
 
No speech; the raised hand affirms 
All that is left unsaid 
By the mute tongue and the unmoistened lips: 
The land’s patience and a tree’s 
Knotted endurance and 
The heart’s doubt whether to curse or bless, 
All packed into a single gesture (Thomas 1993, p.12).  
 
36 
 
The peasant in these poems is less a revelation or proclamation than a question 
mark, and a very inarticulate one at that; indeed, Thomas writes elsewhere of Pryterch’s   
 
 dark figure 
Marring the simple geometry  
Of the square fields with its gaunt question (p.87).  
 
We may infer very little of the divine purposes from such a figure, such a fate – 
nor, as evinced by the stars’ curious gaze, does he render human life more intelligible to 
the heavens either.   
Phillips comments that the “endured toil and suffering [of the people the poet-
priest is confronted by] extracts a respect for a religion which wants to make something 
more of it. Yet, we have little indication […] of what that ‘something more’ can be. The 
very attempt to give it a content comes under severe threat from the life which surrounds 
the priest” (Phillips 1986, p.9).   
So, for the life witnessed and re-presented by the poet, in its lack of ‘content’ – its 
reluctance to lend itself to propositional sense, to constructive apologetics – it is the form 
of this life which must speak (if at all possible) of man’s relation to God; and it is the 
form of the poetry – and so poetry rather than apologetics – which must seek to mediate 
this life, to render it intelligible and significant, to poet and reader both, to priest and 
people alike. Crucially, then, it is the hiddenness of God which makes demands of an 
apophatic poetic method; a method which doesn’t seek to present God by way of content, 
but which must somehow render God’s absence a kind of presence – render God present 
in his absence.   
Pryterch and the land he inhabits, to be sure, prove very resistant material for the 
poet; but it is in the hard-won clarity of the poems where Thomas succeeds, that we may 
see Pryterch and his kind in a perspective that allows them to speak (despite and beyond 
themselves) of his likeness (however tarnished) to a God who became incarnate and 
suffered his Passion on earth.   
37 
 
For an early example of the hard-won beauty of Thomas’ poetry, we may look to 
“In A Country Church”; in which we glimpse the iconicity of a place where God may 
alleviate the sense of absence, and so hallow the hard life, in the most humble way: 
  
To one kneeling down no word came […] 
 
Was he balked by silence? He kneeled long, 
And saw love in a dark crown 
Of thorns blazing, and a winter tree 
Golden with fruit of a man’s body (Thomas 1993, p.67).  
   
There is no real depiction here, but the sketched evocation of a scene, and there is 
no attempt to draw a conclusion, or to preach a lesson; what iconicity the poem possesses 
lies in its terse distillation of experience – in the subtle confluence of some central 
symbols of the Christian faith, and the glimpse of a possible life briefly graced by 
significance in the light of these symbols.        
These poems contain no proof or justification of God’s ways, any more than do 
the fictions of Greene or Dostoevsky, but they demand of us to adopt a religious view on 
the world, from which perspective alone these poems reveal the significance of their 
forms and of the forms of life they re-present.   
R. S. Thomas is clear in his aims and methods; we may perhaps read his “Via 
Negativa” as a manifesto for his approach to poetry and to God: 
    
Why no! I never thought other than 
That God is that great absence  
In our lives […] 
the place where we go  
Seeking, not in hope to arrive  
Or find […] 
We look at people 
And places as though he had looked 
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At them, too; but miss the reflection (Thomas 1993, p.220).     
  
Crucially, the poems themselves may constitute negative icons, not only in their 
deliberate apophaticism, their lack of affirmation, but also in their (acknowledged) failure 
to even trace or illumine this way of negation. Indicative of this is Phillips’ comment that 
“The poet may have nothing to offer but songs which can do no more than express the 
failure of his own language” (Phillips 1986, p.40). At best, it seems, the poems may 
succeed to mark the limits of our conceptions and our language about God. The poet-
priest, hence, may have   
 
nothing to leave  
But a few songs, cold as stones 
In the thin hands that asked for bread (Thomas 1993, p.84).  
 
In such a case the negative way is not a choice, but an insurmountable constraint, 
not only on the abilities of Thomas, or any other poet in particular, but on human 
conception and expression at large. Yet, in writing against this barrier, we may, perhaps, 
serve to render it a little more translucent, however monochrome our renditions of the 
divine; and even a glimpse through a ‘glass, darkly’, is better than the utter opacity of a 
surrendered effort to re-present God’s glory in language, image and metaphor.  
What artworks of Thomas’ kind may fail to reveal, or may hold back from 
presuming to reveal, may nevertheless be intimated in the way they point beyond 
themselves; in the longing these artworks kindle, the waiting on God they enjoin us to 
practice, and the wonders and verities they suggest beyond the frontiers of their language.      
  
R. S. Thomas perceives, and feels deeply, also the failure of others to generate creative 
and devotional responses to the silence that surrounds us. We may see this in “In 
Church”, where the church itself – which should be the crowning of our religious labours 
– not only falls short of being an icon of our heavenly home, but even fails to offer any 
earthly warmth and light, and so fails to kindle the energies and the inspiration requisite 
for our reaching towards God, in and beyond language: 
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These are the hard ribs 
Of a body that our prayers have failed 
To animate. 
[…] 
There is no other sound 
In the darkness but the sound of a man 
Breathing, testing his faith 
On emptiness, nailing his questions 
One by one to an untenanted cross (Thomas 1993, p.180).  
 
There is a wonderful negative iconicity in the invocation of the ‘untenanted’ 
cross; which may suggest an absent or indifferent, even a non-existent, God, but which 
may also speak in the starkest terms – indeed, by the very absence of a positive sign – of 
Christ’ victory over death. To our perpetual question – where is he? – the empty cross 
offers the inescapably ambiguous response: he is not here, he is no longer here.   
In the poem “Pietà”, the same or another untenanted cross is left as if forlorn, 
robbed of its prize, much as the mind confronting the image or scene is robbed of its 
questions – for the answer given, the answer glimpsed, of a love or compassion both 
stranger and stronger than death, is too vast for comprehension:  
 
The tall Cross, 
Sombre, untenanted, 
Aches for the Body 
That is back in the cradle 
Of a maid’s arms  
    (p.159).  
 
The cross in these poems may be seen to provide content of a Christian kind; but 
it is not the inclusion of the cross – of such a cross as these, which hold no glorified God 
up to our gaze, but rather confront us with a vacancy of sense – in the inventory of the 
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poems’ contents that make these poems Christian. If these are Christian artworks, they 
are so for the form the poetry builds around the cross, the form the cross assumes in the 
language, and for the kind of experience the poems invite. Thomas invites the reader into 
a properly Christian sphere of signs and significance, all centred on the love for and the 
love of the crucified God. The cross, even when unspoken and scarcely hinted at, is the 
centre of gravity and the fount of meaning in Thomas’s work; as such, perhaps, his work 
may be said to be cruciform.          
The ambivalence of the cross as a signifier is reflected in the tone of the poet, his 
almost impartial gaze, and the poems’ refusal to provide clear interpretations; I say 
‘almost’, for there are clues as to the tendency of Thomas’ thought and attitude. In 
“Pietà”, for example, the capitalised ‘Cross’ and ‘Body’ provide an emphasis, betray an 
attitude, which renders the scene an object, not of empathy or curiosity, but of reverence.    
In poems like these, language, form and metaphor bring us to the very 
borderlands of our concepts and preconceptions; and by their subtle but insistent 
challenge to our settled modes of thought and our standard models of sense, they may 
indeed manage to gesture to a new way, a new form, of apprehension and ‘making sense’ 
altogether – where the act of waiting, the suspension of conclusive explanations, both 
yields and constitutes the only kind of significance we may hope for.     
 
Another kind, another degree of apophaticism, is reached in such poems as “The Island”, 
where we read: 
 
 And God said, I will […]  
    cause this people to worship me,  
And afflict them with poverty and sickness 
In return for centuries of hard work 
And patience […] 
  
And their women shall bring forth 
On my altars, and I will choose the best  
Of them to be thrown back into the sea (Thomas 1993, p.222).   
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This is a poem which could only be read as a most savage rejection and ridiculing 
of God, if we did not know the poet who penned it, if we weren’t sensitive to his 
techniques; a poem which, like Ivan Karamazov’s allegory of the Grand Inquisitor, in 
fact constitutes an assault on false conceptions of God (whether the speaker understands 
this or not; in fact, the ignorance of the speaking voice in such cases may indeed be 
crucial to the work’s effect).  
We enter the territory here of what is sometimes termed a ‘purifying atheism,’ 
whereby such claims or images of God as may constitute a hindrance to right belief are 
disproved or deconstructed; often what is done away with are false presumptions of 
knowledge of God, in favour of an apophatic attitude of ignorance before the mysteries of 
the faith. If poems such as “The Island” may succeed in smashing an idol, this is as 
important as any right affirmation of God; in the hope that a recovery of right belief may 
grow among the ruins of our positivism and our propositions.  
The fierce satire of “The Island” is fuelled, not only by the righteous indignation 
of the speaker, but more importantly by the inspired fury of the poet-priest against the 
attempt (even of Christian apologists, not only deluded atheists) to justify a God who 
wills, not only tolerates, human suffering. The dialectic at work here is very similar to 
that in Dostoevsky’s treatment of the Grand Inquisitor. It is a risky method, in both cases, 
for the attack is so convincing that we may fall into thinking that the effigy being 
destroyed is in fact the real thing; the challenge is for us to see, and for the artist to enable 
us to see, why the apparent triumph of the iconoclast is not the triumph he thinks it is.  
The vulnerability of this approach – as well as its force – is nowhere better 
illustrated than in The Brothers Karamazov, in Dostoevsky’s response to the ideas 
presented by Ivan; where, instead of offering a systematic critique of Ivan’s vision, 
Dostoevsky lets Alyosha silently give his older brother a kiss. Dostoevsky has realised, as 
has Thomas, that the rejection of the false critique of God must entail a rejection not only 
of its premises and conclusions, but indeed of its very methods. There are layers of 
negation here, therefore; beneath which we may find the stark clarity wherein to ground 
our further labours of right perception, right praise and right belief.     
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So far does Thomas go in his rejection of any systematic justification of God’s 
ways to men, that Phillips can call this body of work “the graveyard of theodicies” 
(Phillips 1986, p.74). It is in the light of such an assessment, and in the light of such a 
crucial poetic contribution as Thomas’s truly is, that we must understand why ostensible 
Christian ‘content’ is not a necessary feature of Christian art.   
For such work to remain Christian, some other powers of perception and 
articulation must be at work; another approach to God, by a way of negation, in which 
God’s absence as content may be rendered a kind of presence as a form or gestalt quality 
– indeed, as the form or gestalt which constitutes the inverse or negative of the poems’ 
inability to speak positively of God, and of their unwillingness to provide positive 
justifications of his ways.    
These are poems, then, that also asks much of its reader’s willingness to walk 
such a path, which offers such scant encouragement and such meagre provisions for the 
journey. Thomas could say, with Eliot, that 
 
In order to arrive at what you do not know 
You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance. 
In order to possess what you do not possess 
You must go by the way of dispossession (Eliot 1944, p.17).   
 
This is to demand of the reader a real Christian experience, an engagement that 
requires belief in the very gift the poems are forced to withhold.          
 
We can see in the example of R. S. Thomas how the choice of poetic method has real 
implications for philosophical and theological thinking and speaking about God, as well 
as for aesthetic and religious experience.   
D. Z. Phillips seeks to show how Thomas’ poetry in fact builds a powerful 
rebuttal of the kind of theology and philosophy of religion which supposes a God of 
theodicy, by giving us instead a God who suffers. A key poem here is “The Coming”, 
where we may glimpse the significance of the cross from quite another perspective than 
in the previous poems quoted:  
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          On a bare  
Hill a bare tree saddened 
The sky. Many people 
Held out their thin arms 
To it, as though waiting 
For a vanished April 
To return to its crossed 
Boughs. The son watched 
Them. Let me go there, he said (Thomas 1993, p.234).  
 
We may see the cross here as from the very first a result of love, of the 
profoundest divine compassion for a suffering humanity in their desperate longing for 
deliverance.   
Phillips comments on this poem: “This coming of God is the emergence of a God 
very different in kind from the product of the theodicies” (Phillips 1986, p.81). According 
to Phillips, Thomas points to the flawed presuppositions of such thinking, which fashions 
a philosophers’ God of omni-attributes that the existence of evil cannot but throw into 
logical difficulties; thus, “what R. S. Thomas is showing us is that we should not accept 
the assumption [that God has] two attributes, omnipotence and love. On the contrary, the 
God that R. S. Thomas’ deepest poems reveal is a God whose only omnipotence is that of 
love” (p.81). Alyosha kissing Ivan may be understood in this same way.             
According to Phillips, Thomas is a poet who, “like Simone Weil, sees creation 
[…] in terms of a self-emptying love” (p.83), and we may understand faith in such a God 
as also demanding the same kenotic love of ourselves. In particular, it is in surrendering 
our claims to knowledge, in dying to expectations of closure and full disclosure, that we 
may become present to God, and the absent God may become present to us.    
The poems of R. S. Thomas seek, not only to guide us along such a via negativa, 
but to offer occasions for such intimations of presence; by giving examples and images of 
self-emptying, and by asking of us – in our acts of reading – that we suspend our cravings 
for convenient sense and our customary habits of rationalisation, and learn instead to wait 
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on grace. In such a way, these Christian artworks offer an experience which is 
indissolubly aesthetic and religious, and which may grant us an experience of God in and 
through the engagement with the artistic work.     
Indeed, we should see that also Thomas’ poems, as Christian artworks, seek to 
manifest the form and beauty of God, though their medium and manner of mediation is to 
reveal God’s light by, as it were, placing us in its shadow; as in “Alive”: 
 
The darkness 
is the deepening shadow 
of your presence; the silence a  
process in the metabolism 
of the being of love (Thomas 1993, p.296).  
   
Yet, every now and then, Thomas too allows the light to break forth, however 
briefly, from our cloud of unknowing, as in “The Bright Field”; where we may learn that 
 
  Life is not hurrying 
 
On to a receding future, nor hankering after 
An imagined past. It is the turning 
Aside like Moses to the miracle 
Of the lit bush, to a brightness 
That seemed as transitory as your youth 
Once, but is the eternity that awaits you (p.302).     
 
This poem in itself may be seen as such a light, in the dark landscape of Thomas’ 
poetry, and such an invitation to turn aside. Indeed, the real light of this poem may only 
be appreciated relative to the pieces which surround it, to the general tendency and 
temperament of Thomas’ work. What Thomas wants with his poems, so Phillips astutely 
argues, is to provide the conditions where “wonder and grace [may] come in at the right 
time [so that it becomes] possible to see all things as coming from God” (Phillips 1986, 
45 
 
p.127). The real experience of these poems is one that partakes of the patience, the 
endurance and waiting on God, that the poems themselves both practice and re-present; 
and thereby partakes of that breaking in of solace through the walls of language that the 
poems, at their best, accomplish.   
It is right, I believe, to call these poems – in their terseness, sparseness, and 
searing dedication to bare essentials – beautiful; and their beauty is absolutely integral to 
their success as Christian works. This is the real manifestation of God; and it is this 
beauty, not merely the experience rendered or re-presented ‘within’ the poems, which 
makes us accept the poems themselves as occasions for Christian experience, as objects 
of real significance and value.    
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1.2 FORM & LIFE       
 
Whatever the merits of Clive Bell’s formalist theory as concerns the strictly aesthetic 
qualities of an artwork, I am unable to condone its account of the artwork’s relation to the 
wider world in which it is situated; that is, sympathetic though I am to the notion of 
significant form, and fruitful as that concept is for Christian art, I must redress Bell’s 
unforgiving division between art and ‘life.’ Christian art shows us that what Bell calls life 
is merely formless living, to be overcome precisely in the achievement of lived form; and 
that the success and value of art is conditional upon the ability of its forms to transfigure 
lived experience.        
Such Christian artists as T. S. Eliot, William Blake and David Jones are 
united in their understanding of the practice of art, the creation of form, as both 
expressive of and indissolubly embedded in the religious pursuit of a valid form of life. 
Bell’s “first commandment of art – thou shalt create form” (Bell 1914, p.44) should also 
be the first commandment of Christian art, differently construed; for it is a basic 
assumption of Christianity that, as Rowan Williams notes in his reflections on David 
Jones, “a life may become a significant form – as, decisively and uniquely, in the life of 
Christ” (Williams 2010, p.89).    
 
 
1.2.1 Form in Context 
 
Clive Bell is quite right that art is not history; but neither is art mathematics, as he 
sometimes seems to think. For art is – Christian art most certainly is – culturally and 
institutionally embedded; inescapably implicated in human experience and in a collective 
history of forms and meanings. Bell’s neglect of experience leads him to underestimate 
that sphere of cultural relations within which, and only within which, the work is fully 
intelligible and meaningful.            
It is especially important for Christian art that ‘form’ is not understood in the 
narrow sense of formal properties pertaining only to the material of the artwork per se, 
but rather involves the apprehension and experience of the work’s intrinsic and relational 
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qualities; we may say that form is symbiotic with the artwork’s proper cultural habitat. 
We may endorse Lamarque’s point that, if we accept that “cultural objects have 
intentional and relational properties as part of their identity conditions, then we might 
say, albeit with a hint of paradox, that works are intrinsically intentional and relational” 
(Lamarque 2010, p.28).     
In the case of a musical work such as Rachmaninov’s All-Night Vigil, for 
example, the setting can indisputably make the experience of the music more intense, its 
power and significance more pronounced; ideally of course, the work would be 
experienced as part of the properly celebrated religious service, but also in the case of a 
straight performance of the work as an artistic piece, the setting of a church would almost 
invariably offer a fuller experience than the concert hall. When the Vigil is sung in full 
synergy with the architecture, the icons, the ‘choreography’ of ritual and the response of 
prayer, we may speak of a ‘total Christian artwork’ offering a Christian experience of 
tremendous depth and resonance.   
R. S. Thomas’ work is not an exception to this. Having seen the kind of 
experiences offered by his poems, it must be emphasised that the right conditions for 
such experiences are not only internal to the poems but is truly a matter of perceiving the 
poetry in the right context. In many of Thomas’ poems, certain small words, by no means 
specific to Christian discourse, evoke meanings not only great in scope but also decidedly 
Christian in character – for the reader attuned to Christian language and experience, and 
attuned to the tendencies of Thomas’ work as a whole. For example, we know who the 
‘He’ of such poems as “Migrants” is, not chiefly (if at all) by virtue of the poem’s 
internal pointers, but by the poem’s place in Thomas’ oeuvre; the significance of that 
‘He’, as of the poem at large, is in no small part conditioned by its context. “The 
Annunciation by Veneziano”, meanwhile, only really works – as art, and as Christian art 
– by reference to another, visual, work; in itself, the poem is so subtle, so fragile, saying 
little; but in its dialogue with the visual motif – in articulating what is not there in the 
scene as we see it – the poem is hauntingly poignant.       
Thus, as our discussion above should have illustrated, a real engagement with 
Thomas’ work entails an effort on the part of the reader which is not limited to close 
readings of the poems, but which is also appreciative of the context of their creation and, 
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moreover, attuned to the works’ theological and philosophical implications. Phillips 
makes the point, with Robert Matthias, that, since the poet is a priest in the Church in 
Wales, “To forget that would be to misunderstand […] the nature of the journey in verse” 
(Phillips 1986, p.51) which his oeuvre constitutes. Above all, the vital Christian 
contribution of this body of work only becomes apparent to a readership attentive to the 
Christian culture (of practices and concepts; of doing, making and meaning) in which the 
poems are embedded; indeed, more than being attentive to this context, the ideal reader is 
himself embedded in it, and so possesses lived experience of the kind of life the poems 
re-present.         
Bell claims that “To praise or abuse or be interested in a work of art because it 
leads or does not lead to another work of art is to treat it as though it were not a work of 
art” (Bell 1914, p.102). This is sound up to a point, for our attention to the artwork should 
be primarily directed at discerning its significant form; to assess it as a piece in a puzzle 
of provenance or biography is to consider aspects extrinsic to the art-nature and art-status 
of the work. It is far less accurate, however, to say that “The connection of one work of 
art with another may have everything to do with history: it has nothing to do with 
appreciation” (p.102); for connections between works can have something to do with 
appreciation, if one work is in close stylistic or thematic dialogue with another and thus 
demands our awareness of their points of intersection – for the sake, not only of mutual 
elucidation, but of a proper response to the significant form of the work in question.        
It is my position that crucial elements of an artwork remain obscure for one who 
does not possess the requisite frames of reference. This is not to say that the meaning of 
the work itself is to be found only externally to it, but that the internal qualities and 
significance of the work are yielded up only to a mind which is perceptually and 
conceptually prepared. Blake’s Milton does not ask of me to read the works of John 
Milton for the sake of establishing links of historical causality or influence, but for the 
sake of a fuller enjoyment of Blake’s initially difficult poem. Similarly, my familiarity 
with such works as Dante’s Divine Comedy and the Revelations of Julian of Norwich 
may serve to enhance my experience of the Four Quartets. Neither of these exercises in 
complementary reading implies a case for historical analysis against the formalist 
approach to art, but simply illustrate that a full and fruitful reading is also one that is 
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informed about the influences or inheritance of the work, and which is thus literate in the 
language used by the work in question.       
To clarify: it is not a matter of gaining knowledge of one work, so as to identify, 
with a pedant’s or scholar’s relish, the technical or thematic echoes in another, but 
entirely a matter of undergoing those experiences of relevant works of art which may 
prepare the heart as well as the eyes for the new aesthetic encounter. I can read all the 
commentaries there are on Milton’s epics, without getting any nearer to a proper 
understanding of Blake’s Milton – or even of Milton’s epics, for that matter. On the other 
hand, if I have read the works of the former as works of art in their own right, I am likely 
to discover – as I read Blake in his own right – that my alertness to even implicit 
allusions and inflections will make this a more rewarding and revealing aesthetic 
experience.   
 
William Hood (1993), in his wonderful study of Fra Angelico’s monastic frescoes, states 
what ought to be a commonplace as we approach any meaningful art: “an adequate 
interpretation of Fra Angelico’s formal or aesthetic decisions rests on a clear 
understanding of the messages that he intended his paintings to support” (p.263); I would 
also argue that, vice versa, an adequate grasp of the message or meaning also demands a 
keen attention to the aesthetic properties of the works in question.  
A rudimentary schooling, at least, in the rich sign-world of Christianity would 
seem to be a prerequisite for a recognition of what is significant about the aesthetic 
solutions employed, the associations invoked and, ultimately, the forms created by Fra 
Angelico or R. S. Thomas; and thus prerequisite, too, for a proper appreciation of this art 
on its own terms, as an art which indisputably guides the viewer to a Christian 
experience, to a vision of the Christian God.   
Similarly, the identity of Eliot’s interlocutor in the second section of “Little 
Gidding” is unmasked as Dante (though not solely Dante) only through the ‘clue’ – the 
homage, the emulation, the application – of Eliot’s adaptation of the terza rima form of 
the Divine Comedy; poetically, as indeed religiously, by this adoption of his master’s 
form, Eliot achieves an effect much more powerful than would the mere invocation of 
Dante’s name, or some more explicit paraphrase of his ideas.         
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For Christian art, the lesson is this: that an immersion in the wider aesthetic, 
figurative and conceptual life of the faith and culture of Christianity make us abundantly 
better prepared to embrace the experience offered by the work of art; which work will not 
only ask of us that we recognise certain implications or articulations, but which will ask 
of us that we are prepared to hold certain attitudes and beliefs as valid.    
Thus, when I stress that we do not encounter the work of Christian art in a cultural 
vacuum, this is not only to say that we may not appreciate the art-qualities of Christian 
art in such a vacuum, but that also the Christian nature of the experience is conditional 
upon the context of the engagement; for, as von Balthasar writes, the “form of Jesus 
Christ does not stand in isolation before the gaze of the believer. On the contrary: in an 
inextricable manner, Christ’s form is embedded into a context of truths [and] offers itself 
to view only within  these contexts, which for the eyes of faith are not separable from 
himself since they stand in a most intimate ontological connection with the form that is 
beheld” (von Balthasar 1982, p.198).   
We glean here that Jesus Christ, as the ultimate form towards which every 
Christian artwork points, is also the ultimate context of these artworks and the 
experiences they offer. The cultivation of a right responsiveness to the Christ-form is the 
prerogative of every Christian practice; the case of Christian art is not an exception, but is 
rather exemplary and instructive in this respect. The Christ-form, importantly, refers not 
only to Christ himself, but also what we may call his ‘cultural extension’; the 
ecclesiastical, liturgical, sacramental, and artistic forms which he himself instituted or 
which are established in his name for the perpetuation of his revelation.            
Importantly, the need for real familiarity with the Christian world – its internal 
language, its collectively lived experience – pertains both to the viewer of art and, 
perhaps to an even more crucial degree, to the maker of it. Fra Angelico’s only recorded 
saying has him asserting that “’Art demands great tranquillity, and to paint the things of 
Christ, the artist must live with Christ’” (Robertson 1947, p.21). This attitude is 
consistently enshrined in the practice of icon-painting; which, to this day, entails the 
observance of prayer, fast, communion and liturgy, as well as close compliance with the 
style and iconography of precedent works. In short, the icon-painter carries out his 
creative work within the institution of the Church; indeed, his creative work both 
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confirms his bonds to, and fruitfully contributes to the life and vitality of, that greater 
body. He, as any Christian artist, therefore hopes and asks for a viewer or reader who 
may share, in some form, his lived dedication to the form of Christ; as Blake writes at the 
very beginning of his masterpiece Jerusalem the Emanation of the Giant Albion, “I hope 
the Reader will be with me. wholly One in Jesus our Lord” (Blake 2000, p.300).  
This, then, is my message to Bell: We do not appreciate art in isolation any more 
than we create it in isolation. The Christian artist, importantly, does not only create his 
works within a set of cultural expectations, but also in the light of a religious vision of 
God – which it is the work’s responsibility to reflect. As the cases of R. S. Thomas, Fra 
Angelico and the painters of icons show us, the gravity of this task – as well as the joyful 
privilege of it – asks that the artist not only works but also lives in conformity to this 
vision. Moreover, for the Christian artist, the making and the living are not two distinct 
pursuits, but one (composite or unified) discipline: the creative life is the religious life.  
 
 
1.2.2 The Christian pursuit of form 
 
It is Bell’s conviction that “to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing 
from life, no knowledge of its ideas or affairs, no familiarity with its emotions” (Bell 
1914, p.25). This is manifestly false. While Bell is quite right that representation is not 
the point of art, he is perfectly wrong that life does not inform the experience of art and 
that this experience does not bear on life. In Bell’s account, as we appreciate or 
experience the significant form of a work of art, “For a moment we are shut off from 
human interests; our anticipations and memories are arrested; we are lifted above the 
stream of life” (p.25). While there is something intuitively true in this characterisation – 
for we all know those moments of epiphany, peace and inspiration – Bell misrepresents 
both the phenomenology and the implications of the experience. For our interests, our 
anticipations and memories – which Bell here admits we bring with us, even if he thinks 
we leave them at the very threshold of the art-experience – are not simply disbanded or 
dispelled, but rather distilled by this experience and returned to us in a different form.  
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That art moulds the stuff of experience – whether it elevates our perceptions or 
makes us descend into the underground – should be beyond dispute. It is Bell’s 
contention, however, that insofar as we allow this to happen, we have adulterated the 
experience, and so failed to partake of that rarefied atmosphere that belongs to the realm 
of purely ‘aesthetic emotion’. But art can make us feel more intensely and fully alive; this 
is why we value it so, why we seek it out for substance, solace and sustenance. This is not 
a concession to content, reference and sentiment, to a view of art as some kind of 
therapeutic ‘means’ for our emotional succour; for it is precisely my understanding that 
art may bring us the world anew – distilled, transformed, re-presented – through the 
‘ends’ of its significant forms.          
For life, properly understood, is form. This is a perennially and thoroughly 
Christian notion.  We mustn’t forget that the very Creation of the world entailed the 
creation of form – for before its completion as a place of life and beauty, and a suitable 
habitat for man, “the earth was without form, and void” (Genesis 1:2). David Jones 
speaks on several instances of a “will to form” as characterising human life (Jones 2008, 
p.104); he calls man a “form-maker,” seeing our creation of forms as absolutely integral 
to human nature (pp.86-87). Blake, too, consistently posits the creation of form as 
absolutely central, not only to divine and human labours of generation and regeneration, 
but also to a life lived in responsiveness to the divine vision and likeness. Thus   
 
Albion was slain upon his Mountains 
And in his Tent. thro envy of Living Form. even of the Divine Vision 
 
and thus Los 
 
laboured at his resolute Anvil 
among indefinite Druid Rocks & snows of doubt & reasoning. 
Refusing all Definite Form (Blake 2000, p.248), 
 
tirelessly resisting the powers of dissolution and perpetually  
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delivering Form out of confusion (p.355).     
       
With Los’ example in mind, and Blake’s own relentless labours to manifest the 
living form of Christ, we can aim the following words of von Balthasar’s, steeped in 
Christian experience, against Bell’s abstractions: “The recalcitrance and drudgery of 
everyday existence induce us to flee into a sphere of illusion where we think we are going 
to come face to face with the beautiful in distilled form. And yet we know that it is only 
the overcoming of workaday rigours and perseverance in them that will hew out the 
precious stone which has to emerge from the rough block of our existence” (von 
Balthasar 1982, p.239). This is a vindication of the labours of Christian artists, as well as 
Christian saints, through the centuries, whose arduous work witnesses to the 
manifestation of form and beauty in the midst of the conditions of human life.       
Let us say then that life is the perpetual – and perilous – effort at achieving form. 
Formlessness, on the contrary, is death and dissolution, a failing of love and discipline, 
and a falling away from the likeness of God. So, in a sense, art in giving us form gives 
life. Herein, above all, lies its value: not in the escape from life, but in the transfiguration 
of that disorder which so often passes for – and which Bell confuses with – life.  
 
The artist who does not work at all with the raw materials of life will not be a great artist, 
though he may become a great logician, mathematician or designer of satellites or space-
shuttles. It is indeed part of the poet’s task that he is attuned, not only to his own 
experience, but to the experience of the people among whom he lives. Not only the 
quality of his empathy, but also the potency of his imagination, depend upon his 
sensitivity towards his neighbours’ triumphs and travails. We see this at work in R. S. 
Thomas, in his unflinching – by no means always sympathetic – attention to Pryterch and 
his fellows.     
The case of T. S. Eliot is also illustrative, as Derek Traversi’s excellent study of 
the longer poems makes clear. “As always for Eliot,” Traversi writes, “the poet is not an 
original philosopher, or one whose business it is to argue the truth of any particular set of 
convictions: ‘It is not the poet’s job to think: his job is to express the greatest emotional 
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intensity of his time, based on whatever his time happened to think’” (Traversi 1976, 
pp.88-89).      
A poet who is not responsive to life around him can be said to be deficient in that 
responsibility that constitutes no small part of his vocation and his expectations. For life, 
no less than language, is shared, and as the poet will learn, borrow and steal from his 
contemporaries no less than his predecessors, so he is honour-bound to return to them the 
fruits of his labour, in some intelligible and meaningful form. Thus Traversi continues: 
“The criterion by which we, as readers of poetry, may judge his success in doing this is 
not one of reasoned assent or dissent to a set of propositions which may be said to emerge 
from the poem, but our feeling of his success – or lack of it – in moulding his emotional 
material into a shape, or form, which seem to fulfil our instinct for a satisfying, 
integrating ‘pattern’ of experience” (pp.88-89). Eliot achieves this in the Four Quartets. 
R. S. Thomas achieves this too; which is not to say that the pattern must be either easily 
discerned or easily followed. Indeed, the Christian pattern and form of life will demand a 
great deal of sacrifice from us.    
Bell may still be right to say that “in the spectator a tendency to seek, behind 
form, the emotions of life is a sign of defective sensibility always” (Bell 1914, p.28); but 
instead of prescribing a complete break with the emotions of life, for the sole attention to 
form, say instead that we should seek in art the emotions of life refashioned, rescued 
from the flotsam of contingency and cast in an eternal aspect, as seen in the light of their 
contribution to significant form. Say, too, that he who has no such baggage, no such 
schooling in despair and desire, will come to the work of art unprepared; that his 
‘aesthetic sensibility,’ if untutored in human history, will not reveal the artwork to him at 
all, but will leave him like a deaf man at a concert, to borrow Bell’s own metaphor.     
For the insensitive or uncultured spectator, Bell claims, “a work of art depends on 
what they bring to it; nothing new is added to their lives, only the old material is stirred” 
(p.29). What I want to say, of course, is that life is indeed made new in the work of art. 
This is a gift that will certainly elude those who cannot see past the accumulated 
prejudice and preoccupations of their own selves. But, and here is where I differ 
markedly from Bell, this gift will also be lost on those who do not allow art to address 
life at all, who could not fully appreciate the fact of renewal because they did not first 
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recognise the need for it, and for whom the experience of the artwork would not be 
allowed to cast its light and transformative influence beyond the closed circuit of the 
painted canvas and the perceiver’s prejudiced eyeballs. Art, for this kind of person, would 
not be granted its full capacity to replenish, reinvigorate and reorient a life at large. Some 
art, certainly, may not entertain such far-reaching ambitions, or possess such reserves of 
generosity, but Christian art certainly does, and I suspect that Bell’s beloved Cezanne and 
Matisse do as well.      
It seems foolish, frankly, to suggest that something like the Four Quartets does 
not both demand and reward lived familiarity with the themes that give flesh and blood to 
the poem. Similarly, he who sees in a Crucifixion only ‘form’ and not life (or death, for 
that matter), does not even see form but sees only shapes and shades which obscure the 
recognition of significance; unlike him who comes versed in the human (and Christian) 
story as well as with aesthetic sensibility (and ideally with some faith as well), who will 
experience life and form embodied in line and colour.           
What Bell fails to acknowledge is that form and life are not antonyms, but are 
rather given us to be perceived and inhabited as one. Ordinary life, so slighted by Bell, is 
not the sloppy and haphazard collision of disparate emotions and half-baked ideas alone, 
but is rather the attempt, strenuous as nothing else, of walking straight and speaking 
clearly, of sifting the wheat from the chaff, of seeing outline and savouring substance, 
setting stone to stone and building an inhabitable home – in short, of making and 
preserving significant forms.      
Thus, at the end of “East Coker”, we find the parallel drawn between the poet’s 
efforts at the creation of intelligible and meaningful structures, and the effort which 
characterises life itself. Indeed, the former seems embedded in the latter, while the latter 
may only become explicit and become conscious of itself in the former. In the words of 
Traversi, “The impulse to use words accurately reflects another, still more universal, to 
find form, significance and coherence in the material given by experience” (Traversi 
1976, p.147). It is not an easy business, as the poem makes clear:   
 
So here I am […] 
Trying to use words, and every attempt 
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Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure […] 
And so each venture 
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate 
With shabby equipment always deteriorating 
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling, 
Undisciplined squads of emotion (Eliot 1944, p.19).  
 
What is clear from Eliot’s example is that the tapestry of significant form which 
the poet seeks to articulate is inescapably implicated in, informed by, and perennially 
indebted to, the fabric of human experience and the struggle of the emotional life. By no 
means is the stuff of life discarded as irrelevant to the artistic project. Any attainment of a 
perception or embodiment of significance is reliant on this stuff as a fire is reliant on fuel. 
Indeed, the accomplishment of a poetic form, a pattern of word and image, is symbiotic 
or synergetic, if not synonymous, with the attainment of a lived pattern, in which the 
mass and the mess of daily life may be read and spoken of as meaningful. This pursuit, 
and this trust in the possibility of meaning, is decisively central to Christian art, but I 
suspect that it pervades all good art. I strongly distrust both the motives and the merits of 
any art which presumes to do without the attempt at, and the appeal to, the formation of 
meaning.     
 
The Christian critique of Bell should, I believe, be directed above all at his purely 
abstract concept of significant form; his failure, consequent upon his hostility towards 
‘life’, to see the human form divine (to borrow Blake’s phrase) as the fulfilment of form. 
It is precisely this fulfilment, I would argue, which motivates Christian art, which sees 
both the end and origin of form in the face of Christ. This is, of course, the same vision 
which motivates the Christian life.          
Bell’s abstraction is evident in his conception of significant form and the aesthetic 
experience as ‘timeless’, not in the sense of transfiguring the stuff of time, of casting this 
and holding it up in an eternal aspect, but in the sense of having nothing whatever to do 
with either a particular present or the general passing of time. This is in grave contrast to 
the Christian artist, committed to all the implications of the Incarnation. In the words of 
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David Jones, “It is axiomatic that the function of the artist is to make things sub specie 
aeternitatis […] True, but the works of man, unless they are of ‘now’ and ‘this place,’ can 
have no ‘for ever’” (Jones 1959, p.120). This is entirely in line with Eliot’s view of 
poetry as presented in Four Quartets and other writings; for  
 
Words move, music moves 
Only in time (Eliot 1944, p.8)   
 
and 
 
Only through time is time conquered (p.6).   
   
This Christian stress on life as inescapably and essentially lived in time (in order, 
ultimately, to redeem or ‘conquer time’) is in danger of being omitted altogether from 
Bell, whose vision risks being simply escapist rather than redemptive. Hence, perhaps, 
his mistaken parallels between Christianity and Buddhism. For the Christian, time is 
essentially – and not simply malevolently – our arena of spiritual activity. This relates, of 
course, to St John Damascene’s (1898) understanding of iconic art as the fruitful use of 
matter; his defence of visual re-presentation entails a powerful defence of matter as 
potentially graced and spirit-bearing, the stuff not only of our created bodies but also of 
our regenerative and sacramental making.      
While Christian art certainly proclaims a kingdom not of this world, this by no 
means precludes that it awakens and works with feelings particular to the time and space 
in which it finds itself; indeed, anything else would be both impossible and contrary to 
purpose, for in order to grant the viewer access to that other kingdom, the road and the 
door must be first established in this world. As Blake knew full well, the return of 
Jerusalem to Albion’s shores may only be inaugurated through our unfailing care to the 
minute particulars of this world. Eliot, similarly, knew that the emotions suffered in a 
provincial village, be it Burnt Norton or any other, do matter for the attainment of the 
Heavenly City. Eliot’s experience in the Four Quartets provides a conclusive case 
against Bell, culminating as it does in the combined understanding, both 
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phenomenological and ontological in import, that “History is now and England”  while 
“All manner of thing shall be well [when] the fire and the rose are one” (Eliot 1979, 
p.43).          
Bell’s claim that, “Art and religion are, then, two roads by which men escape 
from circumstance to ecstasy” (Bell 1914, p.92) implies that each road is of itself 
sufficient, and that a person who chooses the one could do well without the other. This is 
not the Christian experience, where the two roads – more like two tributary rivers – 
ceaselessly feed each other; and where the attainment of ecstasy, or of sustained 
joyfulness in love, owes gratitude to both forces, to their mutual enrichment and 
inspiration. This attitude of art’s essential contribution to the religious life also informs 
Pavel Florensky’s bold claim that “The artery of iconpainting sustains the whole 
ecclesiastical body” (Florensky 1996, p.90). Christian art and Christian religion are not, 
as Bell would have it, distinct and self-sufficient expressions of the same ‘spirit’; nor do 
their pursuits of form indicate hostility to life, but rather constitute the concerted effort at 
giving form to, thereby transforming and spiritualizing, the materials of life.             
These so-called materials of life, as we have seen, are not held in any high esteem 
by Bell. Crucially, Bell’s contemplative understanding of religion ignores the 
consecration of matter that is so absolutely intrinsic to a sacramental religion – and 
Christianity is the sacramental religion par excellence, as explored by David Jones in The 
Anathemata. Now, being a sacramental religion, as we will see Jones argue in a later part 
of this thesis, entails being a form-making religion. Insofar as Christianity is indeed a 
religion of ecstasy – though Christos Yannaras, not Bell, provide the right Christian 
understanding of this term5 – this ecstasy not only draws upon, but also directs itself at, 
the making of forms, whether these be creations of arts and crafts, the formulations of 
liturgy and dogma, or the cultivation of charity. Yes, the life and ‘occupation of the 
saint,’ as Eliot puts it, no less than that of the artist, is an exercise in and accomplishment 
of significant form. This is how the bond between art and religion, and between the artist 
and the religious, should be understood, and not, as in Bell’s account, by positing a desire 
to escape the world.       
                                                 
5 Person and Eros, 2007.   
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It is Bell’s notion that “Art transports us from the world of man’s activity to a 
world of aesthetic exaltation” (Bell 1914, p.25). There is something pseudo-religious 
about this, and also something naively false. The first thing to say is that art is activity. 
The second is to stress that religion, too, is activity; not simply meditation and epiphany, 
but ceaseless spiritual labour.     
In Eliot, the interlacing and mutual fruition of the life of the artist and the 
religious life is extensively explored and affirmed. As Traversi comments, “The 
exploration” of ‘the hints and guesses’, the intuitions and intimations of an extra-
temporal order of meaning and beauty, “in the process of artistic creation represents for 
the majority of human beings immersed in and conditioned by the temporal process the 
limit of spiritual possibility” (Traversi 1976, p.179). Only very occasionally, if at all, are 
we granted real experiences of what Eliot calls “the intersection of the timeless with 
time”; the rest, Eliot writes, “Is prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action” in the 
light of, and for the sake of, that “hint half-guessed” and that “gift half-understood” 
which is “Incarnation” (Eliot 1944, p.30).    
Here, then, I see Eliot affirming my claim that the search for ‘significant form’ 
not only involves art and the artist in human life, but that the same search indeed 
constitutes life as understood religiously; for ‘life’ lived without any reference to what 
Eliot calls ‘the timeless’ would not be much of a life at all.       
 
We may perhaps understand now this startling dictum of Blake’s:  
 
Prayer is the Study of art  
Praise is the Practice of art (Blake 2000, p.403).  
  
Blake, importantly, is not alone in making such claims; we recall the example of 
Fra Angelico. St John Damascene, similarly, in his defence of holy images, calls upon the 
Christian to express his faith through such re-presentations of moments from the life of 
Christ: “Give to it all the endurance of engraving and colour,” he urges, and he adds 
encouragement and reassurance by writing, “Have no fear or anxiety; worship is not all 
of the same kind” (Damascene 1898, p.9). Thus creative labour and expression are 
60 
 
strongly encouraged by this great theologian, not as a pastime, but as a form of worship 
integral to the Christian life.       
Perhaps no one has been such a strong formalist as William Blake, but he was a 
‘spiritual formalist,’ for whom aesthetic outline was spiritual form and form was spirit 
embodied, and for whom the perfection of art was implicated in the redemption of man, 
in the attainment of a transfiguring union of the material and the divine. Importantly, 
Blake also held that “Art can never exist without Naked Beauty displayed” (Blake 2000, 
p.403), by which Beauty he meant precisely the true spiritual form of man, perfected in 
Christ. To Blake, the artist cannot be an atheist any more than the saint can be an atheist; 
life lived for the expression of significant form is life lived for Christ, and vice versa. 
Crucially, it was Blake’s conviction – as I think it is the aim and hope of every Christian 
artist – that the forms of Christian art may really manifest the form and beauty of Christ.  
With this ambition, then, we move into the question of the ontological aspirations 
and implications of Christian art.        
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1.3 FORM & REALITY  
 
It is Clive Bell’s bold ‘metaphysical thesis’ that the significant forms of art are significant 
because they reveal or connect with what he calls the Real. He holds “that what the artist 
surprises behind form, or seizes by sheer force of imagination, is the all-pervading 
rhythm that informs all things” (Bell 1914, p.57). This suggestion is an attractive one, and 
congenial to a philosophy of Christian art; I can embrace the gist of Bell’s understanding, 
for Christian art indeed has the aspiration of showing what is real and true.  
Bell, however, is very vague about what this ultimate reality is, though he flirts 
with both Platonic and theological ideas; we must be more precise and emphatic than Bell 
is. For Christianity the Real must be identified with God. If, as Bell argues, significant 
forms disclose the real, then the significant forms of Christian art should be taken as 
disclosing the real as understood by Christianity; that is, to manifest that which is of God: 
the patterns and energies of his creation, the forms and beauty of his revelation. Thus, in 
icons and other Christian art, in the words of St John Damascene (1898), “the invisible 
things of God since the creation of the world are made visible through images” (p.11).      
The claim is that art shows us what is, not simply what was or even what could 
be. Recalling David Jones’ painter, we can see his painting as an original and unique 
expression of mountain-ness; which is something like saying that a kind act is not simply 
the representation or imitation of a previous kind act, but that it does indeed possess and 
manifest real kind-ness, or like insisting that the bread and the wine of the Eucharist are 
not simply tokens of remembrance but indeed the real body and blood of Christ.     
While a fuller exploration of the ontological dimensions of Christian art will be 
given in chapter 4, my concern here is chiefly to establish that Christian art harbours the 
ambition to communicate and make present the real, understood as that which is of God, 
and to say something of how this ambition may be realised. I will argue, against Leo 
Tolstoy, that Christian art – as art in general – is not a matter of the communication of 
emotions, but indeed of the real; and I will seek to show how the significant form, as well 
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as the thing-ness, of the Christian artwork can be seen to manifest the presence of the 
divine realities.6   
 
 
1.3.1 Communicating the real  
 
Leo Tolstoy, in What is Art?, champions an understanding of art as governed by the 
communication of good emotions, understood in a utilitarian way. Though Tolstoy 
pursues his account under his own conception of what constitutes a Christian life and 
Christian art, his understanding of art – as indeed of Christianity – is fundamentally at 
odds with the vision of this thesis.     
Tolstoy (1995) argues that “In order to define art precisely, one must first of all 
cease looking at it as a means of pleasure and consider it as one of the conditions of 
human life. Considering art in this way, we cannot fail to see that art is a means of 
communication among people” (p.37). A problem of this approach is that Tolstoy still 
perceives art as a means; but if art is a ‘means’ of communication, in what respects may it 
be said to be an end? Granting that art does communicate, it is vital to emphasise that 
every artwork is primarily an end and realisation, as a significant form and a thing in 
itself, offering a unique experience not accessible by other means.         
Moreover, we should ask what it is we communicate by the particular means of 
art that can’t be communicated by other means, such as letters, if not, ultimately, our 
experience of form and beauty? Tolstoy’s view, that art communicates ‘emotion’, is not 
satisfactory. In this respect I think Bell is much closer to the mark. For art should be the 
end of an experience that demands artistic realisation, because only the ‘means’ of 
significant form can adequately manifest a way of experiencing, a way of seeing, which 
has significant form itself – and beauty itself – as its object. Through art, then, we seek to 
express or communicate our experience of a reality which discloses itself though form 
                                                 
6 Though beauty is properly the topic of our next chapter, I will note here that the criterion of beauty is vital 
for the Christian artwork’s ontological ambitions; for, as the next chapter shall argue, beauty is real (not 
‘subjective’) and the beautiful artwork really gives us the beauty of God.  
63 
 
and beauty; to communicate both what this reality is like, and what it is like to encounter 
or apprehend it. This is not what Tolstoy means by emotion.     
Tolstoy is better at recognising the mutual and communal aspect of art than he is 
at understanding the nature, implication or purpose of this experience. For Bell, as well as 
Blake, Eliot, Jones and others, can agree with Tolstoy that “Every work of art results in 
the one who receives it entering into a certain kind of communion with the one who 
produced or is producing the art, and with all those who, simultaneously with him, before 
him, or after him, have received or will receive the same artistic impression” (Tolstoy 
1995, p.38).  
What we would have to say, however, is that what is shared is a relation, not only 
to the artwork, but to the real: we come to stand in the same attitude towards the real, in 
experiencing the same significant forms and the same beauty. We are not simply joined 
together in fellow feeling, in some kind of cosy inter-subjectivity, but find ourselves 
confronted with the same objective qualities. If Tolstoy construes the art-experience very 
much as a telling of fables in a circle around the campfire, I would rather suggest that it is 
a matter of standing, shoulder to shoulder, looking at the constellations in the sky.  
It is vital, as we discuss Christian art, to see that the visions that are captured in 
line and colour, in image, metaphor or melody, while they are personally experienced by 
the artist, are neither self-derived nor self-circumscribed, but ultimately communal in 
character. Though much Christian art is intensely personal – and though, as Yannaras 
(2007) argues, only personal relations may disclose the personal truths of the world and 
of God – the aim and interest of the artwork is not the experience of the artist, but that 
reality which he or she is a witness, and of which we readers and viewers are invited to 
partake.   
Far from suggesting a radical difference from ‘secular’ artistic experience, 
however, this should rather serve to alert us to the fact that all art is conducted, not only 
within an institution, but also as part of a community and a lineage – in short, a tradition, 
both as regards the acquisition of skill and the articulation of meaning. As Florensky 
explains, the true artist “wants not his own (at any cost) truth but rather the objectively 
beautiful and artistically incarnate truth of things – and he cares nothing at all about 
pride’s mean-spirited question whether he is the first or the hundredth to speak this truth. 
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If the work is true, then is establishes its own value” (Florensky 1996, pp.79-80). This 
stress on art’s ambition and ability to disclose ‘the truth of things’ is of great importance, 
declaring as it does that the significance of art – certainly of Christian art – is not limited 
to the ‘aesthetic’ alone, but also involves what we may call the metaphysical or 
ontological.       
No one reading the Divine Comedy would for a moment imagine that the 
meanings of that work are exhausted in what the person of Dante may say to the person 
of the reader; or that what is expressed in the work is simply a matter of subjective 
experience, on the one hand, and subjective interpretation or reception on the other. 
Rather, a work of that calibre seems to ask – to compel, with imperative authority – that 
we recognise the objective value of the forms there encountered; before which reality, 
and of which plenitude of meanings, the persons of reader and writer alike are partial 
partakers at best.   
Another invaluably testimony to this ambition is the work of St Ephrem the 
Syrian. Ephrem, in the 4th century, employed the medium of poetry – a poetry of symbol 
and paradox – to discern and disclose the truths of God’s relation to man; as in this 
example he evokes God’s self-emptying love in the Incarnation: 
 
Your mother is a cause for wonder: the Lord entered her 
and became a servant; He who is the Word entered  
– and became silent within her; thunder entered her  
– and made no sound; there entered the Shepherd of all, 
and in her He became the Lamb, bleating as He came forth 
    (Brock 1985, p.25).  
 
This is theology inseparable from poetry; and all subsequent Christian art, in 
some manner and in some measure, harbour the same hopes of theological elucidation 
and the communication of divine realities.     
Thus Dante, through his art, aspires to manifest – by grace, no less than craft – the 
true forms of God’s design that he has witnessed and experienced; to reveal that “order 
[which] is the form that makes the universe like God” (Dante 1995, p.382). This is a 
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daunting task, to be sure, and Dante often voices his own fears that he will fail; in the 
knowledge that the religious and the aesthetic failure would be one and the same. Blake, 
meanwhile, expresses his ambition, as a Christian artist, like this: 
 
I rest not from my great task; 
To Open the Eternal Worlds. to open the immortal Eyes 
Of Man inwards […] into Eternity 
Ever expanding in the Bosom of God (Blake 2000, p.302).    
 
Tolstoy is hardly attuned to the aims of Christian art, then, when he insists that 
“Art is not, as the metaphysicians say, the manifestation of some mysterious idea, beauty, 
God” (Tolstoy 1995, p.40). Christian art, certainly, has this ambition of ontological 
disclosure; and thus seeks, for example, not simply to convey a feeling for the Mother of 
God, but to reveal what she is really like, and her likeness to God; and to do this by 
means of really manifesting the significant form and beauty of her person.        
Interestingly, Tolstoy identifies as “the chief feature of every true work of art – 
wholeness, organicness, when the least change in form disturbs the meaning of the entire 
work” (p.102) – what we might call, with Maritain, ‘integrity,’ and which comes close 
indeed to what Bell means by significant form. The difference, just to reiterate, is that 
Tolstoy takes this formal wholeness to constitute the (means of) emotional expression of 
the artist, whereas I – with Bell – see it rather as the aesthetic manifestation (the 
imaginative apprehension and creative re-presentation) of a spiritual reality. We do not 
only ask for ‘real emotions’, but ‘emotions’ – visions and experiences – of the real.   
It was the preoccupation of R. S. Thomas too to “’have conversations or linguistic 
confrontations with ultimate reality’” (Phillips 1986, p.xv). The challenge of Thomas, 
and others with him – Eliot, certainly, is eloquent about the limitations of language – is to 
speak of and speak with a God whose     
    
resistance 
is endless at the frontier of the great poem (Thomas 1993, p.291). 
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We understand this from the discussion above, in the poems’ ambition to lead us 
to the very threshold of conceptual thought, there to encounter God in the absence of our 
justifications. Yet in making this resistance felt, in bringing it to bear on our perceptions 
and articulations, this resistance becomes a form of presence, and we thus encounter God 
as resistance; but also, at times, as generosity, gratuity, grace, when he lowers his guard 
and lets his defences down to meet us in peace – in, between, and through the words we 
offer. Crucially, we also encounter God in the beauty of the poems.    
It is the ambition of R. S. Thomas to reveal a hidden God, a deus absconditus, not 
only beyond but “in the language we use” (Phillips, p.127). Thus Thomas, in his way – as 
David Jones in his way – seeks to make anathemata of the language he uses; to do with 
word and metaphor what, for example, John Tavener does with music, Andrei Tarkovsky 
does with film, and what František Bilek does with wood or metal; namely, to make the 
world over to God, and to render God present under the forms of our making.     
Blake voices a similar sense of the challenge involved in speaking of and for God, 
when language itself as well as the artist’s weakness are the obstacles; but he also 
expresses his faith that such communication is indeed possible, with divine sanction and 
assistance. His words, then, may speak for many Christian artists:   
 
O how can I with my gross tongue that cleaveth the dust. 
Tell of the Four-fold Man. in starry numbers fitly orderd 
Or how can I with my cold hand of clay! But thou. O Lord 
Do with me as thou wilt! for I am nothing, and vanity: 
If thou chuse to elect a worm, it shall remove the mountains (Blake 2000, p.266).  
 
 
1.3.2 Form and presence 
 
Bell makes the move from the aesthetic to the metaphysical realm by claiming that to see 
a thing or an artwork as “an end in itself” is to see the “thing in itself; ultimate reality” 
(Bell 1914, pp.52-54). Indeed, to express (his apprehension of) reality is the very task of 
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the artist, and “this emotion can be expressed only in pure form” (p.54); as Eliot testifies 
in “Burnt Norton”,    
  
Only by the form, the pattern, 
Can words or music reach 
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still 
Moves perpetually in its stillness. 
Not the stillness of the violin, while the note lasts, 
Not that only, but the co-existence, 
Or say that the end precedes the beginning, 
And the end and the beginning were always there 
Before the beginning and after the end (Eliot 1944, p.8).  
 
Through the manipulation – what amounts to transfiguration – of matter and of 
time, art may manifest the spiritual and the eternal; this is the clear aim of Christian art, 
and it is the reward both of beauty and significant form.   
We do not need to subscribe to Bell’s curious amalgamation of Plato and Kant, to 
appreciate the tendency of his thought; on the contrary, we can adopt it, for Christian art, 
to say that to see its uniqueness and integrity is to see each thing as God gives it. This 
was the position of Gerard Manley Hopkins, as he sought to justify the religious validity 
of the aesthetic attitude and the practice of art; and a similar understanding is manifest in 
Blake’s famous lines,    
 
To see a World in a Grain of Sand  
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,  
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand  
And Eternity in an hour (Blake 1974, p150).  
 
These intuitions certainly have much in common with Bell’s thesis, for he 
rhapsodises as follows, claiming that as we perceive or experience the pure form of a 
thing, “we become aware of its essential reality, of the God in everything, of the universal 
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in the particular […] the ultimate reality” (Bell 1914, pp.69-70). This claim, I think, is 
only as bold as it is right, and it is supported by Christian art.     
Gerard Manley Hopkins, the poet and Jesuit, coined the term ‘inscape’ to speak of 
the form of things, whether of artifice or nature, as these appear within the intentional and 
gratuitous fabric of God’s world. He said of his own poetic efforts that, “as air, melody, is 
what strikes me most of all in music and design in painting, so design, pattern or what I 
am in the habit of calling ‘inscape’ is what I above all aim at in poetry” (Hopkins 1961, 
p.xxii). What we discover here is a belief in the artwork’s ability to communicate the 
real; not only by re-presenting the particulars, the things and forms of the world, but by 
constituting such a particular, such a thing and such a form itself.  
Martin Heidegger (1978) reasons similarly when, for example, in The Origin of 
the work of Art, he claims that “Van Gogh’s painting is the disclosure of what the 
equipment, the pair of shoes, is in truth” (p.102). Crucially, Heidegger is as emphatically 
dismissive of representational or imitation-theories of art as are Clive Bell and David 
Jones; thus: “is it our opinion that this painting by Van Gogh depicts a pair of peasant 
shoes somewhere at hand, and is a work of art because it does so successfully? […] By 
no means” (p.103). It is rather as a unique thing in itself that the artwork may open onto 
truth – as indeed onto Being – and not by being the impression of something else. Here, 
albeit in his own singular idiom, Heidegger may be seen to pursue a way of thinking 
closely akin to the Christian artists here under discussion.   
Returning to the example of Hopkins, then; as James Reeves (1961) explains, by 
‘inscape’ “Hopkins meant simply the outer form of all things, animate and inanimate, as 
it expressed their inner soul […] Perhaps by ‘inscape’ he meant much as the same as 
Roger Fry meant by the once fashionable term ‘significant form’; the difference being 
that Fry never made it clear what his idea of form was significant of; Hopkins had no 
such doubt – he was confident that the form or inscape was significant of God’s presence 
in all things” (p.xxii-xxiii).7    
                                                 
7 Bell, perhaps unlike Fry, did at least try to make it clear what his idea of form was significant of – 
namely, the Real; nonetheless, Hopkins’ inscape provides just the contribution or corrective Bell’s 
metaphysical thesis that a philosophy of Christian art needs, for it situates the artwork both phenomenally 
and ontologically in a world that, when rightly perceived, speaks of the presence of God in all things. We 
can therefore argue that ‘significant form’ is significant because it can be a revelation of God’s will and 
image. This is to reaffirm the thesis that the Christian artwork aspires to likeness to God.   
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We find further theological corroboration of these or similar intuitions in the work 
of Christos Yannaras, a thinker deeply indebted to (though not uncritical of) Heidegger’s 
work. “In our personal relation to the world,” writes Yannaras, informed by the energies-
essence distinction of Orthodox theology, “beings as ‘things’ reveal the existence of a 
personal God” (Yannaras 2007, p.68). Interestingly, such an understanding can reveal the 
links between such apparently different poetical and theological temperaments as 
Hopkins’ and R. S. Thomas’, while also elucidating the theological import of the thing-
ness of the work of art, which is so vital also for David Jones. Yannaras uses the example 
of art to explain the manifestation of God’s energies through the particulars of this world. 
A painting by van Gogh, he writes, “is a thing, a pragma, a personal act. It testifies to the 
person of van Gogh. It is van Gogh […] But although the presence of ‘things’ witnesses 
to the person, it does not interpret the person except as absence” (pp. 36-37).     
We may perhaps approach the poems of R. S. Thomas again in this light; to see 
how his evocations of God’s absence are integrated into the hope of still rendering God a 
presence in the poems, in the forms that constitute the poem as a ‘thing’. Thus “Tidal” 
and “Migrants”, from Mass for Hard Times, are two ‘negative icons’ using the very 
language of absence, negation and withdrawal, offering no positive content or 
proclamation; yet in giving voice to the aspiration, the yearning and faith of the speakers 
– and in the implicit affirmation of the objective reality of that towards which the poem’s 
form and meaning tends – they do ultimately offer a testimony to the sense, the more than 
possibility, of divine presence. Thus we read in “Tidal”: 
 
The waves run up the shore 
and fall back. I run  
up the approaches of God 
and fall back […] 
Let despair be known 
as my ebb-tide; but let prayer 
have its springs, too, brimming, 
disarming him (Thomas 1992, p. 43).  
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We may say with Yannaras that “The absence is always experience of the 
privation of a personal immediacy, which presupposes the reality or the possibility of the 
relation” (Yannaras 2007, p.68). Thus in “Migrants”:  
 
He is that great void 
we must enter […] 
What matter 
if we should never arrive  
to breed or to winter 
in the climate of our conception?  
 
Enough we have been given wings 
and a needle in the mind 
to respond to his bleak North. 
There are times even at the Pole 
when he, too, pauses in his withdrawal (Thomas 1992, p.80).        
  
The hope of the apophatic seeker after God, like Eliot or R. S. Thomas, is also 
that articulated by Blake in Jerusalem, where Jerusalem, who has come to feel herself “an 
outcast from the Divine Presence” (Blake 2000, p.375), finds herself addressed directly 
by Jesus:   
tho thou seest me not a season 
Even a long season & a hard journey & a howling wilderness […] 
Only believe & trust in me. Lo. I am always with thee (p.359).   
 
Further to these ideas of presence, David Jones’ pronouncements on 
representation and reality are of great importance. We shall look more closely at his 
sacramental understanding of art in a later chapter, but it’s important to note already here 
that Jones suggests that the activities and the signs instigated at the Last Supper and in the 
Upper Room at Emmaus “envisaged an abstract art par excellence; for nothing could be 
less ‘representational’ or more re-presentative or further from ‘realism’ or more near 
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reality [for here] sign and thing signified are regarded as having a true identity” (Jones 
2008, p.170). Here, then, we find yet another affirmation of the understanding of form as 
presence, and can see here the theological foundations of an understanding of art as 
essentially implicated in the communication, and the making present, of divine realities.      
We may understand Jones’ position as holding that a sign is not merely a sign, or 
symbol merely symbol, but that these things are laden with substance, instantiate and 
make present the thing symbolised. This is an understanding deeply enshrined in the 
theology of icons, and may be seen as pervading all Christian art.      
It is a vital aspect of the philosophy of icons that the painted image not simply 
represents but rather re-presents the particular saint; that the line and colour, the form and 
beauty of the image makes the saint really present to the perceiver. This at first startling 
claim not only underlies the reverence paid to icons, but indeed arises from the practice 
of greeting, kissing, thanking and turning to these images in the course of liturgy and 
prayer. This is not to say that the wood, paint and gold ‘become’ the saint, but is more 
like saying, with analogical and metaphorical licence, that these materials and mediums 
are rendered transparent, like a window, to the real form of the person there figured. Just 
as David Jones can say that the painted image is mountain, so Pavel Florensky wants to 
say that the painted saint is the saint. To Florensky, “icon-painting is the metaphysics of 
existence – but a concrete, not an abstract, metaphysics [because] the icon makes visually 
manifest the metaphysical essence of the event or the person it depicts” (Florensky 1996, 
p.113). In this way, for example, in John Tavener’s “Icon of Light” we are invited to 
experience the music itself as the divine light under the form of sound; just as, in the 
“Protecting Veil”, we are to experience the protecting veil of the Mother of God in and 
through the music.  
Heidegger, again, on like ontological grounds, thinks towards very similar 
affirmations; as when here – in The Origin of the Work of Art – meditating on the 
meaning of a Greek votive statue: “It is not a portrait whose purpose is to make it easier 
to realize how the god looks; rather, it is a work that lets the god himself be present and 
thus is the god himself” (Heidegger 1978, p.107).          
Florensky, in his way, expresses with great consistency the understanding that 
reality is (more than expressed in) appearance, as life is (more than expressed in) form. 
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For him, this truth is best exemplified by what he calls the iconic face; for reality is not 
only appearance, but rather countenance – meaning an appearance which communicates 
personality, life and light – as opposed to the mere mask of unreality, which prevents 
appearance” (p.155) and consequently also obscures the disclosure and obstructs the 
presence of the real.       
It is Florensky’s position that “the countenance of a thing manifests its ontological 
reality” (p.51). We may see this as taking seriously the implications of some of our most 
fondly held intuitions, such as the eyes being the windows to the soul, or that the face of a 
person is where his personality resides and where it is truly presented to the world.8 Of 
course, Florensky’s understanding of countenance is also derived from the Biblical 
concepts of image and likeness, which also underpin the tradition of icons. This 
understanding of image and likeness is, I would maintain, not only the fundamental belief 
of Christianity, but also the essential principle of Christian art.   
We are created in the image of God in order that we may attain to his likeness. As 
Florensky relates, “the image of God must be understood as the ontologically actual gift 
of God, as the spiritual ground of each created person; whereas the likeness of God must 
be understood as the potentiality to attain spiritual perfection […] to incarnate in the flesh 
of our personality the hidden inheritance of our sacred likeness to God: and to reveal this 
incarnation in our face” (p.51). This is the vocation and ultimate hope of our form-
making lives; it is also the immediate task of the icon-painter, who seeks to render in line 
and colour the spiritual form of the figured saint, that his likeness to God may be 
manifest in his body and shine forth in his true or transfigured face. Florensky describes 
the culmination of this process – as it is testified to in the art of icon-painting – as 
follows, suggesting that everything inessential or accidental to our face “is swept away by 
an energy like a strong fountain of water breaking through a thick material husk, the 
energy of the image of God: and our face becomes a countenance” (p.51). The line of 
reasoning followed by Florensky can, I think, feed into our own.           
Thus, adding Florensky’s contribution to the previous discussion, we can say that 
the significant form of a thing is its countenance, the open face in which its reality is 
                                                 
8 In a somewhat more soberly Anglo-Saxon manner, Roger Scruton also takes such notions seriously in The 
Face of God.        
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manifested. Importantly, for Florensky, the reality unveiled or manifested by the 
countenance of a thing is not only always spiritual but is, moreover, always beautiful.  
This combined formulation – of significant form as countenance – has the benefit, 
I feel, of granting an essential quality of personality to the notion of significant form, 
something which well accords with the ambitions of Christian art. If Clive Bell’s notion 
of the real may seem somewhat abstract and impersonal, the practitioner and philosopher 
of Christian art must redress this deficiency by stressing that all significant forms, in 
disclosing the real, are also revelatory of a personal power and presence.     
 
It is important that we stress that there is a particular vision of God and his world which 
gives rise to the particular practice and vision of Christian art. The history of icons and 
the iconoclast controversy should be sufficient proof of this; as the theological conflict is 
resolved at the 7th Ecumenical Council, we find theology stipulating, not only that a 
vision of the face of God may be re-presented in line and colour, but that matter itself 
may be transfigured so as to partake of the likeness of God. God is not represented, but 
revealed, not pointed to, but made present; this was the bold proclamation of the 
iconodules, and this is the lasting experience of the Christian imagination. When Bell 
dismisses the entire controversy with the claim that, “The history of that hundred years’ 
war […] does not concern us” (Bell 1914, p.134), this shows his insensitivity towards the 
theological import and grounding of Christian art.     
We should see, instead, how the whole Byzantine project (and Bell happens to be 
a great fan of the Byzantine visual imagination) seeks to render the world a witness to 
Christ – not simply by painting pictures of what Jesus may have looked like, but by 
making the very fabric of the material world conform to the figures, patterns and forms 
that reveal the presence and power of the Logos and Lord and of the Trinity. Christian art 
is thus entirely complicit in this vision and revision of the world – an active agent, and 
not a coincidental by-product, of what David Bentley Hart would call the ‘Christian 
revolution’ – which through socio-cultural and philosophical upheavals has taught us to 
see the material world as an object of love and a revelation of divine form. Ultimately, 
this is the only understanding of the real that Christian art, as Christian theology, 
proclaims and discloses.        
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CHAPTER 2: THE BEAUTY OF CHRISTIAN ART  
       
This account of beauty is intended to build on the account of form just given; to 
complement and take further the understanding of Christian art as engaged in the 
revelation of divine realities. Indeed, beauty bears on all the central claims of the 
previous chapter: this chapter will bear out how beauty attends upon, but is not 
synonymous with or reducible to, significant form; how beauty, like form, is contextually 
discerned, while a right desire for beauty is cultivated in the course of a Christian life; 
and how beauty manifests the real, for the real – as that which of God – is beautiful.         
The ascription of beauty to God – indeed, the affirmation of beauty as a 
valid ‘name’ of God – is deeply enshrined in Christian theology; I do not need to reiterate 
the various grounds for such positions here, but will engage major representatives of 
Orthodox and Catholic traditions in what follows. Beauty, on these conceptions, is of 
God – like, and no less than, being, life and grace are of God. Hence Hans Urs von 
Balthasar speaks of ‘the glory of the Lord’, while David Bentley Hart recommends an 
understanding of beauty as “the handing over and return of the riches of being” (Hart 
2003, p.18). This theological underpinning provides the validation for the model of 
understanding Christian art that I am proposing.      
Art, as on both Bell’s and Heidegger’s conceptions, is engaged bringing 
forth and bringing to light Being and the Real. On the Christian model, this means the 
revelation and re-presentation of that which is of God. For the tradition of Christian art, 
as the body of Christian theological aesthetics, this entails the manifestation of divine 
beauty. Thus beauty has always been integral to the icon, in seeking to disclose the 
transfigured form and person of the saint; for the saint is beautiful in and with the divine 
likeness. In seeking to offer an aesthetic and artistic experience that is also, indivisibly, a 
religious experience, the Christian artwork aims for – hopes for – the manifestation of 
beauty, a beauty which is of God. Thus, if both Bell and Heidegger, in broad terms, wish 
art to offer an epiphany of the real presence of Being, Christian art aims to offer a 
theophany of God’s glory.   
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Importantly, there is art that is not beautiful, and there is beautiful art which 
is not Christian9, but Christian art seeks to be beautiful with and in the beauty of God. It 
is also important to stress, however, that the disclosure of God’s beauty does not 
necessarily translate into an obviously or conventionally attractive or pleasing artwork; 
indeed, the revelation of divine beauty may sometimes challenge and unsettle 
conventional aesthetic values, and may demand much of a viewer’s, reader’s or listener’s 
discernment – which may need to be theologically, not less than aesthetically, literate. 
There are Christian artworks where the beauty is ‘hidden’, as in the poetry of R. S. 
Thomas, and there are Christian artworks where any trace of divine beauty seems 
banished, as in certain renditions of the suffering Christ.   
  It is not my intention here to give a theological account of the beauty of the 
Christian God. My account of the beauty of Christian art, however, will seek to position 
the beautiful artwork, and the experience of it, within a comprehensive and intelligible 
theological picture; both so as to validate the perhaps bold claims I have to make about 
the beauty of Christian art, and to draw out the implications – for art as well as theology – 
of the encounter with such beauty. I hope to provide a case for a conception of beauty 
that is congruent both with Christian art and Christian theology; a conception which 
shows how the experience of such beauty, even in the man-made particulars of a painting 
or a poem, may be allocated a central place in Christian experience and Christian life.     
The argument in this chapter is an argument both from and for the gratuity of the 
beautiful. It takes its departure from the intuition that beauty, as we encounter it in the 
particulars of this world, has something generous, excessive and fortuitous about it. 
Beauty as encountered in the Christian work of art, as a real but ineffable quality, 
irreducible to the formal or aesthetic properties of the artwork, is understood as a gift. 
Indeed, an account of the Christian engagement with beauty must be the story of the 
grateful reception of this gift, of the lived response to a promise of participation in divine 
delight and love. The beautiful Christian artwork partakes of the abundant and freely 
                                                 
9 This is crucial to note; that while on the Christian model here proposed all beauty is of God, this does not 
mean that every beautiful thing – nor, of course, every beautiful landscape or beautiful person – is (or 
should be designated) Christian. While such things may still offer religious experiences to the Christian 
believer, it would be wrong to seek to appropriate non-Christian works (whether they belong to another 
culture or whether they are avowedly critical of Christianity) to a Christian aesthetic and a Christian order 
of meanings and value.     
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bestowed beauty of God. To achieve this condition, I hold, is the aim of the Christian 
artistic endeavour.     
I have three main points to argue: that beauty, as it appears in the Christian 
work of art, is an invitation to delight and gratitude; that beauty, as we encounter it in the 
Christian work of art, asks of us both the deepening of discernment and the cultivation of 
desire; and that beauty, as it is manifested in the Christian work of art, is not created by 
the artist but is bestowed as a gift of the Trinitarian God.    
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2.1 DELIGHT AND GRATITUDE 
 
“The beautiful,” says Jacques Maritain, “is essentially delightful” (Maritain 1943, p.27).  
This must be our point of departure. We will get nowhere, will not pronounce a 
single meaningful word on beauty if we attempt to ignore, deny or obfuscate this very 
simple and inescapable fact – whether we do so in the name of a higher aesthetics or with 
pretensions to religious sobriety. If we shy away from the joy beauty gives, or resist the 
desire it kindles, the beautiful will forever elude us.      
Thus Robert Bridges (1934) begins his testament to beauty by recalling how, 
walking the South-downs one day,  
 
a glow of childlike wonder enthral’d me, as if my sense 
had come to a new birth purified, my mind enrapt 
re-awakening to a fresh initiation of life (pp.1-2).  
 
This is illustrative of beauty’s beginnings in us, as it were; of beauty’s first 
address to us, and our first stirrings of responsiveness to its promise. To grow in this 
responsiveness, the realisation of the new life that beauty offers, is the prerogative of our 
desire – and the end is love.    
 
 
2.1.1 The pleasure given 
 
To argue that beauty is delightful is to concede that beauty is in a sense pleasurable. It is 
not, however, to define beauty as pleasure. Nor, as we shall see, is delight all that beauty 
gives, or the full import of the gift. This is a crucial issue, which gives me cause to 
engage with Leo Tolstoy’s position in What is Art?   
It is often, perhaps chiefly, the element of the pleasurable which breeds distrust in 
beauty’s detractors; it is also this aspect of beauty which leads to most mistaken 
definitions, not least along subjectivist and relativist lines. Thus, in Tolstoy’s case beauty 
becomes a worldly and decadent thing, instead of a spur to spiritual commitment; for he 
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adopts the definition of beauty as pleasure. It is this mistaken attribution or definition 
which causes him to bar beauty from true religion, just as it causes Clive Bell to ban it 
also from the work of art. My own account is set squarely against both prohibitions – and 
so affirms the place of the beautiful artwork at the very heart of Christian experience.                 
The pleasure that beauty gives is not, as Bell would complain, a cheap and sugary 
sensation, the sentimentality of simpletons, but is rather the salt and sustenance of saints; 
for as Richard Viladesau (2013) argues, “the apprehension of beauty reveals as its 
ultimate horizon an absolute act of joy, of delectation in being” (p.149), and so allows us 
to commune with God, the giver of life.                
Tolstoy’s argument in What is Art? suffers from a series of misinformed 
distinctions and misapplied prescriptions. Insofar as beauty is defined, in some theories, 
as pleasure, Tolstoy is right to be critical; but he should be critical of the definition, not of 
beauty. His great failure is to persist in his critique, based on that erroneous definition, 
without providing an alternative account of beauty. In this way he proves himself as blind 
as those he berates, unable to recognise beauty as beyond and other than pleasure. 
Importantly, however, a defence of beauty along the lines of my thesis does not need to 
endorse any of the theories criticised by Tolstoy.   
According to Tolstoy, all the relevant “aesthetic definitions of beauty come 
down to two fundamental views: one, that beauty is something existing in itself […] the 
other, that beauty is a certain pleasure we experience, which does not have personal 
advantage as its aim” (Tolstoy 1995, p.31). Tolstoy’s take on this apparent dichotomy, 
between the objective and subjective accounts, is to dissolve it; for, he argues, “the 
objective definition is nothing but the subjective differently expressed. In fact, both 
notions of beauty come down to a certain sort of pleasure that we receive, meaning that 
we recognise as beauty that which pleases us without awakening our lust” (p.32). He is 
mistaken, to my mind, both in his conflation of the objective and subjective accounts, and 
in his identification of the ‘sort of pleasure’ involved in the appreciation of beauty.   
It is wrong to assume that the objective or metaphysical account of beauty can 
be collapsed into, replaced with or paraphrased as, a subjective or sensuous one. For one, 
it does not follow that any objectively real beauty must either be recognised by, or yield 
itself as, a pleasurable sensation; nor would it follow, even if this objective beauty was so 
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apprehended, giving us occasion for pleasure, that this beauty thereby would forfeit its 
objectivity and simply end up a matter of personal taste or predilection. Above all, 
Tolstoy is wrong to think that beauty’s ability to offer any kind of personal pleasure 
precludes that beauty is also objectively real.      
On my model, on the contrary, it is delight itself which leads us to recognise 
beauty’s objectivity.     
The delight which beauty gives is ‘a kind of pleasure’, but not the kind of pleasure 
that Tolstoy has in mind; for it is precisely a pleasure in the gratuity of beauty. It is a 
delight in beauty’s simply being there, at large in all kinds of objects and situations, 
without it having to be there; it is delight, not in a perceived necessity, or even harmony, 
but in something at once mysterious and generous. In the words of David Bentley Hart 
(2003), “Beauty is there, abroad in the order of things, given again and again in a way 
that defies description and denial with equal impertinence” (p.16). On this picture, I 
delight in the beautiful thing for what it gives, not for what I receive; for the qualities it 
possesses – and of which I may partake – not for the effect it has on me. We delight 
because beauty strikes us, and overwhelms us, as something extra-utile, granted by 
freedom and good will, as a kind of abundance for the sake of it. Roger Scruton (2012b) 
testifies to the same experience when he writes that “In the experience of the beautiful 
[…] we savour the world, as something given, and not just as something received” 
(p.131).          
Gratitude, which follows or ought to follow from this kind of pleasure, owes far 
more to our moral faculties than to our sensory ones; for gratitude entails the recognition 
of beauty as gift, and of our own role as recipients thereof, and thereby entails the 
acknowledgement both of a quality and reality to beauty exterior to our senses and 
faculties as well as suggesting a giver wholly other than ourselves.       
 
Beauty quickens our erotic energies, on a conception of eros, central to theology as well 
as Platonic philosophy, as our self-transcending drive and longing for communion with 
others and with other, objective, goods. “Erotic ‘wonder’ in the presence of the 
uniqueness of a physical beauty,” writes Christos Yannaras, “is always an invitation to 
communion and relation […] the satisfaction of the existential desire for communion”; an 
80 
 
“attraction which is not always tied to human bodily beauty” but which may also be 
generated by “the physical beauty of a place or a work of art” (Yannaras 2007, p.83). 
Bridges expresses some of this succinctly in verse:  
 
This ken we truly, that as wonder to intellect, 
So for the soul desire of beauty is mover and spring (Bridges 1934, p.115).  
 
The tragedy, as Yannaras observes, is that all too often the self-centred individual 
“receives the call of beauty as an invitation to seek its own pleasure” (Yannaras 2007, 
p.83) instead of responding to the “essential ‘goal’” of beauty’s invitation: “To succeed in 
a fulfilling communion and relation with the world’s personal principle or logos” (p.83). 
Hence, what I will call the cultivation of desire is necessary for a right responsiveness to, 
and engagement with, beauty’s call and bestowal; to turn desire away from self-
gratification and towards the love of beauty as revelatory of God.  
 
 
2.1.2 The acceptance of the gift   
 
Beauty calls us to grow through delight in beautiful particulars to the love of the Beauty 
of God. Thus the maker and lover of Christian art feels, with Bridges,  
 
How Natur (as Plato saith) teacheth man by beauty, 
And by the lure of sense leadeth him ever upward 
To heav’nly things, and how the mere sensible forms 
Which first arrest him take-on ever more and more 
Spiritual aspect, – yet discard not nor disown 
Their sensuous beauty, since that is eternal and sure, 
The essence thereof being the reverent joy of life (Bridges 1934, p.100).  
 
It is crucial, to a Christian understanding, that we are not called to aspire away 
from beautiful particulars, but rather to deepen our perception and love of God’s beauty 
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in the things of this world. Love of God and the beauty of God, therefore, returns the 
Christian to the visible world with gratitude and ardour; to give thanks, as St Francis 
does, for the beauty, solace and splendour of the Sun, the Moon and those things of Earth 
and our earthly existence that manifest God’s resplendent presence:   
 
Praised be my Lord, 
by means of all Your creatures, 
and most especially by Sir Brother Sun, 
Who makes the day, and illumines us by his light: 
For he is beautiful and radiant with great splendour; 
And is a symbol of You, God most High. 
Praised be my Lord, 
by means of Sister Moon and all the stars: 
For in Heaven you have placed them, 
clear, precious and fair (Francis of Assisi 2007, p.21).      
 
Thus the Christian gives thanks and praise for the essential goodness of Creation; 
and the Christian artistic effort constitutes an effort to contribute to God’s creation – and 
to help repair it, insofar as it is broken or tarnished by human ill-use – by fashioning 
works of beauty.  
 
Tolstoy is not sensitive to the validity of either this delight or this gratitude. As regards 
gratitude, Tolstoy is not aware, as is Roger Scruton, that beauty engages our moral 
responsibilities as well as our aesthetic responses. Having barred beauty altogether, along 
with pleasure, from access to the moral, from any inclusion in considerations of the good, 
Tolstoy has shut himself off from any such mature engagements with beauty.   
For beauty does not only delight, does not only give, but also – as gift – makes a 
claim upon us. This is understood by Scruton, and his intuition can be amplified by the 
experience of Christian art.    
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In Scruton’s account, this ‘claim’ amounts to our responsibility to treat the 
beautiful thing as an end in itself, not a mere means for our gratification.10 This certainly 
reaffirms the difference between delight and pleasure, and it anchors this difference in 
our conscious attitude and volition, revealing a kind of ‘ethical’ dimension to the 
immediately aesthetic. Ultimately, for Scruton, beauty finds its place on the threshold of 
the sacred; it witnesses and lights the way to a whole spiritual order, a kingdom of ends, 
which most compellingly confronts us in the embodied human person, but which also 
meets us in great works of art. This stipulation of an ‘end’ is philosophically compelling, 
and comes with a respectable pedigree. However, to my mind, the more fittingly 
Christian account of the claim would be this: that we treat the beautiful thing as a gift.    
Thus, instead of the ethical injunction of respect towards the object, we postulate 
gratitude as the appropriate Christian response to beauty. We can say that gratitude is 
respect in a Christian key, directed towards that which is personal and divine in kind. We 
can also speak of reverence and veneration as varieties of this gratitude.    
Concisely, we could say that if delight is the right response to the gratuitousness 
of beauty, then gratitude is the right attitude to the gift (and, through this, to the giver). 
We all know the delight of receiving, and excitedly unwrapping, a gift; and we know how 
this delight is transmuted into gratitude once the thing has been revealed, and how our 
gaze is lifted from the object to the giver.    
I do not, therefore, propose a theory of ‘disinterested interest’, or ‘disinterested 
pleasure’. However helpful such terms might be, initially, in deflecting notions of beauty 
as subjective pleasure alone, they are based on quite a different understanding of beauty, 
metaphysically speaking, than the one under which I am working; and they suggest a 
relation of reserve which is quite foreign to both the desire and the delight that I identify 
as, respectively, the fundamental motive and the immediate response to beauty.  
For the beautiful work of art, on my understanding, while stipulating a kind of 
distance between the object and the perceiver, simultaneously issues an invitation to us to 
                                                 
10 I should stress that non-Christians and Christians experience the same beauty, and all may take great 
delight in it; but not all who perceive this beauty feels or acknowledges its claim; and of those who do, not 
all (not even Scruton) will conceive of this claim in Christian terms and so attribute this beauty to God. A 
further theological point is crucial here: that beauty is given freely and abundantly by God (to believers and 
non-believers alike); it invites, but does not insist upon, being recognised as divine.  
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seek out ever more of the beautiful. Thus beauty as manifested in the particular thing or 
artwork raises our vision, and directs our desires, towards what we may call, with Hart, 
the beauty of the infinite. For this reason, I do not only allow our delight and gratitude to 
encompass the attitude of reverence, but I also hold that, ultimately, the beautiful object 
should so train and transform our desire so as to become an object of love. This is the 
topic of the section that follows.      
 
By way of bringing this section towards its conclusion, then, this pointed passage of 
Maritain’s, on the purity of art, may be invoked as a reaffirmation of my position and as a 
rebuttal of Tolstoy: “Art has to be on its guard,” says Maritain, against such “foreign 
elements which threaten its purity. For example, the beauty to which it tends produces a 
delight, but the high delight of the spirit, the absolutely contrary to what is called 
pleasure, or the agreeable tickling of the sensibility; and if art seeks to please, it commits 
a betrayal and tells a lie” (Maritain 1943, p.65).     
That is, Christian art does not seek ‘to please’, but it does aim to give delight – 
just as it aims to be an occasion for gratitude and, as we shall see, a spur to the cultivation 
of desire. To be able to offer the right kind of pleasure, so to speak, is therefore not a 
concession to lesser faculties and pedestrian tastes, but is in truth an achievement with 
metaphysical implications.        
For the experience of beauty is nothing other than a metaphysical experience; as 
Viladesau affirms, ‘the apprehension of beauty is already an ontological event’ 
(Viladesau 2013, p.152). hence, to stop at pleasure as a sensation is not to experience 
beauty as what it is; to stop at pleasure as a concept is not to explain beauty but to explain 
it away, to erect a great wall between the perceiver’s self and the reality of beauty. This is 
to forfeit the great opportunity that beauty offers; namely, the chance to cultivate our 
desires and direct our lives towards the beauty of God.    
The perception of beauty – and our delight in its gift – is also an invitation to 
spiritual growth, to the tutoring and transfiguration of our desires. Thus, while we bend in 
gratitude for the things of this world, we yearn to ascend – not from, but through the 
things of beauty, in growing responsiveness and, indeed, likeness – to partake of the 
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infinite Beauty of God. Bridges, I think, is sensitive to this balance, as he affirms our 
ultimate desire and its implications: 
 
I see the emotion of saints, lovers and poets all 
To be the kindling of some Personality 
By an eternizing passion; and that God’s worshipper 
Looking on any beauty falleth straightaway in love; 
And thatt love is a fire in whose devouring flames 
All earthly ills are consumed, and at least flash of it, 
Be it only a faint radiancy, the freed soul glimpseth, 
Nay ev’n may think to have felt, some initiat foretaste 
Of thatt mystic rapture, the consummation of which 
Is the absorption of Selfhood in the Being of God (Bridges 1934, pp.76-77)11 
   
Christian art can certainly support, I believe, the weight of Bridges’ suggestion 
that the encounter with beauty in this world prefigures the Beatific Vision; indeed, it is to 
this consummate experience all Christian art, by seeking to manifest the form and beauty 
of God, wishes to spur and to guide us.    
 
For you are the true desire and the inexpressible joy of those who love you, Christ 
our God, and all creation hymns you to the ages. Amen.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 I would substitute, in the last line, Personhood for Selfhood, and construe our consummation in terms, 
not of absorption, but of communion with the Trinitarian God.      
12 From the Orthodox prayers of thanksgiving after communion.  
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2.2 DISCERNMENT & DESIRE  
 
This second section will have two points to make: one, that our encounter with the 
beautiful is embedded in the material and cultural world; the other, that we ourselves 
must embody a real receptiveness to beauty – by becoming beautiful ourselves; not, of 
course, in the sense of becoming pretty or attractive, but rather more like becoming good. 
As I hope to make clear, however, the acquisition of beauty is not the same as the 
acquisition of virtue or goodness.        
Beauty certainly makes claims upon us, both in the sense of us giving an 
appropriate response to beauty and its objects, but also – and here we must go further 
than Scruton – as regards our nature and growth as persons created in the image of God.     
Scruton argues, compellingly, that the experience of beauty should be placed at 
the very centre of our lives. This is not for the sake of making our everyday lives more 
pleasurable, but to challenge us to grow as the rational creatures that we are; for, Scruton 
writes, “for a free being, there is right feeling, right experience and right enjoyment just 
as much as right action. The judgement of beauty orders the emotions and desires of 
those who make it” (Scruton 2009, p.197). The claims here are founded, I believe, on two 
firm intuitions, regarding two aspects and implications of the experience of beauty.   
The first of these two demands of beauty, as we may call them, is the need for 
informed perception and judgement on our part, in order to achieve a full experience of 
beauty’s disclosure and beauty’s value. The second demand speaks more deeply still to 
the potentials of our nature, as creatures capable of directing our will, no less than our 
perception and intellect, towards the highest realities and ideals.   
In what follows, I will speak of these two aspects of beauty as the cultivation, 
respectively, of discernment and desire. The same two demands can also be identified, I 
believe, as the governing concerns of a Christian response to beauty – lifted from 
Scruton’s largely psychological-anthropological discourse into the context of theological 
aesthetics. Thus David Bentley Hart, articulating an understanding not dissimilar to 
Scruton’s about the ordering of our desires, claims that “The beautiful is not a fiction of 
desire, nor is its nature exhausted by a phenomenology of pleasure; it can be recognised 
in despite of desire, or as that toward which desire must be cultivated” (Hart 2003, p.17).      
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2.2.1 The trained and luminous eye 
 
Much is involved in the full perception of beauty. Thus, without diminishing or 
detracting from its essentially ineffable character, it is my understanding that beauty – as 
we encounter it in particular works and objects – is also, in a sense, a cultural and 
contextual phenomenon, embedded in human practices and values. The perception of 
beauty demands a discerning effort of understanding the forms and meanings where 
beauty is found.       
To be clear, Beauty itself remains a transcendental, but the beautiful is 
indissolubly part of actuality, and part of a contextual fabric. Our experience of beauty is 
an experience of a beautiful particular, and a particular manifestation of beauty. I 
experience beauty in this sonnet or this sonata, through this process of discernment. I 
glimpse infinity through this finite thing.    
We need to understand what Eliot says of time, history, and renunciation – or 
what Dostoevsky says of love, will and repentance – in order to pronounce the Four 
Quartets a beautiful poem or Crime and Punishment a beautiful novel. These works need 
to play on our affections, intellects, memories and imaginations; and the realisation of 
beauty, if beauty is there, emerges as we engage with and submit to these significant 
forms. I cannot find beauty in Eliot until I begin to grasp the spiritual resolutions to 
which his words and images tend – and this begs of me, not only the complementary 
reading of other poetry and theology, but also a lived familiarity with experiences of loss, 
regret and regeneration.          
 
It is not true, as Tolstoy says, that “Great works of art are great only because they are 
accessible and comprehensible to everyone” (Tolstoy 1995, p.81). Art demands of us that 
we come prepared to make the effort of discernment and participation. It is no easy thing 
to get the better of such vast and intricate creations as the The Divine Comedy or 
Canterbury Cathedral: a full imaginative engagement is asked of us, with all that this 
entails.    
At the same time, that which is real and beautiful in these works certainly gives 
itself to all who draw near, who have eyes to see, who surrender self and go forward in 
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the readiness to be inspired and to offer reverence in return. To be prepared and equipped 
for such an engagement, however, may very well mean having undergone certain 
experiences, either in ‘life’ or through other works of art; it may mean that certain ways 
of reading have been practiced, a certain literacy acquired, and perhaps even that certain 
values and beliefs about the world must be acknowledged as, at least potentially, valid.  
Sometimes, therefore, we are simply unable – from lack of experience or 
imaginative maturity – to understand or engage with some great works; but instead of 
blaming the work for its elitism, obfuscation, or some such perceived wrong, we should 
hold out and see if, at some later stage – after life has its way with us, after we have 
become exposed, willingly or not, to such things of art and experience that eluded us the 
first time around – the work is suddenly not only intelligible to us, but even meaningful, 
even a source of revelation and regeneration.     
This is not to say something so crude as that the greatest works of art are also the 
most intractable and inaccessible, but rather that the greatest art may sometimes make the 
greatest claims upon us, ask the most of us in return for its qualities, its meanings, its 
realities – while at the same time it may also, importantly, be the most generous (for we 
mustn’t forget that vital ingredient of gratuity); thus we find that many of the greatest 
works of Christian art are such as strike us, already at first glance, sometimes even 
despite our own dimness or reluctance, with their astonishing and indisputable beauty. 
Indeed, the beauty of Christian art may provide a non-Christian person with the first 
impulses towards conversion. This is no small aspect of beauty’s role and importance.     
Tolstoy’s next suggestion is more fruitful, raising as it does the issue of a more 
than aesthetic discernment, befitting the artwork’s more than artistic demands. Certainly, 
when we speak of Christian art, we must not forget the Christian aspect of the object and 
the experience; nor, however, must we forget the artistic aspect. Tolstoy is right, to a 
degree, in his point that what renders a good religious work inaccessible to some is not a 
lack of refinement or specialist education, but rather a shortage of religious consciousness 
and what we might call, perhaps naively or presumptively, a simple human 
responsiveness to genuine truths about life. “I know people, for example,” he writes, 
“who consider themselves most refined, and who say that they do not understand the 
poetry of love for one’s neighbour and of self-denial, or the poetry of chastity” (p.82).   
88 
 
This is an important observation; however, we must make certain amendments to 
its implications and applications. As we cannot accept Tolstoy’s identification of art with 
the communication of feeling, but must instead stress the importance of the artwork’s 
qualities as art, and as art of a particular kind, we must also maintain that, however 
virtuous or sincere our character, even a formally or stylistically straightforward poem or 
painting might elude us if we do not possess the requisite sensitivity to the artform in 
question. We can certainly imagine someone saying, in response to Tolstoy, that they 
‘know people, for example, who are considered paragons of neighbourliness and charity, 
but who fail entirely to get to the end of The Brothers Karamazov or who turn away in 
utter perplexity at the sight of David Jones’ Vexilla Regis’. We should not presume, as 
Tolstoy does, that the good man “can see everything perfectly well” (p.83). Instead we 
can state as a kind of axiom, that to experience good art we do not have to be ‘good 
people’, but we have to be good at experiencing art. As it happens, good art itself is the 
best educator in this respect, and if only we do not shy away from its gifts and demands, 
we may grow in receptiveness and responsiveness to what it has to show us.    
At the same time, crucially, our discernment of the truth and beauty of Christian 
revelation – in art, as in other aspects of the religious life – requires that we are in a fit 
state to receive it. We must be full of light, the Gospel tells us, to see and receive the 
light. The theological poetry of St Ephrem the Syrian articulates this same truth, as in this 
example:      
 
It is through the eye 
that the body, with its members, 
is light in its different parts […]  
 
Through the eye that was darkened 
the whole world has darkened […] 
but when it was illumined by the other eye, 
and the heavenly light 
that resided in its midst, 
then humanity became reconciled once again (Brock 1992, pp72-73).   
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Sebastian Brock informs us that St Ephrem’s choice of word for ‘light’, when 
speaking of the ‘luminous eye’ needed for the faithful, can also mean ‘beautiful’. 
Ephrem, moreover, calls Christ ‘the Luminous One’ and tells us that we need a luminous 
mouth in order to praise him:  
 
For it is only the mouth that is lure and luminous  
and which resembles You, Lord, that shall sing to You  
– the luminous to the Luminous One, the pure to the Pure one (p.74).   
 
The same applies to the reading of Scripture. As I have suggested above, 
discernment is needed to grasp the significant forms of Scripture, as of all Christian art, 
but beyond this a luminous eye is needed to receive the divine light and revelation; not 
for the sake of understanding alone, but to properly receive the beauty of Scripture, which 
manifests the beauty of God. Ephrem writes, ‘”the Gospel is but a figure of the beauty 
that is above which does not fade and at which all the sins of the created word are 
rebuked”’ (p.77).   
Our task, then, is not only to train our perceptions, but also to purify our hearts – 
our whole persons – in receptiveness to the divine light. It is vital to recognise that beauty 
is not automatically disclosed; that what we see as beautiful, and what we see of beauty, 
is not all the beauty there is, and is not all there is to beauty. This emphasises the 
metaphysical depths of beauty’s demands, and the depths within ourselves (the depth of 
change in ourselves) in which our discernment must be grounded. Importantly, there is 
more to beauty, and more beauty to be had, because there is also more to us – and beauty 
asks this more of us, if it is to give of itself more fully. Our attitudes and responses to 
beauty must be embodied, must become part of our character. This is something that is 
acquired through the cultivation of desire.        
 
 
 
 
90 
 
2.2.2 Becoming what we see 
 
Nicolas Berdyaev (2009b) claims that “One must be initiated into the mystery of beauty 
and without this initiation beauty cannot be truly known. To know beauty, one must live 
within it” (p.246). This is a key Christian thought. We understand perfectly well, I 
presume, the idea – as developed by Robert Adams, for example – that in loving the 
Good we do and should grow in goodness. Analogously, this is how to understand my 
claim that in loving Beauty, we should grow more beautiful ourselves. This is not, 
however, a matter of simply transposing the ethical model into an aesthetic mode; it is 
also to recognise that we are, in dealing with beautiful things, dealing with something that 
is visibly manifested. Conformity to this manifestation – to something that is seen – 
entails, I think, not only that a change is wrought in our ways of seeing, but that this 
change can also be seen to have been wrought in us. Thus we acquire the likeness of that 
beauty which inspires and instructs us. Pavel Florensky, in this respect, claims that the 
saints are not ‘good’ persons but beautiful ones; where to be beautiful means to be spirit-
bearing and radiant with the light of God.13           
We may speak of ‘spiritual’ as contrasted with ‘physical’ beauty, by way of 
clarifying that Christian art enjoins us to grow, not in sexual or aesthetic attractiveness, 
but in a quality rooted in our personality. However, on my model, this dichotomy is false; 
for I believe that there is only one kind of beauty, and that whereas this beauty is 
certainly not a matter of appearances alone, it is manifested to sight and vision. Beauty is 
sensory and perceivable, as well as truly of the spirit; it is both inner and outer. Though 
beauty is by no means synonymous with an attractive appearance, it is true that a 
beautiful person is seen as beautiful; it may also be true that to see this beauty takes a 
great deal of discernment, for it is no easy thing to perceive the true nature or quality of a 
person. But a beautiful person is manifestly so; for those who have eyes to see, the beauty 
of such a person will shine through, however dirty or deformed his physical features.     
One way to recognise a beautiful person is by that person’s own responsiveness to 
beauty; for it is a real openness to beauty’s gifts and beauty’s claims which renders a 
person beautiful. The concurrent claim is that someone who is deficient in such openness 
                                                 
13 “’And indeed asceticism creates not a ‘good’ man, but a beautiful one’” (Pevear 1995, p.xx).  
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– or, what’s worse, someone who is defiant against it – will become a person devoid of 
beauty and, at the same time, will become insensitive to it. There are many ways for a 
person to render himself blind to both appearances and essentials, and so to render 
himself dull and opaque. The calling of Christian art is for us to reverse this tendency, to 
be converted, to realise the opposite possibility of being partakers of beauty’s reality and 
radiance. This conversion entails the abandonment of a self-centred and subjective 
attitude to beauty, in the adoption of a self-annihilating relation of mutual love.  
Christos Yannaras can therefore speak of “Ascetic self-transcendence as a 
presupposition for knowledge of the truth of the world’s beauty” (Yannaras 2007, p.84); 
for the personal gift and relation that is beauty asks that we step outside of our selves, 
that we are open ec-statically, not only to the recognition of an objective goodness, but 
also to personal communion. We must cultivate philokalia, the theological love of beauty 
as the personal gift and disclosure of God. “Thus,” writes Yannaras, “the world, from 
being an object of the senses, an objective ‘phenomenon’ and subjective impression, is 
transformed into the second term of a personal relationship” (p.86).      
Scruton’s contribution, of a moral responsibility towards the beautiful, must thus 
be amplified, within the context of a Christian aesthetic, to mean a wholesale 
reorientation of our vision as well as our volition towards the infinite beauty of God.  
“Thus,” writes David Bentley Hart, “to come to see the world as beauty is the moral 
education of desire, the redemption of vision […] In learning to see the world as beauty, 
[…] one’s vision of the world […] is deepened toward that infinity of beauty that 
comprises it” (Hart 2003, p.256). Importantly, on my adaptation of this view, the 
beautiful work of art remains a concrete source of such an experience, a touchstone of 
vision and desire; for each particular work of art provides a unique manifestation of that 
same infinite beauty which is God’s.                  
 
One work which may be seen to bear out – in the substance of its poetry as well as in the 
philosophy we may extrapolate from it (and which informed it) – the model of 
discernment and desire that I am proposing, is Dante’s Divine Comedy.     
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Dante, all too aware of the great demands placed on him in the telling of his 
journey through Hell, Purgatory and Paradise, is fully aware also of the powers required 
by the reader who wishes to follow him; he even cautions the unprepared to turn back:  
 
do not  
attempt to sail the seas I sail; you may, 
by losing sight of me, be left astray (Dante 1995, p.384).   
 
He who wishes to understand Dante’s work, and who hopes to take it to heart, 
must be open to the kind of experiences the poet-voyager himself undergoes: the horrors 
of the diabolical descent, no less than the hopes of heavenly ascent. Even on a directly 
textual level, with all its allusions and references to classical and contemporaneous 
sources, Dante’s poem asks a fair deal of the erudition of its reader. No less vital, to 
render the poem intelligible, is a share of that spiritual ardour which fuels both the 
journey and its telling. The readers that Dante invites to follow him are  
 
those few who [have] turned [their] minds in time  
unto the bread of angels;  
 
that is, those lovers of wisdom and beauty who are motivated by the  
 
thirst which is innate and everlasting –  
thirst for the godly realm (p.384).  
 
The suggestion here –  that the ideal reader should come equipped, not only with 
prerequisite learning and literacy, but with a particular kind and quality of love – chimes 
very well with our model of Christian art.          
Further, Dante first encounters eternal beauty as embodied and personified in 
Beatrice. It is she that inspires his love of beauty, and it is she that demands of him that 
his love, in turn, becomes embodied in a life made pure through repentance and directed 
heaven-wards. Beatrice – by heavenly grace and with the assistance of Virgil – is the 
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cultivator of Dante’s desire. Moreover, Beatrice herself is as beautiful as she is because 
of the great strength of her own vision of that Beauty which is God’s, and of which she 
thereby partakes; if, she explains to Dante, she appears so radiant to him that “I overcome 
your vision’s force […] I am so because of my perfected vision – as I grasp the good, so I 
approach the good in act” (p.398). This reinforces the point, I believe, that to see the 
beautiful is to become beautiful.   
 
Blake claims that “If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to 
man as it is. Infinite’” (Blake 2000, p.120); and to see the infinite, for Blake as for Hart, 
is to see God. Yannaras, similarly, writes how we see the “true [and] personal” “beauty of 
the world in proportion to the measure of the purification of our individual sense organs”; 
in the words of Basil the Great, “’The beauty which is true and most beloved can only be 
contemplated by one whose mind has been purified’” (Yannaras 2007, p.89).     
We find the same core idea, variously articulated, in a host of Christian 
philosophers and theologians, Hans Urs von Balthasar among them. I have already 
argued below how the notion of the ‘disinterested’ is unfitting for the Christian 
understanding of, and response to, beauty. von Balthasar reinforces this, claiming that 
“Christian contemplation is the opposite of distanced consideration of an image: as Paul 
says, it is in the metamorphosis of the beholder into the image he beholds (2 Cor 3.18).” 
This entails, among other things, the acknowledgement of the real qualities of what is 
beheld; “it is possible only by giving up one’s own standards and being assimilated to the 
dimensions of the image” (von Balthasar 1982, p.485). Beyond this, more importantly, it 
entails our committed conformity to this reality. Thus beauty itself asks of us that, in 
order that we may see it more fully, we become like it. The appropriate response to the 
beautiful is therefore to grow, through love, ever more receptive and ever nearer to it. 
Love and vision, in this way, mutually nurture and inspire each other.14  
                                                 
14 ”Albion before Christ” – as plate 76 of Blake’s Jerusalem the emanation of the giant Albion is commonly 
called – may be taken as a potent illustration of this crucial theological point; the illumination shows 
Albion, with arms outstretched in a cruciform posture, before Christ nailed to a large oak tree; and shows 
Albion partaking of the light that streams from the transfigured form of the redeemer. It is one of Blake’s 
most unambiguously Christian visual statements, calling the believer to an imitation of Christ understood as 
growth in the divine likeness.      
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This understanding should be absolutely central to both the production and 
reception of Christian art. It is my belief that just such an attitude is enshrined – always 
implicit, on occasion pronounced – in the tradition which leads from icon-painting 
though the frescoes of Fra Angelico and the poetry of Dante, right up to the music of 
Arvo Pärt and the words of R. S. Thomas. It follows that also the artist needs to cultivate 
his responsiveness to beauty as well as a real skill in his craft. The Christian artist, we 
may add, pursues his craft within the greater cultivation of a Christian life. Thus the 
artist, like the lover of beauty, must conform fully to the end he hopes to realise. “The 
artist,” argues Maritain, “must be in love with what he is doing, so that his virtue 
becomes in truth, in St. Augustine’s phrase, ordo amoris” (Maritain 1943, p.48). Indeed, 
it is through the love and beauty manifested in Christian works of art – from Rublev to 
Tavener – that we recognise them as Christian, as belonging to that tradition.     
Importantly, as shall be argued in our final chapter, as Christian works of art are 
themselves labours of love, they are therefore appropriate objects of our love. In the very 
act of reading, seeing or listening – in reflecting upon, and returning again to the work – 
we must seek to practice that same love which inspired the work’s making. The Christian 
artist and the Christian lover of art, for whom the artwork is a form of prayer and praise, 
will both say with Ephrem the Syrian:    
 
Let our prayer be a mirror, Lord, placed before your face; 
then Your fair beauty will be imprinted on its luminous surface. 
O Lord, let not the Evil One, who is ugly, gaze on it, lest his ugliness be  
impressed upon it (Brock 1992, p.75).      
 
These words are exemplary, as we strive to grow in the likeness of God’s beauty, 
by cultivating beauty in our lives, in our prayers, and in our creative works.   
 
The model of discernment and desire here proposed may not only be elucidating as 
regards our responses to works of unquestionably Christian merit and ambition; it may 
also, so I hope, let us know which artworks really are Christian in the first place. It may 
help us to answer a question that, perhaps, persists in the reader’s mind; namely, does 
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Christian art really have to aim for beauty? My claim that, yes, it does, is likely to invite 
queries and counter-examples. What do I say, for example, to the numerous evocations of 
hell, judgement and damnation that fill the churches and museums throughout the 
Christian world? Surely these are not beautiful? But surely they are still Christian works 
of art, capable of granting very powerful religious experiences?       
I make three crucial points in response to such apprehensions; firstly, these 
objects may not be artworks at all; secondly, even if they are works of art, they may not 
be Christian, though they seem to be; and thirdly, these works may indeed be beautiful, 
though at first sight they appear not to be. We must bear in mind, as regards this third 
point, that God’s beauty may be revealed, and perceived, under challenging modes and 
forms.       
We should therefore ask, first of all, whether these paintings of fire and brimstone 
are artworks at all, or whether they are pieces of polemics, didactics or dogmatics 
executed in line and colour. If we think they really are art, we should then ask if they are 
Christian art – for as we have argued above, the inclusion of ostensibly Christian imagery 
does not guarantee this. If the work in question shows us a punishing deity, from whose 
torment-inflicting antics we are made to turn away in repulsion, the chances are that it is 
not Christian at all.  
If we still maintain that the work is Christian, we should return to it with more 
consideration to ask – is it not beautiful, after all? If it is genuinely a Christian work of 
art, yielding an experience of the form and presence of God, we will find that it is indeed 
beautiful. If, on the other hand, we do not find any beauty there, then we must conclude 
that it isn’t a Christian work of art, that it remains opaque to God.    
There are renditions of Christ and the Christian story with are either subversive of 
the artistic and religious tradition, unsettling in their depiction of the potential depravity 
of human nature, as well as the decay of the human body; artworks, therefore, which may 
seem to offer no respite – let alone positive inspiration – for the vision of divine likeness. 
As examples of such works, which nevertheless may ultimately be Christian and offer 
profound Christian experiences, may be mentioned Hans Holbein the Younger’s The 
Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb, certain Crucifixion paintings by Grünewald or the 
works of Hieronymus Bosch.       
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If, in these cases – beyond the renditions of intense human suffering, of decay, or 
even of depravity and perversion; the very negations of natural forms and divine will – 
there is no beauty, no vision of God’s light and love, then the work is not Christian. But 
if, beyond the initial responses of shock, sadness or revulsion, we do indeed discover a 
revelation of, and an invitation to, God’s beauty and love – then, yes, it is. The 
experience of beauty – though ultimately an invitation to delight, gratitude and reverence 
– may certainly be accompanied by negative feelings, such as remorse, repentance and 
even fear; indeed, we might experience these emotions precisely because the invitation to 
delight and participation so indicts our own lack of purity, our own tarnished beauty.15        
Discernment is vital here, for we must be attuned to the religious and theological 
meaning of that which is shown, in order to respond appropriately. Faced with a dead 
Christ, for example – whether on the cross or in the tomb – it may only be by knowing 
what happens next in the story, so to speak, that we may be able to find solace and source 
of celebration, even in and through our responses of sorrow and despair.    
Richard Viladesau’s reflections on aesthetics in the perspective of the cross, 
resonant with several themes of my own thesis, are entirely apposite here, and may serve 
to conclude this brief discussion:    
 
The cross is not beautiful or good in itself: it is beautiful only insofar as it 
represents Christ’s ultimate faithfulness and self-gift to God, even to the point of 
death, and insofar as this act given eternal validity by God overcoming death 
itself. That is, the cross only has beauty as the expression of an act of love; and 
love is “beautiful”, theologically speaking, precisely because it is not finally 
defeated, but victorious (Viladesau 2013, p.197).          
                
At this point, it is worth briefly rehearsing the claims made above, before embarking on 
the next stage of the argument. It is our understanding that beauty, while offering delight, 
also demands of us a culturally and spiritually literate discernment, and that a full and 
proper response to beauty’s gifts and claims is consequent upon our cultivation of desire 
and our growth, through love, into beauty’s likeness.     
                                                 
15 We should recall here the discussion of ‘negative icons’ in Chapter 1.  
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The implication, throughout all this, is that beauty is truly of God. Thus Hart, 
following von Balthasar, adopts an aesthetically charged vocabulary to speak of our 
conversion and conformity to Christ. “In this way one’s grammar is converted, one enters 
ever more into divine rhetoric and divine music: one is conformed to Christ by assuming, 
and being assumed by, the language of God’s revelation” (Hart 2003, p.315). This is a 
process in which art joins forces with liturgy, ritual and sacrament to re-fashion the entire 
person according to that which he beholds. Conversion, on this model, is validly 
conceived as an aesthetic practice, the cultivation both of discernment and desire.       
As I see it, this also has a further implication for Christian art. For if the beauty 
encountered in works of art is of such a kind as to encourage, not just the direction of our 
desire, but the growth of our entire personhood towards the likeness of God, then, it 
seems sensible to suggest, this beauty really cannot have its true origin in the works of 
man. This is indeed my next argument: though beauty makes its appearance – though it is 
manifestly present – in made-made objects, it does so and is so as a gift of God.     
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2.3 THE GIFT NOT MADE BY HANDS  
 
The understanding of beauty as gift has underpinned the account given in this chapter; if 
the first section, on delight and gratitude, dealt with the phenomenological aspects of this 
claim, the present section will seek to articulate its ontological foundation. We may take 
as the guiding theme or principle of this section, the understanding, here voiced by Hart, 
that “The Christian use of the word ‘beauty’ refers most properly to a relationship of 
donation and transfiguration, a handing over and return of the riches of being” (Hart 
2003, p.18).        
Three crucial points will here be argued: firstly, that beauty is not made by the 
artist; secondly, that things (works, objects, persons) are beautiful that are in the image of 
God. Thirdly, a more strictly theological point will also be made, which will support the 
model of bestowal; namely, that Beauty, on a Trinitarian model, is best identified with 
the Spirit, and not, as is common in Scholastic thought, with the Son. I here follow the 
lead of Sergius Bulgakov and others from a predominantly Orthodox perspective.     
 
 
2.3.1 Beauty’s gratuity 
 
My account is grounded in the conviction that beauty really is of God, and thus that it is a 
valid thing to say that God is Beauty. “Beauty is a name of God,” Aidan Nichols affirms 
(Nichols 2007, p.136); while Maritain argues that “God is beautiful […] by Himself and 
in Himself, absolutely beautiful […] He is beauty itself, because he imparts beauty to all 
created beings, according to the peculiar nature of each” (Maritain 1943, p.31).      
As we shall see, I will come to differ in important respects from the Thomistic 
account of Maritain; but this may be invoked, initially, to give credence to my assertion 
that the beauty of an artwork does not have its source in that artwork, nor in the hands of 
its artist, but belongs to it by the gracious gift of the fount of all beauty, who is God. I 
agree with Maritain that “the production of beauty belongs to God alone” (p.35); man’s 
task, meanwhile, as artist and maker, is the formal perfection of the particular work at 
hand – to which beauty may, God permitting, be added.    
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Thus the Christian artist works in the hope and vision of beauty; but beauty is not 
of his provenance. It comes by another dispensation. Nor, importantly, is there anything 
necessary about beauty’s manifestation; it is not a particular shape the artwork can fit, nor 
does it appear, time and time again, at the same conditioned signal. No, its appearance 
and realisation will remain mysterious, unique, and gratuitous. In this, Maritain, 
following Aquinas, is less emphatic and consistent than I would wish; for the Scholastic 
account suggests something very fixed and law-like about the conditions that govern 
beauty’s bestowal. On this count, my model and my language must differ crucially from 
theirs.         
Here, then, is the Scholastic centre of Maritain’s idea of beauty, about which I 
have some reservations: “If beauty delights the mind, it is because beauty is essentially a 
certain excellence or perfection in the proportion of things to the mind. Hence the three 
conditions assigned to it by St. Thomas: integrity, because the mind likes being; 
proportion, because the mind likes order and likes unity; lastly and above all brightness 
or clarity, because the mind likes light and intelligibility” (Maritain 1943, p.24). My own 
understanding differs firstly, and markedly, in seeing as common but not necessary 
conditions of beauty’s manifestation what Maritain affirms as essential aspects of 
beauty’s nature. Integrity, proportion and clarity are three important and pervasive 
excellences in artworks, but they are not necessary for beauty’s appearance and they are 
not beauty. The reality of beauty is not reducible to, or divisible into, these terms. Beauty, 
for all its fondness for these properties, is something quite other.          
Most importantly, this otherness of beauty is to be found in its gratuity, which – 
unlike these other qualities – may appropriately be identified as an aspect of beauty’s 
nature. In the final analysis, such formal excellences as clarity and proportion are 
incidental – neither integral, nor even instrumental – to beauty and beauty’s appearance. 
Not all things that achieve these properties, or that satisfy these criteria, are beautiful – 
nor do all beautiful things fulfil these criteria, or possess these properties.  
This non-formal understanding of beauty provides a peculiarly Christian approach 
to the beautiful, in contrast to classical attitudes and ambitions. For Berdyaev, formal 
beauty is a pagan concept and ambition; Christian beauty, on the other hand, always 
opens to the transcendent, so breaking through a merely worldly order. “In the art of the 
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Christian world, there is not, nor can there be, a classic finality of form, immanent 
perfection”, he writes; “In this world only a striving towards the beauty of another world 
is possible, only the longing for that beauty. The Christian world permits of no closing-in, 
no finality in this world [and so] The thirst for the redemption of the sins of this world, 
and the thirst for communion with another world, are imprinted on the ideals of Christian 
art” (Berdyaev 2009b, p.229). Thus Christian art is importantly ‘open-ended’; something 
Williams (2011) has stressed with reference to Dostoevsky’s fictions, and something we 
also find in the poetry of R.S. Thomas. I will discuss this open-endedness further in 
chapter 5.    
Crucially, beauty is not predictable or law-governed, because it is personal and 
reveals the person of God. Yannaras uses the example of an artwork, where the 
“dissimilar and unrepeatable character of artistic expression is not the exactness of a 
programmed uniqueness […] but the universal ec-static energy which is always 
revelatory of the creative person” to claim that “the beauty of the entire reality of the 
universe does not refer to the arranged exactness of a mechanical orderliness, but is […] 
the beauty of the revelation of a person” (Yannaras 2007, p.82).      
If harmony and proportion are not necessary for beauty, it is essential to beauty 
that it is a gift. The gratuity of beauty is vital – and we like gifts; we like the startling, the 
spontaneous and the free, for all these are signs of life; and we like that beauty is not 
predictable, not reducible to the three conditions of Aquinas. We like that it testifies to 
another order, manifests a reality higher still than the proportions, integrities and clarities 
of the philosophers’ universe; we like that it manifests personality.   
All beauty, for the Christian, is revelatory of God; as Yannaras writes, “the beauty 
of the world […] shows beings to be the products and principles of the divine creative 
presence” (p.82). Being personal, God’s self-revelation, it is therefore God’s gracious gift 
of himself. Thus “We call grace (charis) the fact that God gives himself (charizetai) in 
his erotic ecstatic self-offering” (p.67).      
It is a danger of the Scholastic definition, I believe, that by neglecting beauty’s 
gratuity it also misrepresents its divinity. We like beauty because we recognise, not only 
that it is other than us, but also that we are privileged to receive and partake of it, and so 
we recognise that it speaks to and reveals the best in us; we like how it confirms that we 
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too are of more than a natural or necessary order, that we share in beauty’s otherness, and 
so that we are, ultimately, in a vital sense like beauty. It is this experience which is 
expressed in delight and gratitude, for these are proper responses to the surprising and 
generous. It is also this kind of experience which makes us recognise in beauty and its 
bestowal the image in which we are made, the likeness to which we are called.    
 
 
2.3.2 In the likeness of God  
 
It is my understanding that for something to be beautiful means for that thing to be in the 
likeness of God. To develop this model, I propose that while beauty is gift and a giving, it 
is also a kind of given or ‘givenness’. Importantly, I do not intend for beauty to be 
something given and added to art after the artwork’s completion. There is no such 
temporal division involved. For though beauty is, in significant ways, conditional upon 
the artwork’s accomplishment, it is also, crucially, always already there. For it is under 
the influence and inspiration of beauty that we as makers awaken to our task. “What is 
revealed to me in the experience of beauty”, writes Scruton, “is a fundamental truth about 
being – the truth that being is a gift, and receiving it is a task” (Scruton 2012b, pp.151-
152). It is in response to beauty’s original gifts that we want to produce something 
worthy of being a beautiful gift in return. Thus Bridges writes of man that  
 
Beauty is the prime motiv of all his excellence, 
his aim and peaceful purpose (Bridges 1934, p.6).   
 
We may understand this in ethical or religious terms, but also in practical terms, 
as applied to our artistic making. Thus we seek to make beautiful things in grateful 
response to the beauty given to us – to the abundant given beauty of the world. Bridges 
(here identifying Beauty with Wisdom) further imagines our creative responsiveness to 
the gift in these terms:  
 
So she herself, the essential Beauty of Holiness, 
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pass’d her creativ joy into the creature’s heart, 
to take back from his hand her Adoration robes 
and royal crown of his imagination and Love. 
And when she had made of men lovers and worshippers, 
these vied to enshrine her godhead in enduring fanes 
and architectur of stone, that high her persiv towers 
might hallow their throng’d cities and, transfeaturing 
nature’s wilding landscape to the impress of her Mind, 
comfort man’s mortality with immortal grace (p.28).      
 
We achieve culture, no less than cultivate character, in response to beauty’s 
promptings and calls. We sense here in Bridges’ poem how our creative service to beauty 
has implications – as shall be further discussed in subsequent chapters – for our 
conception of the good, of ontology, and of love.   
Beauty provides the fundamental motivation and inspiration behind the Christian 
artistic effort, which is an effort at God-likeness.  In saying that an object may attain to 
such a likeness, that it may partake of the beauty of God, we may say that it exists within 
the light of God’s radiance, and even  - recalling the claims and ambitions of the previous 
chapter – that it manifests the presence of God.             
Let my metaphor be this: A glass figurine is created, in conditions of lamplight, 
and created with great care so as to hold and reflect that light in a particularly striking and 
all-suffusing way. The figurine is fashioned by the artist, who manipulates his medium of 
glass to achieve a particular form, while the light which suffuses that form is not itself 
created with it, but rather resides there as a gift. The figurine partakes of the light, 
manifests that light in a particular way, unique to this artwork. The light is really and 
objectively present there in the figurine, and it is the same as that of the lamp.             
Recalling the previous chapter, we may learn from the poetry of R. S. Thomas 
that God’s beauty is not to be conquered by force, does not let itself be coerced into 
presence, but comes as a gift - to the one who waits. We recall the patience exhibited in 
and by Thomas’ poems, when the waiting entails taking up one’s position in the absence 
and the darkness; and we recall that a prerequisite of receiving the gift of presence is that 
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we renounce our own selves’ claim to completion and instead open ourselves in the hope 
of receiving fulfilment from God. Thus, in lines from “The Bright Field” not quoted 
above, we read:   
 
I have seen the sun break through 
to illuminate a small field 
for a while, and gone my way 
and forgotten it. But that was the pearl  
of great price, the one field that had 
the treasure in it. I realize now  
that I must give all that I have 
to possess it (Thomas 1993, p.302).   
 
Here again, then, is an echo of Eliot’s call to go by the way of dispossession; this 
is indeed the way whereby and whereon we may be rewarded with beauty. We learn from 
Thomas, as from many others, that God’s beauty cannot be of our making, cannot be a 
thing created, because it is a bestowal of grace.     
It is my meaning – in saying that beauty is a gift, and that to possess beauty is to 
be in the likeness of God – that beauty is uncreated. That is, artworks, nature, persons 
may be created and beautiful – indeed, they may be created beautiful – but their beauty is 
not created; it is not a ‘created beauty’ of which they partake and which they manifest. 
The beautiful thing or person is created, but its relation and likeness to God is not; which 
is tantamount to saying that, insofar as something is in the image of God, a share of that 
thing is uncreated, and that thing has a share in the uncreated.      
 
 
2.3.3 A Trinitarian model  
 
Now, in arguing that the beautiful object is beautiful in the image and likeness of God, 
and that beauty is manifested in such an object by the gift of God, we must attempt to 
articulate – albeit in a cursory, concise manner – how it is that beauty should be properly 
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attributed to God. It is hoped that my take on this theological problem is consistent with 
my model, as developed so far, of beauty as gratuity, and consistent with the experience 
of this beauty in Christian works of art.       
Here, while acknowledging their contributions, I must contend again with the 
particulars of Maritain’s and Aquinas’ positions. We are in agreement in generally 
ascribing beauty to God, in naming God beautiful and the fount of all beauty. It is in the 
details that my model diverges from the Scholastic account; namely, in the question of 
precisely how beauty belongs to God.      
Firstly, I would lay a different, and perhaps a greater, emphasis on beauty’s 
Trinitarian character. God is Beauty, and beauty belongs to God, eminently and above all 
as Trinity; not because of the ‘integrity’, ‘proportion’ or ‘harmony’ of the triune God, so 
much as for the mutuality of the three Persons, their dynamic perichoresis of love, delight 
and radiant glory. This is to invoke the language of Hart, Bulgakov and others (of a 
predominantly Orthodox tradition) over the customary terminology of Latin and Anglo-
Saxon thought.16 Thus Didymus the Blind calls beauty the “’triadic adornment of 
creation’”, and Yannaras comments that “the beauty of created things is […] the 
disclosure of the single and at the same time triadic mode of the divine energy” 
(Yannaras 2007, p.90).         
Beauty, on this view, does not strictly ‘subsist’ or ‘inhere’ in any ‘part’ of God, 
nor does it belong to the ‘totality’ of God, but is rather that abundant outpouring of glory 
which, though internal to God, also reveals and communicates God to the world. Thus 
Hart claims that beauty “is being itself, the moment of being’s disclosure, the eloquence 
by which everything, properly and charitably regarded, says infinitely more than itself” 
(Hart 2003, p.146). As Beauty, then, and in beauty’s bestowal, God gives (beyond) 
Himself – not as a formal manifestation, but as something over and above form.                
I am not in agreement, therefore, with Aquinas’ way, endorsed by Maritain, of 
allocating beauty to the second Person on the Trinity. “In the Trinity,” Aquinas holds, 
and Maritain with him, “the title Beauty is specially appropriated to the Son” (Maritain 
                                                 
16
 John Navone, similarly, holds “that God (especially as triune) is the instance of primary beauty, and that 
this beauty is not merely proportion. What it is, however, is ‘Gods eternal delight’, which itself is the 
delightfulness of all creation” (Farley 2001, pp.76-77).  
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1943, p.32). This is a reasonable position, as the Son is said to be the visible image and 
form of the invisible God. Still, this identification of beauty with the formal aspect of 
God is to the detriment of the element of gratuity and, I believe, to a properly Trinitarian 
understanding of beauty.    
Preferably, I would refrain from such specific attributions altogether; but if it 
comes to assigning beauty to one of the three persons, I would follow Sergius Bulgakov 
in giving that name to the Holy Spirit. This, to my mind, ensures a dynamically 
Trinitarian model of beauty; it also helps to safeguard, and to make sense of, beauty’s 
nature as gift.       
When Maritain claims that God “is beauty itself, because he imparts beauty to all 
created beings, according to the peculiar nature of each” (Maritain 1943, p.31), this to me 
evokes the Spirit’s gracious descent on each person at Pentecost. Indeed, the Spirit is the 
Person in God who is most fittingly credited with transmitting God’s glory to that which 
is not of God – to creation, to human beings. In the Creed, it is the Spirit we address as 
the ‘Giver of life’. Thus, that “eternal Beauty” which, in Balthasar’s words, “always 
pours itself out in a superabundant irradiation that is beyond every demand and 
expectation” (von Balthasar 1982, p.417) is best identified, I believe, with the Spirit.          
Importantly, this is to speak of God in such a way as to allow the action of the 
Spirit to properly complement the action of the Son. For the account of artistic creation 
given above, in the metaphor of the glass figurine, is applicable also to the creation of 
God. We may want to say, with the scholastics, that God’s creation has integrity, 
proportion and clarity; but I must emphasise that beauty is again something added to this. 
By this I do not mean, of course, that beauty has its origin outside God, but that the 
beauty of creation, relative to its form, has its source in another person of the Trinity. In 
short, to the perfect creation carried out by the Father through the Son, the Spirit bestows 
the extra quality of beauty. In the words of St. Irenaeus, “’the Father makes beautiful by 
means of the Spirit what he creates by means of the Son’” (Nichols 2007, p.74). Thus we 
have something as astonishing as an added gratuity to an act already infinitely free and 
generous – making more glorious still what is already stamped with the genius and 
grandeur of God.      
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This is absolutely not to suggest a temporal sequence between the action of the 
Son and the action of the Spirit, anymore than it is to suggest a division between two 
‘autonomous’ agents; it is simply to elucidate the manifold simultaneity of God’s 
creation, for which formation does not exhaust the description, and for which 
beautification is a valid – indeed, a crucial – complementary term.    
Christ is, foremost, the form of the Father; definite, delineated, making the 
invisible visible, making God materially and physically present. As Basil the Great 
articulates it, “’the Person of the Son becomes as it were the form and face of the 
knowledge of the Father, and the person of the Father is known in the form of the Son’” 
(Nichols 2007, p.21). Thus Christian experience and theology, directed towards Christ 
and through him towards God, is foremost a matter, as Balthasar shows, of ‘seeing the 
form’ of God and God’s glory. Yet, I would argue that no one can see Christ – as no one 
can address or confess Christ – but in the Holy Spirit; for the special form of Christ is 
only discernible as Christ (and not, for example, as an ‘historical Jesus’) in the light and 
beauty of the Spirit. The apprehension of the form of Christ is indivisible from, 
impossible without, the apprehension of that Beauty in which the form abides. Thus the 
full and dynamic manifestation of the Christ-form and its Beauty is truly a Trinitarian 
event.               
For Aquinas, “The Son is beauty as the Father’s perfect Image, proportioned to 
him, resplendent with expressivity as his word” (Nichols 2007, p.11). Yet here is an 
account which leaves out the Spirit: say rather, the Son is beautiful as the Father’s perfect 
image and visible form, resplendent with the beauty bestowed by the Spirit – for this is a 
Trinitarian account. The idea of ‘proportion’ here marks a difference between my model 
and the scholastic understanding of beauty; I have already argued how proportion is 
neither essential to beauty’s nature, nor a necessary criterion of its manifestation. The 
qualities of mutual delight, mutual freedom and love are abundant in the Trinity; these 
are not just ‘proportionate’ to the Trinity’s form or nature, they are disproportionate, 
gratuitously overflowing – and it is the Spirit we hold responsible for this excess. Thus I 
think it more appropriate to speak of beauty in terms of glory, not harmony or proportion. 
My model finds support in Bulgakov, for whom glory is identified particularly with the 
Holy Spirit, while ‘kingdom’ and ‘power’ are identified, respectively, with the Father and 
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Son. For Bulgakov, “beauty is a palpable manifestation of the Holy Spirit” (Bulgakov 
2012, p.105).    
To conclude this tentative Trinitarian defence of my model of beauty, then, I may 
join Bulgakov in naming the Holy Spirit “’the hypostasis of Beauty’” (Nichols 2007, 
p.76), in the hope that this is supportive of and consistent with the experience of beauty 
as granted by Christian art. That is, I ground my account of beauty as a gift of God by 
suggesting that beauty is already a gift even in God, in the relations of the Trinity.     
 
Now I wish to conclude this chapter by invoking another work of Christian art. In Gerard 
Manley Hopkins’ “Pied Beauty” we have, I believe, both a poetic-philosophical defence 
of the model of beauty I have championed and, more importantly, an exemplary instance 
of a delightful, beautiful work of Christian art.           
Hopkins, himself influenced by scholastic thought, does justice to the best strands 
of that theological thinking on beauty; for he illustrates truly Maritain’s realisation that 
“this very brilliance of form, the essence of beauty, shines on matter” – I would say, is 
manifested in matter – “in an infinite variety of ways” and that “Beauty therefore does 
not consist in conformity to a certain ideal and unchanging type” (Maritain 1943, pp.28-
29). Yet the achievement of Hopkins, and the vision his poem enables, should incline us 
further, I believe, to my own model; for it is certainly the gratuity of beauty which is here 
given due, and duly exultant, recognition. For here, I believe, beauty is evoked, not as a 
matter of proportion and harmony, but as an ineffable quality, charitably given to all 
manner of idiosyncratic particulars – “all things counter and strange” – on account of the 
unique and uniquely significant form of each. Each in its own form, and its own 
inimitable way, manifests the glory and bounteous beauty of God, and so each “dappled 
thing” can be seen within His likeness, and His likeness can be seen in each.   
For the marvel of it all, so elegantly captured by Hopkins’ dazzling poetics, is that 
this beauty of particular and peculiar things, not only has its source in the beauty of God, 
but is the same as that infinite, inexhaustible beauty; so that all the beauty we encounter 
in this changeable world, “He fathers-forth whose beauty is past change.” Fittingly, then, 
we are enjoined to “Praise him.”     
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In conclusion, the poem itself is an exquisite giving of praise. Born of delight and 
gratitude, it is a perfectly appropriate response to Beauty’s gratuity; it shows us how to 
direct our vision and our desire to and through the particulars of creation, and how to 
participate, creatively and charitably, in the Trinitarian glory which graces this world.  
 
Pied Beauty   
  
Glory be to God for dappled things - 
   For skies of couple-colour as a brinded cow; 
      For rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim; 
 Fresh-firecoal chestnut-falls; finches' wings; 
   Landscape plotted and pieced - fold, fallow, and plough; 
      And áll trádes, their gear and tackle and trim. 
 
All things counter, original, spare, strange; 
   Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?) 
     With swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim; 
 He fathers-forth whose beauty is past change: 
                Praise him. 
    (Hopkins 1961, p.24) 
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CHAPTER 3: THE GOOD OF CHRISTIAN ART 
      
Building on the models of form and beauty already given, this chapter offers an account 
of the good of Christian art, which also anticipates the subsequent discussions of 
ontology and of love.        
It is chiefly my understanding of Godlikeness in terms of the manifestation of 
beauty which forms the basis of my account of the good of Christian art, as indeed it 
forms the basis of my understanding of the Good. I am proposing what I call an iconic 
model of the Good; whereby that is good which partakes of and manifests the Good, 
where this Good is Beautiful. I am, but I am not only, arguing that beauty is the relevant 
and decisive good of Christian art; I am also grounding this stipulation in a model which 
holds that the Beauty of God is the good above others towards which our lives should be 
oriented.      
Thus it is my intention here to subsume some familiar dichotomies of aesthetic 
discourse under a concern for what transfigures the world and manifests divine realities. 
One such is the contrast between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental’ goods, the ‘good for’ and 
the ‘good in itself,’ of an artwork; Christian art resists such polarities and affirms a 
commitment to both kinds of value. Another dichotomy – that between being ‘good as’ a 
work of art, and being good pure and simple – is also problematic when it comes to 
Christian art. For it may be that it is through (the good of) an artwork that we have access 
to a good which transcends it; and it may be that the particular artwork is only properly 
pronounced good by virtue of its participation in that transcendent Good.       
The need to be wary of these apparent dichotomies is further motivated by the 
critical importance of beauty to the work of Christian art. My account of beauty, given in 
the previous chapter, implies that we may not consider a work of Christian art good – in 
any of the senses here hinted at – if it is not also beautiful.                
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
3.1 ENDS AND INSTRUMENTS OF THE GOOD  
 
We should always take care to approach an artwork as, in some relevant sense, an end in 
itself; our judgements of a work’s goodness should be concerned primarily with its 
artistic and aesthetic qualities, and not with any didactic or other external values. In 
general terms, then, priority should always be given to what we call the ‘intrinsic’ values 
of an artwork; however, in line with everything I have argued above about the 
discernment of form and beauty, these qualities and values are relational and only 
possessed by the work as fully and properly contextual.      
At the same time, a concern for the so-called ‘instrumental’ values – better 
construed as the artwork’s being good for something else – may be difficult to escape. 
After all, an intuition that (attending to) the artwork is at least, in some minimal sense, 
good for us – even is only as a source of diversion, comfort or laughter – is surely part of 
our motivation to engage with art in the first place. As regards the Christian work of art, 
this sense of the experience being good for us has more gravity; for a proper encounter 
with works by Fra Angelico, say, may be understood to be good for our Christian life and 
our relation to God. Thus the value of the artwork ‘in itself’ and its being good for 
something other or greater than itself are virtually inseparable.    
This is not to say that the instrumental trumps or supplants the intrinsic. It may be 
true to say that art, simply by being what it is, is always for human perceivers; if so, then 
the relevant goods of such artworks may also be taken to be dependent upon the relation 
between work and audience. However, the case of Christian art, on my model, suggests 
that a work may be good without any reference to a reader or a viewer; for as an object 
manifesting the beauty of God, a fresco by Fra Angelico is good, in itself, even when 
there is no one around to see it17. The divine beauty of which it partakes is really there in 
the work, and really renders the work good, even as it waits for a human to appreciate it. 
 
 
                                                 
17 At the same time, of course, on a theological conception, we humans are disposed to recognise and 
indeed to strive for the beautiful. Beauty does not come into being by our powers of perception, by the eyes 
of its beholders; on the contrary, it is already there for us to discern, and there to guide our perceptions and 
dispositions to God.      
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3.1.1 Good ‘in itself’ and good for   
 
“So soon as we begin to consider a work as anything other than an end in itself,” writes 
Clive Bell, “we leave the world of art” (Bell 1914, p.102). This is true, as far as it goes. It 
does not preclude, however, that we must also be attentive to the relations between 
several works, all of which are original ends in themselves, which together may mean 
something greater than a single work in isolation; nor should it preclude that the ends of 
art also constitute significant moments within a life that is, on the whole, directed at a 
more all-encompassing end. Fra Angelico’s frescoes in the monastery of San Marco may 
serve to illustrate this; for here is a family of artworks which – and in this they are 
perfectly symbolic of the monastic situation itself – together constitute a vision of the 
Christian life which is infinitely richer than the view offered by the piece in any one cell; 
and which, moreover, are executed for the sake of furnishing the religious life with 
appropriately inspiring images of appreciation, contemplation, and love. The value of 
these artworks, of this composite artwork, lies in the ability of the painted images to 
exemplify and enhance the life lived for God – as well as to glorify God by their forms 
and their beauty. This is what these frescoes are for, and good for, but this is also, 
crucially, what these works are ‘in themselves’; there is no way, in a case like this, to 
separate the aesthetic or artistic values of the works from their Christian value.           
Of course, we must always be careful not to speak of works of art solely as 
‘means’ to other ends, even if this appears in some respects inescapable. Even Bell seems 
unable to escape the tension, and the potential contradiction, for he insists upon the 
artwork’s status as end even as he claims that “all art is moral because […] works of art 
are immediate means to good” (p.20). Similarly, the Christian work of art must be treated 
as an end, as an object of loving and imaginative attention, not to be appropriated for 
other purposes than the appreciation of its integral qualities and the experience it offers; 
at the same time we must recognise that every such work of art does open beyond itself 
and does invite the perceiver to look through it as much as at it. If we allow that works of 
art may grant us uniquely inspiring, ecstatic or reflective experiences, we should be able 
to grant that they contribute to enhance the Christian life without being characterised as 
mere ‘means’ to that end.      
112 
 
This, then, should allow us to acknowledge as valid the question of what Christian 
art is good for. Importantly, however, neither the question nor the answer should be taken 
to imply a functional order of values, but rather to refer to a greater end. It is one thing to 
suggest that the San Marco frescoes are good for preventing mould and cracks in the 
stonework – or that The Brothers Karamazov is good for curing insomnia and killing 
mice – and quite another to claim, as I am doing, that it is good for the cultivation of 
desire; that is, that the very experience of the artwork may aid the viewer or reader in 
seeing all things in the light of the love of God.  
I am not saying that art is good because it teaches or proclaims Christianity, either 
through representation, exposition or didactics, but that it is good because of the 
experience it offers, as an artistic and aesthetic object, and because the beauty it manifests 
renders the world more in the likeness of God.    
   
We must amend Bell’s assumption that the highest good is a good state of mind. On 
Bell’s view, “to seek any other moral justification for art, to seek in art a means to 
anything less than good states of mind, is an act of wrong-headedness to be committed 
only by a fool or a man of genius” (Bell 1914, p.114). We may say – as Robert Adams 
might – that a good state of mind is one which, in some sense, resembles God; or, less, 
confusingly, that a good state of mind is oriented towards, responsive to and reflective of, 
the Good of God. We may also say, trivially, that such states of mind are indeed the most 
desirable and the highest states of mind we may achieve. But this, of course, is already to 
affirm a good which is both irreducibly other and infinitely greater than the state of mind 
which, in some manner and some measure, partakes of it. Crucially, this good is not only 
mental or immaterial, but may indeed be manifested and given us in material form, under 
the form of paint and wood of Christian works of art, or under the form of bread and 
wine.       
Moreover, in speaking of our orientation towards God, we must take care to speak 
not simply of states of mind, but of the whole embodied personality; for it is this which is 
in the image of God. It is this whole person – not the mind alone, but also the senses and 
the will, our memories and desires, as indeed our bodies – which is engaged in the 
experience of great and beautiful works of art. Sometimes, even physical exertion is 
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asked of us in the proper engagement with a work of art; often our experience entails 
patience and perseverance through time, as when listening (and more than listening) to 
Rachmaninov’s All-Night Vigil, for example, or when climbing the domes and towers of 
great cathedrals.              
 
I am sympathetic, in general, to Robert Adams’ prioritising ‘excellence’ over ‘well-
being’ (or what is good for a person). As I shall show, however, ‘excellence’ on my 
model is not synonymous with either beauty or goodness, nor is it a criterion of either. A 
Christian work of art is good by virtue of its beauty; it does not also have to be excellent, 
but may be flawed or damaged.     
By excellence, Adams (1999) means “the type of goodness exemplified by the 
beauty of a sunset, a painting, or a mathematical proof, or by the greatness of a novel, the 
nobility of an unselfish deed, or the quality of an athletic or philosophical performance” 
(p.83). We may speak of this kind of goodness as a goodness of the thing in itself, 
without reference to external or instrumental values. It is good that a thing is so (noble, 
great, harmonious); it is good that it is, pure and simple. Crucially, this “is the goodness 
of that which is worthy of love or admiration, honour or worship” (p.83). Here we seem 
to enter into a territory or mode of appreciation which emphatically surpasses any appeals 
to what is merely pleasurable, or good for me, or good for the moment. That is, we seem 
to come up here against a kind of objective goodness which asks to be recognised as such 
and duly responded to. This chimes well with our experiences of good works of art; 
moreover, the suggestion here of a register of response which may include such attitudes 
as worship and reverence is certainly congenial to the case of Christian art.     
The priority of excellence over well-being, however, does not preclude that what 
is good in itself is also good for something else. What relevantly concerns us here is the 
possibility that something that is good in itself, such as a work of art, can also be 
fruitfully understood as being good for the persons who have a relation to it – both the 
artist and the viewer – and even for the world which it inhabits.   
What follows, I believe, from the prioritisation of excellence, is that any sensible 
account of what is good for us should be derived from the goodness of the thing in itself; 
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for it is good for us to encounter, to study, to love the beautiful and the excellent.18 
Importantly, we must first ask if the artwork is good in itself – that is, if it is a good 
artwork – before we can ask if it is good for the Christian life in which it is embedded; 
for any version of the ‘good for’ which fails to first consider the aesthetic and artistic 
qualities of the work in question threatens to misappropriate that work as a means for 
purely didactic ends.   
 
In keeping with the general dictum that an artwork should be appreciated and judged for 
the qualities it possesses ‘intrinsically’, I would affirm that non-Christian art may be good 
‘in itself’ without having to acknowledge a greater sphere or end of value, without being 
good for – indeed, without being for – anything beyond itself and the experience it 
engenders. Christian art, however, is always committed to a Good beyond itself, and thus 
to being good for something other than itself.   
It may be entirely inappropriate to ask whether a novel – be it a modern bestseller 
like The Da Vinci Code or a timeless classic like Pride and Prejudice – is good or not for 
the instilling of principles or the acquisition of virtue; for, arguably, these are not the 
kinds of ends or values which are relevant to the experience, enjoyment and appreciation 
of a work of literary fiction. But we are not wrong to ask – indeed, it would be wrong of 
us not to ask – that the frescos at San Marco should be good, in some sense, for the 
greater Christian life, for our growth in the love of God. If they are not, it would suggest 
that they do not manifest the forms and the beauty of God; and this, crucially, would not 
only be detrimental to the frescos’ ‘good for’ but also their ‘good in itself’ – for without 
that beauty they are not Christian works of art at all.              
To clarify: the ‘good for,’ as I construe it, does not entail a simply extrinsic or 
instrumental good and relation. The work of Christian art is such that, ‘in itself’, it is 
                                                 
18
 Indeed, to love the excellent and the beautiful – which may, vitally, include the poor, the broken, the 
dying – is not only good but, I would argue, is in a sense to do good, and to be good; on my thesis, if such 
things are done in the image of God, for the love of God’s likeness in other things and persons, it may also 
mean that to do so, to be so, is to be beautiful.  
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good for the greater glory of God; it is part of that greater glory, as it in itself (but of 
course not of itself, as its beauty is a gift of God) constitutes a manifestation of that glory. 
We must remember that the engagement with the work of Christian art entails an 
encounter with the Beauty of God – an intrinsically valuable, not to say invaluable, 
experience. It should be entirely unproblematic to say that it is good to experience the 
Beauty of God, while each Christian artwork, as a unique manifestation of that beauty, is 
a lovable end in itself.  
The critic of art will be concerned first and foremost with the qualities of the work 
itself. This should also be the focus of attention for the Christian who approaches a 
Christian work of art; but, being Christian, he will also (he cannot help but) evaluate the 
work, and the experience it offers, for the contribution it can make to his cultivation of 
love for the Good and the Beauty of God.    
We may say, then, that the work of Christian art could not be good ‘in itself’ 
without also being ‘good for’. Similarly, we shall see below how the Christian artwork 
cannot be good as a Christian artwork without also being good in the greater sense of 
partaking of or manifesting the Good.    
 
 
3.1.2 Doing and making good  
 
We must not forget, when dealing with art, that we are dealing with a human activity, and 
that the work of art entails a process of labour no less than a product. It is important, 
therefore, to consider the good of the making as well as the good of the thing made.  
This can be explored by considering Jacques Maritain’s contribution to the 
question of what good or goods pertain to works of art. Maritain, working under 
Scholastic categories, is concerned with the issue of the divergence or convergence of 
two different orders of value, two different kinds of good – namely, those of Ars and 
Prudentia, the practical and speculative or moral orders, respectively.               
Prudence is concerned with human good – the good for man, we might say – and 
good in relation to God; the concern of Art, meanwhile, “is for the work in question to be 
good in itself […] and it relates to the peculiar good or perfection not of the man making, 
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but of the work made” (Maritain 1943, p.7). But we must note, immediately, that the 
good of the work might indeed have its roots in the good of the man; in the skill, the 
virtue, and the mind of the maker. Such a skill is a good and valuable thing to possess – a 
kind of excellence, on Adams’ model – and as such is good also for the man. It may, 
furthermore, be the case that the good of the work – the good work – is good for all who 
encounter it, as an object and occasion for a valuable experience; in the case of Christian 
art, a Christian experience.   
To my mind, then, Maritain’s categories are effective only up to a point. I suspect, 
at least, that while the above classification or division may be suitable for understanding 
art and morals in general, it is not suitable to the particular phenomenon of Christian art. 
For if my model, as a whole, is fitting, then Christian art finds itself at the very centre of a 
human destiny that, in its holistic nature and final end, does not allow for such neat 
distinctions between art and prudence, making and morals, but which is concerned only 
with the dedication to transfiguration – which recognises only the iconic good of likeness 
to God.    
 
Maritain’s thoughts on these matters, however, revolve less around the issue of the 
practical and moral orders, and more around a second dichotomy that he discerns within 
Ars itself; namely, the difference between making and action, where art finds its place in 
the former category.    
As Maritain’s own musings make clear, there are subtle overlaps between making 
and action; for while art, “remains outside the line of human conduct, with an end, rules, 
and values, which are not those of the man, but of the work to be produced,” it is 
nevertheless essentially entwined with the human processes and values of its making; 
thus even “if art is not human in the end which it pursues, it is human, essentially human, 
in its method of working. It involves the making of a man’s work, stamped with the 
character of man” (Maritain 1943, p.7). Thus we come to speak of a virtue of art in the 
artisan.       
It is important to stress, as Maritain himself does, that this virtue of art does not 
translate into a moral virtue; for the “actions [of the artist] often runs contrary to his art” 
(p.12). That is, someone who makes good works doesn’t always do good deeds. We can 
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say, succinctly, that the artist is good at art, without this meaning that he is by any means 
an ethically exemplary person.   
I do think, however, that a work of art is very much an action, and one that 
demands a great deal of character and personality. Indeed, it demands the embodiment of 
the virtue of art, as Maritain tells us, not simply mechanical skill. This is not to say that 
this places the artwork, or the making of it, within the moral order, but to say that 
something more than the good of a ‘thing’ is involved in the good of the work; and it is to 
suggest that to make something good is itself a good thing to do.19      
Dostoevsky does not have to be a ‘good man’ in order to write his books, but the 
iconic good of his novels also, I suggest, attaches to the man (however flawed or sinful) 
who produced such things as The Brothers Karamazov. There is something exemplary, 
something iconic, not perhaps about the private individual, in isolation from his labours 
and his works, but precisely about the man in his making, his dedication, his 
achievement.      
Richard Viladesau, paraphrasing Thomas Aquinas, writes that “Like an artist, 
God creates for the sake of beauty. All things are made, therefore, to be beautiful, so that 
they imitate in various degrees their exemplary cause” (Viladesau 2013, p.115). Also the 
artist, I would argue, imitates God; so that the artist, whatever his other qualities, is iconic 
in his creation of beautiful things.     
Maritain suggests that such a man must be torn between the very different 
demands of two kinds of good; “as the artist is first a man and then an artist, it is easy to 
see what conflicts will rage in his heart between Art and Prudence, his character as Maker 
and his character as Man” (Maritain 1943, p.15). Perhaps this is true; in any case, it 
probably would be true if the artist subscribed to this dichotomy, if he recognised two 
such valid but competing claims on his person and his activities. I would suggest, 
however, that the two goods are more conflated than Maritain understands them, and that 
they may find joint and mutual fruition.     
                                                 
19 This is emphatically so when we come to consider the ethical and eschatological implications of 
Christian art; indeed, we may even find an imperative which tells us that ‘to make something good’ is 
something we should do – for the good of our calling, for the good of mankind, for the good of God.       
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The account of man as essentially an artist, a maker of signs and a maker of 
things, which I shall pursue in the following chapter, should go some way towards 
appeasing this apparent conflict of values. David Jones, with his idea of ‘man-the-maker,’ 
makes a crucial contribution to Maritain’s model. Under Jones’ tutelage, we can affirm 
that to ‘make good’ is no less vital – to man, to our relation to God – than to ‘do good’. 
This, I believe, is also Blake’s conviction. It can be supported, moreover, by voices from 
theology and theological aesthetics. Indeed, as we live in a fallen world that needs 
regeneration, our making – our making new, making beautiful anew – may be seen as our 
divinely appointed task and vocation above all. Thus there may be no place for Prudence 
as a separate category of value, as it is not a separate aspect of our lives, but is rather 
assimilated into the regenerative task.      
The conflict that Maritain posits is this: on the one hand, the “artistic habit [or 
virtue] is concerned only with the work to be done [and the] sole end of art is the work 
itself and its beauty”; while on the other hand, “for the man working, the work to be done 
of itself comes into the line of morality and so is merely a means […] It is therefore 
absolutely necessary for the artist, qua man, to work for something other than his work, 
something better beloved.” And “God,” Maritain claims, “is infinitely more lovable than 
Art” (p.74).      
Insofar as there is a problem here, I suggest that my own model is more capable 
than Maritain’s of solving it. There need not be an irreconcilable antinomy between the 
‘good in itself’ of the artistic effort and the ‘good for’ of the artist as man. For Christian 
art, as I conceive it, the end of the art-work is subsumed within, and also contributes to, 
the greater end of a more perfect vision and practice of love. The artwork is an object of 
love within a greater love; the artistic labour is carried out within a greater labour of love. 
Such must be the priorities governing Christian art. Perhaps the best way to appease or 
conflate the two spheres of making and action, then, is to conceive of both as two aspects 
of our works of love; for love is the end of both creativity and morals. Furthermore, love 
is both beautiful and good.      
Blake’s case is illustrative here, of an artist who is well aware of his personal 
flaws of virtue, but who conceives of his artistic labour as an act of devotion and a 
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sustained effort at revealing the goods of God. Thus Blake confesses at the beginning of 
Jerusalem:   
 
I am perhaps the most sinful of men; I pretend not to holiness: yet I pretend to 
love. to see. to converse with daily. as man with man: & the more to have an 
interest in the Friend of Sinners (Blake 2000, p.300).   
 
He ‘pretends’, crucially, to inspiration, and to use his creative powers entirely in 
the service of glorifying Christ. To do good for him, as I propose for the Christian artist 
in general, is to make good; and the question of how to be good – for the artist, whose life 
is dedicated to this making – is answered (in the only way possible for the artist) by his 
dedication to this creative, regenerative task. Thus, as we have already seen Blake 
proclaim, 
 
I rest not from my great task; 
To Open the Eternal Worlds. to open the immortal Eyes 
Of Man inwards […] into Eternity 
Ever expanding in the Bosom of God (p.302).    
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3.2 PARTICULAR AND TRANSCENDENT GOODS   
 
Whatever is the case for other art, Christian art is at least implicitly committed to (a belief 
in) an objective and transcendent good, which is in some sense identified as the Good of 
God. The Christian artwork, therefore, should be posited in relation to this good, and 
apprehended and appreciated accordingly.        
In general, as critics or lovers of art, we should direct our attention and our 
judgements towards the artwork as artwork – the novel as novel, the poem as poem – 
quite irrespective of its bearing on other issues. When appreciating and assessing the 
value of a particular poem, that is, we are first and foremost to engage with and address 
its poetic qualities; and not, for example, its merits as an ethical or political statement.   
As we saw above, however, such theoretically distinct spheres of value are 
difficult to entirely keep apart; thus, in a similar fashion to the admissible conflation of 
the good ‘in itself’ and the ‘good for’, the concern for the ‘good as’ of an artwork may 
legitimately open out to accommodate questions of the artwork being good, pure and 
simple, in a moral or religious sense – where the criterion of the work’s goodness is no 
longer simply the categorical framework of values that governs the making and reception 
of poems as poems, but indeed a supreme and transcendent Good.       
However keen we may be to safeguard to the greatest possible extent the 
artwork’s so-called autonomy from moralistic incursions of the Tolstoyan variety, I do 
believe that our assessment of an artwork – indeed, the very act of reading or perceiving 
– is inescapably informed by our faculties of moral judgement. The reading of a great 
novel, such as War and Peace, indisputably involves a holistic and composite 
engagement, where a real grasp on the significant forms of the novel – our understanding 
of characters, themes, narrative structures – demands of us a moral no less than an artistic 
literacy.   
Still, it is important, I believe – in keeping with the way many of us do speak 
about art – to maintain a distinction between two different discourses of the good; one of 
which concerns itself with the goods pertaining to particular things, disciplines or 
situations; another which maintains that all our judgements (and indeed our every use of 
the very word) of the good invokes a transcendent Good. The former way of 
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understanding the good – as the good of a particular thing, according to the criteria 
particular to its kind – is prevalent in aesthetic and artistic discourse, and perhaps 
justifiably so; for it does make sense to enquire if Ulysses is good as a novel in much the 
same way that we speak of the good of a car as a car, a fork as a fork, where the relevant 
criteria will be unique to each kind of object or phenomenon.   
We say that something is good as a work of art without meaning that it is also 
good in the stronger sense of disclosing and partaking of the Good, or the Good of God. 
Certainly, not every good artwork – however indisputably excellent as a play or a pop 
song – manifests the form and beauty of God.       
The Christian work of art, however, is characterised by this very ambition and 
achievement; and this commits it to a different understanding of the good from that which 
pertains to non-Christian art. It need not trouble the atheist or secular artist that their 
works are only ‘good as’ without also partaking of some transcendent, let alone divine or 
theistic, Good; but the Christian artist must aim to satisfy both conditions. Indeed, 
Christian art, even in order to be good as Christian art, needs to be good in the sense of 
partaking of and manifesting the Good of God.              
Now, beauty is needed to ensure that the Christian artwork is good (in both senses 
currently under discussion); for beauty is a criterion of what makes a hymn or an 
altarpiece good as a Christian work of art, and it is also beauty which manifest God and 
thus makes the work in question good.20 But beauty is not present in all paintings or 
novels that we call good works of art; it may even be an inappropriate element in some 
artworks, contrary to the governing ideas of the school or genre, as in the case of much 
post-modern and conceptual art. Beauty is therefore not always a criterion of the work 
being good as. Works may be great art without being good in the iconic sense of 
disclosing the Good and Beauty of God. Importantly, just as beauty is not a criterion of 
all art, though it is the chief criterion of Christian art, so we do not say that all good 
works of art need to be Christian; only that all Christian works of art need to be good.    
      
                                                 
20 I must reiterate here, lest we forget, that beauty is neither synonymous with, nor dependent upon, the 
achievements of harmony and proportion; nor, though every beautiful work is exemplary by virtue of its 
beauty, does the beautiful work need to be ‘excellent’ in the sense of flawlessness or perfection.    
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3.2.1 The good and the real 
 
It is useful, in developing this model of the good of Christian art, to engage again with 
Leo Tolstoy; indeed, our differing understandings really come to a head as regards the 
questions of the relation between the good and the beautiful.     
Good art, so Tolstoy’s argument goes, is that which conveys good feelings and 
experiences of the good. Thus it is Tolstoy’s understanding that “art is a human activity 
the aim of which is to convey to others the loftiest and best feelings people have attained 
to in life” (Tolstoy 1995, p.53). I have already taken issue with this emphasis on feelings 
in my first chapter. Recalling the aspiration of the forms of Christian art to disclose ‘the 
real’, I also hold that the good of Christian art pertains to the reality which is disclosed by 
the work, and not to the feelings which may or may not attend it. To be good, Christian 
art has to manifest a good reality – indeed, to manifest the reality of the Good – and, 
moreover, a good way of seeing, and a good way of living in relation to, that reality.  
On my conception, crucially, that good reality which Christian art seeks to 
manifest is beautiful. Tolstoy, however, sets the beautiful and the good up as 
diametrically opposed concepts. For him, “The good is the eternal, the highest aim of our 
life,” while “the beautiful […] is nothing other than what is pleasing to us” (p.52). Much 
of Tolstoy’s attack on beauty, with which we have already engaged, follows from his 
defence of a particular understanding of the good. His critique of beauty, we have seen, is 
really a critique of the pleasurable sensation of beauty; and this stance, importantly, is 
consistently founded on a fear of any conflation of the pleasurable and the good. Tolstoy, 
identifying trends within the history of aesthetics to make beauty synonymous with either 
the pleasurable or the good, compounds these into an account which renders the good 
solely a matter of sensory, subjective and momentary pleasure. Whether this accurately 
reflects any actually held theories or not, nothing could be more offensive to Tolstoy’s 
own philosophy, with its strenuous practical ethics, and its markedly puritanical and 
instrumental conception of the good. Thus beauty, seen as the catalyst of the above 
conflation, is set up in Tolstoy’s own dialectic as the very opposite and negation of the 
good.   
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The Christian response is firstly to defend a so-called hedonistic aspect of the 
good – to affirm that ‘pleasurable’ experiences of delight, for example, are not alien but 
native to the realm of the good – and secondly to show, as I have sought to do, that 
beauty is not a matter of subjective pleasure but of participation in an objective goodness 
which is bestowed by God.        
Importantly, since the good on his understanding cannot accommodate either that 
which is pleasing or that which is an object of desire or eros, as beauty is, Tolstoy holds 
that “The more we give ourselves to beauty, the more removed we are from the good” 
(p.52). Thus we end up with a kind of inverse of my own thesis, which works within the 
belief that to give ourselves to the beautiful is to approach the good, or more precisely, 
that the pursuit of the good is most truly realised in giving ourselves to the love of beauty.          
“No matter how we understand the good,” says Tolstoy, “our life is nothing else 
than a striving towards the good – that is, towards God” (p.52). But the striving that he 
mentions may not be the yearning and reaching out that Gregory of Nyssa has in mind 
when speaking of epektasis. Indeed, it is hard to see how the kind of effort advertised by 
Tolstoy could ever bring us closer to a God which is – and asks to be approached as – the 
inexhaustible giver of infinite beauty; for it is Tolstoy’s conviction that “The concept of 
beauty not only does not coincide with the good, but is rather the opposite of it, because 
the good for the most part coincides with a triumph over our predilections, while beauty 
is the basis of all our predilections” (p.52).     
Nothing could be further from the idea of the good and the beautiful – indeed, 
from the idea of our human nature and vocation – under which I am working. For on the 
account that I inherit from Gregory and others, it is affirmed that a longing for the good 
and the beautiful is the aboriginal condition of man as created in the image of God. The 
good does not simply entail a triumph of will over our base nature, nor does the 
experience of beauty entail simply a concession to our faults and weaknesses; rather, the 
reaching out for the good and beautiful entail the realisation of our good desires and 
dispositions. In the words of David Bentley Hart, “As that which moves, becomes, is 
reborn or repeated, human nature’s perfection is nothing but this endless desire for beauty 
and more beauty, this hunger for God” (Hart 2004, p.190). It is this kind of understanding 
of man, of our desires and dispositions, and our relation to the good, the beautiful and to 
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God, which must inform our account. Thus what makes Christian art good is not its 
inculcation of sound moral principles, but its manifestation of the beauty of God. This 
marks my irreconcilable disagreement with Tolstoy.    
  
For Tolstoy, “Christian art is that alone which unites all people without exception” in 
fellow-feeling and a recognition of their equal relation to God, or the good, or, what 
amounts to the same thing, “the brotherhood of man” (Tolstoy 1995, p.130). “This 
effect,” he says, “is produced equally by art that conveys the feelings of the love of God 
and one’s neighbour and by everyday art that conveys the simplest feelings common to 
all people” (p.131).     
Quite apart from the problematic way of conceiving art in terms of the cause and 
effects of emotions, there is a danger attending this kind of levelling, in my mind, which 
entails both downplaying the demands an artwork can make on us and, significantly, 
ignoring the special revelation of Christianity where this may be at odds with common 
sense and conventional emotions.       
Tolstoy’s criterion of universality cannot be accepted as a criterion of art any 
more than a criterion of Christianity. Contrary to Tolstoy’s ideal and assumption, there is 
no such thing as “universal art” (p.132); all art is culturally, contextually and 
institutionally embedded. Aspects of any artwork may ‘transcend’ such frameworks, but 
the full meaning, the full experience, the full significance of its forms, are only to be had 
if the work is engaged with on its own terms. Similarly, the Christian conception of the 
Good is indissolubly interlaced with specific traditions of doctrine and worship, and with 
the particular Christian experience of a personal, Incarnate and Trinitarian God.           
Christianity, of course, accommodates a variety of traditions; and each such 
contextual framework, it must be stressed, may open onto a reality, truth and beauty 
which is neither particular to nor constricted by that framework. Thus a Christian will 
access what he takes to be real and true (regardless of circumstance or perspective) 
through the familiar forms of his particular tradition, where the invitations to the real, and 
the interpretations of it, are given in a manner and style pertaining to a certain practice. 
For the Orthodox believer, the solemn Liturgy he knows and loves might do it, while a 
Protestant Evangelist manner of worship might not.          
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Importantly, we may experience the beauty of God through the fiction of 
Dostoevsky or the music of Arvo Pärt, but for this we must read the former as 
Dostoevsky and listen to the latter as Pärt, with all the requisite attention to genre, style 
and allusion that this entails. Moreover, we must recognise that these works are good as 
works of fiction or music, before we may receive the reality which they manifest, for it is 
as works of art that these pieces may manifest the Good and the Beautiful. We cannot see 
or partake of that goodness unless we know how to; that is, unless we know the rules of 
engagement, the ways of seeing, appropriate to novels, paintings or musical pieces.    
A kind of Christian fellow-feeling, along Tolstoyan lines, may well be an effect of 
experiencing such art, but it is not a necessary one, nor always a desired one, and it is 
certainly not a criterion of the work’s art-ness, Christian-ness or goodness.  
 
 
3.2.2 Integrity and openness  
 
Robert Adams argues that it is not “the presence of something qualitatively identical in 
all good things that constitute their goodness” but that “things are good by virtue of 
relation to some one supreme Good” (Adams 1999, p.39). My own account, insofar as 
beauty remains the chief criterion for the goodness of the Christian work of art, differs in 
this crucial respect; that the same divine beauty is indeed said to be present in each and 
every such artwork, albeit in a unique way. At the same time, the goodness of a thing, its 
likeness to God, is indeed grounded in an attitude and a relation – an openness, a 
reaching out towards God – and in the reciprocal attitude of God towards the thing in 
question; where God commends and embraces this thing precisely for its openness and its 
reaching out.    
Adams, to his credit, recognises how intimations of the infinite call to us in works 
of art; how art may both awaken and satisfy a dynamic hunger for transcendence. He 
observes that “the fracturing of the finite, as in the paintings of Van Gogh, seems to many 
to put us in touch with something even more wonderful than the more perfect finite 
things represented in, for example, the art of Raphael” (p.53). This observation follows 
upon a favourable invocation of Nietzsche’s insistence that we shoot the arrow of longing 
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beyond man, and his claim that “one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give 
birth to a dancing star” (p.53). The Christian version – a correction, and amplification – 
of this attitude is best exemplified, I believe, by Gregory’s and Hart’s epektasis; and this 
can effectively account for the role of art, our making and experience of it, within our 
reaching out for God’s glory.      
Richard Viladesau, similarly, suggests that “there is at the heart of every deep 
aesthetic experience – and perhaps particularly in music – an intense feeling of striving 
toward something beyond the moment” (Viladesau 2013, p.149); a feeling which he 
identifies with the longing for more beauty than the finite thing can contain. Viladesau 
also reminds us, as does Hart and Yannaras, that to be a good person – to become good – 
must be understood in terms of metanoia, repentance and conversion, and in terms of ec-
stasis and epektasis; that is, in terms of our perpetual re-orientation towards, and self-
transcendence within, the infinite glory of God. To be good – to be in a state of becoming 
good, becoming Godlike – means to be open-ended and open to divine inspiration.       
This has implications for how we perceive the integrity, consonance and 
completeness of the work of art. For we want a work of art to be, in a sense, internally 
complete; and we call it good, as art, if it excels within the framework of the medium, 
means and materials used, of the ideas and aims which are integral to it, and of the 
tradition to which it belongs. At the same time, something that is entirely self-contained 
and self-sufficient will not delight, evoke and inspire in the same way as something 
which invites the perceiver’s imaginative curiosity and commitment, and which rewards 
his own exploration of those sources of meaning and illumination which the work 
invokes. Thus we ask of an artwork that it is open to re-readings and re-visions, and that 
it is rich enough to strike us, on each subsequent encounter, as ever new; while, at the 
same time, retaining its enduring values.     
Something that is, persistently, formally and thematically, opaque to the human 
imagination and to human experience is not likely to be deemed a great work of art. Such 
works, much like a person who is entirely self-enclosed and thinks himself a self-
sustaining monad, is not likely to be seen as beautiful, whatever his other qualities. 
Crucially, such things, and such persons, do not invite love; there is nothing there which 
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suggests the need, and thus engenders the desire, for that mutual transfiguration which 
should also characterise our encounter with real art and objects of beauty.      
I must stress this aspect of love as absolutely central to my model of the Good. 
Adams suggests that the good with which he is concerned is “the goodness of that which 
is worthy of love or admiration” (Adams 1999, p.13). It is entirely right that the infinite 
Good should be construed as an object of love, as this tells us that a growth in goodness, 
and a growing responsiveness to good things, should entail a growth in love. However, in 
so far as Adams wants to retain, as an important aspect of his account, the element of 
admiration for a great variety of finite goods, our models diverge. For, to my mind, 
admiration falls short of a full and proper response to the Good. We can admire 
something that is ‘good as’, but the ultimate Good – also being the Beauty of God – 
should not only be admired, but loved.       
Adams, who thinks of beauty as one among many other goods, claims that “to say 
that an object is beautiful is to imply that it is good to admire it” (p.21). I would go 
further, arguing that to say that an object is beautiful is to say that it is good in such a way 
that we should love it; and moreover – in line with my account of desire and Godlikeness 
– that we should become beautiful in loving it.         
Thus I suggest that its so-called ‘open-endedness’ is as crucial an aspect of good 
art as is its ‘integrity’. Importantly, the open-endedness of an artwork should be 
understood, not as complementary to, but as synonymous with its integrity, as that which 
consolidates it as the thing that it is. Thus a work of art, even to be good as a work of art, 
needs a quality of openness to the world – at the very least, to the world of its audience, 
under whose discerning gaze it truly comes alive to yield the significance of its forms and 
meanings.   
A Christian work of art must also comply with this condition, to be good as a 
work of art; but further, be good as a Christian work of art, its openness must tend in the 
direction of God. That is, a Christian work of art, unlike a non-Christian work, in order to 
be ‘good as’, must also be open to – and partake of – the Good of God. Moreover, a 
Christian artwork, which longs for and which requires God’s beautifying gift, is ‘good 
as’ – and, at the same time, is truly good – only when it manifest the Beauty of God. In 
this, my model differs in crucial respects, not only from Tolstoy’s, but also from Adams’.    
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3.3 THE GOOD AND THE BEAUTIFUL   
  
In departing from Robert Adams’ model, an account of the Good more congenial to my 
own thesis is that found in Gregory of Nyssa’s Life of Moses.  
Insofar as this, technically speaking, is a kind of theistic Platonism, Gregory’s 
account is compatible with that of Adams; there are, however, important differences. 
While Gregory and Adams agree that the Good is infinite, for Gregory, emphatically, the 
Good is also infinite Beauty. The following claims by Thomas Aquinas, here in Aidan 
Nichols’ paraphrase, are closer to Gregory than Adams: “All things are turned toward the 
Beautiful and Good, desiring God as their end […] Everything aspires towards the 
beautiful, then, just as everything is constructed by reference to it” (Nichols 2007, p.13). 
If Adams’ approach can be described as analytic, Gregory’s may be better characterised 
as mystical – as the revelations it seeks to communicate are such as are to be most 
properly received, and embodied, within a deep experience of God’s infinite generosity.   
Gregory, like Adams, begins his treatise upon the assumption of a transcendent 
and infinite Good which is (of) God. “The Divine One is himself the Good,” writes 
Gregory, “and since the Divine does not admit of an opposite, we hold the divine nature 
to be unlimited and infinite” (Gregory 1978, p.31). From this metaphysical point follows 
immediately the central thesis of Gregory’s treatise; his very interesting ‘mystical ethics’ 
as we might call it, which develops into a kind of theological aesthetics: “Certainly, 
whoever pursues true virtue participates in nothing other than God, because he is himself 
absolute virtue. Since, then […] this good has no limit, the participant’s desire itself 
necessarily has no stopping place but stretches out with the limitless” (p.31). This 
limitlessness is what Hart comes to call ‘the Trinitarian distance,’ within which all human 
desire and love for the beautiful is enacted. “It is therefore undoubtedly impossible to 
attain perfection,” Gregory claims, but for this very reason “the perfection of human 
nature consists perhaps in its very growth in goodness” (p.31). This growth is a growing 
likeness to the Trinitarian God, in whom our desire for the good and the beautiful seeks 
its consummation; in whom we recognise the infinite perfection of which, by grace, we 
may become finite participants.    
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Significantly, the concept or name of Beauty is introduced by Gregory as, inspired 
by Moses’ insatiable desire for participating in God, he articulates the very essence of his 
treatise:  
 
Such an experience [of epektasis, of progress from glory to glory] seems to me to 
belong to the soul which loves what is beautiful. Hope always draws the soul 
from the beauty which is seen to what is beyond, always kindles the desire for the 
hidden through what is constantly perceived. Therefore, the ardent lover of 
beauty, although receiving what is always visible as an image of what he desires, 
yet longs to be filled with the very stamp of the archetype. And the bold request 
which goes up the mountain of desire asks this: to enjoy the Beauty not in mirrors 
and reflections, but face to face (Gregory of Nyssa 1978, pp.114-115).    
 
Though God is also named the Good, at this point of Gregory’s treatise – at the 
peak of it – the ‘moral name’ and the language of virtue yields to the ‘aesthetic name’ 
and the language of vision and desire. This seems more appropriately to evoke and 
characterise the longing to behold and participate in the abundant glory and radiant love 
of God. The ‘aesthetic’ account more precisely and more powerfully articulates the kind 
of experience we are concerned with; indeed, the emphasis on experience itself invites 
the aesthetic, rather than the moral, characterisation – for we are not speaking of a 
conceptualisation, or evaluation, of God, but of a full embodied experience and vision of 
God’s glory, and while this is not intelligibly construed as a ‘moral experience,’ it may 
fruitfully be described as an aesthetic one.          
It is within the kind of story told by Gregory of Nyssa, I believe, that the practice, 
experience and evaluation of Christian art ought to be positioned. For the Christian artist 
aims for beauty in his art as in his life, as also Robert Bridges affirms:   
 
our true compass in art as our comfort in faith, 
our daily bread of pleasur […] thus I deem 
of Beauty among Goddes best gifts, and even above 
the pleasur of Virtue accord it honour of men (Bridges 1934, p.95).  
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3.3.1 Resemblance and likeness 
 
My model of the good differs from Adams’ primarily over our different understanding of 
Godlikeness. A thing is good, says Adams, insofar as it resembles God in some respect. 
A thing is only truly good, and in the likeness of God, I say, if it manifests the beauty of 
God. Thus when Adams says that “other things are excellent insofar as they resemble or 
imitate God” (Adams 1999, p.29), I react here to the inclusion of ‘imitation’; if this is 
synonymous to resemblance, this provides a reason for me to speak instead of likeness, 
and to understand this likeness not in the sense of mimesis but manifestation. Indeed, I do 
not think that God can be imitated – or that it means a great deal to speak of imitating 
God – but that he can be ever-variously invoked and manifested; just as he does not 
repeat himself, in the sense of a copy or reproduction, but rather, in the sense of a musical 
variation, ever expresses his eternal glory anew.       
Rather than suggesting that any ‘worldly’ instance of the good will necessarily be 
a ‘radically imperfect’ likeness of God, I prefer to say that any such instance does not 
exhaust the Goodness of God; not because God is holding anything back, but because his 
generosity is endless, and because the thing – or the artwork – is finite. More importantly, 
our vision and our capacity for love are imperfect: we behold as much of God’s beauty in 
each beautiful thing as we are capable of – and the more such things we properly discern, 
and rightly desire, the more we grow in capacity to receive what God gives, for our path 
towards him, our growth in Godlikeness, consists precisely in the cultivation of our 
responsiveness to that goodness, beauty and glory which he unceasingly bestows.  
My model has the advantage, over Adams’, that the God-likeness of a thing does 
not have to be located in or identified with a particular internal property of that thing; it is 
rather a quality of possessing something over and above itself. As such, likeness has its 
source in gratuity, in the generosity of God himself. Which is to say that we manifest 
goodness and beauty precisely when we love, create and give beyond ourselves, when we 
open onto, and reach out toward, others – and to the energies and the glory of God.21  
                                                 
21 This model may be further defended with reference to Christos Yannaras’ understanding of the ek-static 
nature of personhood (Person and Eros 2007).   
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Adams, on the other hand, who seeks to locate the resemblance to God more 
empirically in the thing itself, in a particular excellence of that thing, and to identify a 
corresponding or analogous property in God, often has to labour his point; as when he 
suggests that one’s cooking might manifest a resemblance to God’s creativity (Adams 
1999, p.30) or when, as a counter example, he has to concede that a three-leafed clover, 
though it shares the three-in-oneness of the Trinity, is not thereby better than a four-
leafed clover (p.32). It is better, I think, to speak of Godlikeness in terms of manifested 
beauty; where the ineffable nature of this manifestation has its source, not in some 
torturously defined property of the thing, but in the sheer generosity of God.   
 
Adams, when he speaks directly of beauty, which is but briefly, includes it as one of 
many excellences, and one of many ways of resembling God. On my theory, on the other 
hand, beauty is the way, above any other resemblance, in which a thing manifests 
likeness to God.        
For example, justice, unless it is beautiful justice, is not iconic, does not manifest 
Godlikeness; nor is creativity iconic, unless it are beautiful. For all such things may, 
conceivably, in being done for the wrong end – a tyrant’s summary ‘justice’, a murderer’s 
‘ingenuity’ – tend away from God, be closed or opposed to God; and, as such, may be the 
gravest examples of ugliness, opacity and distortion of God’s image. Nor, by the same 
reasoning, is the harmony of a painting, the eloquence of a novel, or the sublime majesty 
of a symphony enough to render these artwork in the likeness of God; for if they do not, 
in their significant forms, as the artworks they are, in their ‘integral open-endedness’ 
reach out for God’s gift, then however good they may be – as paintings, novels or 
musical compositions – they will not be good in the iconic sense of manifesting the 
Beauty of God.    
 
 
3.3.2 God as co-appreciator and co-creator 
 
It is implied, by my account of the beauty of an artwork as a divine gift, that God is 
implicated in the artwork’s completion or perfection. This beauty being what makes the 
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artwork truly good, it would seem to follow that this artwork is good, not simply by its 
relation to the Good of God, but indeed by God having a hand in its making.            
Here, I am committed to stronger claims than those made by Adams in his model 
of resemblance to God. Adams is to be saluted for his bold move of taking God’s 
appreciation and judgement into consideration of what we do, and should, appreciate and 
judge as good. My own model, however, will suggest a different way in which God’s 
affirmation of finite and created goods should figure in our experience and understanding 
of, in particular, beautiful works of Christian art.           
On Adams’ theory, “we can say that what God appreciates is indeed good” 
(Adams 1999, p.35), as God is the best judge of what resembles God. On my own theory, 
we can say that what God beholds as good is indeed beautiful. For I wish to say that that 
is graced with beauty which receives God’s aesthetic affirmation; which pleases him, 
when seen, to adopt Aquinas’ definition of beauty, and to which he – in his very act of 
affirmative appreciation – bestows his own beauty. At the same time, importantly – as I 
have argued in the previous chapter – it is to the infinite generosity of God that the 
Christian artwork is offered as a gift in return. Thus we say that certain works of art are in 
the likeness of God, not simply because they have found favour with God and so have 
received a share of his beauty, but very much because the forms they achieved were such 
as to embody a right responsiveness and attitude towards God, his forms and his beauty.    
Our works are good when God sees that they are good; as, in the Genesis account, 
“God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good” (Genesis 1:31), 
so we should recognise the God-favoured, God-affirmed work as beautiful, as bearing the 
beauty of God. We may say that that is most like God which God likes the most. Indeed, 
as I believe the quote from Genesis suggests, God’s appreciation and approval of his own 
creation is primarily aesthetic, not a matter of moral judgement. Hart, in this vein, speaks 
of God creating and appraising the world as ‘good’ at an aesthetic distance: “and this 
goodness is perfectly aesthetic” (Hart 2004, p.272).       
On my theory, then, we do not have to say that God only appreciates that which 
already resembles him; rather, these things become more properly like him, more fully 
conformed to his likeness, when he, by his generous appreciation and love, manifests his 
own beauty in their forms. Pertinent here is the observation of Dionysius the Areopagite, 
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invoked by Maritain, that God’s “love causes the beauty of what He loves, whereas our 
love is caused by the beauty of what we love” (Maritain 1943, p.27).  
Importantly, there are many beautiful things which are not much good as 
anything, which are perhaps perfectly useless, broken and obsolete; but as God loves the 
poor, the heartbroken, and the suffering – as he loves even the sinners – so he may 
appreciate also such ruins, fragments and botched attempts which reach out to his 
generous Spirit for repair or fruition. On this understanding, it is perhaps easier for me 
than for Adams to claim that something can be beautiful and good which is not 
‘excellent’ in any obvious sense; as my theory, unlike Adams’, is not committed to 
excellence, it is less problematic for me to affirm the divine beautification of our half-
successes and failings.          
Just like our own engagement with beautiful works of art, God’s involvement in 
our creative efforts is no mere ‘disinterested interest’. Indeed, we may say that this 
distance of appreciation is ‘reduced’ to the point of becoming a presence. Now, not only 
is this presence of God’s beauty that which renders an artwork good; it is also this which 
commends the work as a proper object of love.    
 
 
3.3.3 Love of the good    
 
In drawing this chapter to its conclusion, it is important to address again the kind of 
response the object of goodness and beauty calls for and calls forth. My pronouncements 
here will again recall as well as resume my account of the cultivation of desire. One term 
to seize on, in this regard, is that of eros. This finds a central place in Gregory of Nyssa’s 
treatment of our love for the beautiful and the good, where eros is also used to mean an 
intense form of agape (Gregory of Nyssa 1978, p.186). Gregory’s picture of God as a 
valid object of eros is also defended, in slightly different terms, in Adams.22 Both Adams 
and Gregory consistently conceive of the Good as an object of love.           
                                                 
22 For a modern account more closely akin to Gregory’s, Yannaras’ Person and Eros is again an exemplary 
work.   
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Adams uses the term eros to characterise our pursuit, desire and love for good 
particulars, and for the intrinsic value of an object. This, as he presents it, is a pursuit 
arising from admiration and, importantly, from recognition of the qualities of the object. 
Adams is right to stress the element of recognition. For, on my model, the iconic good is 
not ‘judged’ as such by moral deliberation, according to a predetermined set of ethical (or 
aesthetic) criteria, but is rather recognised as such by vision and imaginative engagement. 
Not only does this chime with our experience and appreciation of Christian art; the 
visionary or imaginative mode also characterises, much better than our posture of moral 
adjudication, our relationship to God. For it is not for us to judge or assess God, but to 
see and to love him: in loving, to see him; in seeing, to love him. God, as he is Beauty 
and beautiful, is apprehended aesthetically.23         
Adams recognises that “beauty, in persons or impersonal objects, seems 
particularly apt to inspire Eros” (Adams 1999, p.146). For Adams, beauty is an 
excellence and the eros it kindles, as a more than self-regarding love for an object for its 
own sake, is also a kind of excellence. Of course, it is right to distinguish between good 
and bad desires, where this goodness or badness (tending to fruition or perversion) is 
conditional upon the orientation and the object of the desire; but, rather than as a relation 
of one excellence to another, I would construe the movement of eros towards beauty in 
terms of the mutual open-endedness of the desire and the object of that desire, where the 
desiring person is incomplete and the beauty of the object is inexhaustible. As such, our 
love of particular works of beauty may be positioned within the greater movement 
towards the beauty of God which characterises our state of epektasis.      
That works of art may be appropriate objects of a right desire is of course a 
crucial element of my model of Christian art; Adams’ theory may serve to support such a 
model, for he suggests that “the possible objects of an excellent Eros” includes 
“particular artistic creation” (p.147). More interestingly, Adams also holds that eros can 
be “appropriately ascribed to God” (p.147) and he allows for the possibility of describing 
God as a lover of art. This is a great benefit of Adams’ commendable approach of making 
                                                 
23 If that term may generously be expanded to include even the beatific vision, this could have the very 
interesting implication, for theology, that the aesthetic also characterises our mode of seeing and being after 
death.      
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sense of the good, and the lovable, in terms of what is loved and held as good by God. 
Adams holds that God may love – indeed, that it is a part of God’s own excellence that he 
does love – excellent works of art. Again, I would not characterise this relation in terms 
of excellence, but Adams’ picture does, I believe, corroborate my own synergetic model 
of God’s active and loving participation in our works of beauty; where, crucially, the 
awareness of God’s love should serve to motivate our own labours of, and engagements 
with, Christian art.       
The story told by Christian art is that, indeed, we flourish as persons in love of the 
good, but that this should be construed as love of God’s Beauty. It is desire for God’s 
beauty which defines our epektasis and governs our efforts at Godlikeness. Thus, writes 
Bridges,   
 
man growth to find  
his Will in Goddes pleasur, his pleasur in Goddes Will; 
drawn to thatt happiness by the irresistible  
predominant attraction, which worketh secure¨ 
in mankind’s Love of Beauty and in the Beauty of Truth (Bridges 1934, p.126).  
 
We can turn, in closing, to the poetry of Dante for an exemplary instance, as well 
as a theoretical corroboration, of this account of the good of Christian art. I have 
previously invoked the treatment of beauty in the Divine Comedy; and the vision of 
beauty, I believe, is integral to Dante’s conception of the Good. Not unlike Adams and 
Gregory, Dante presents the Good as an object of love and also the intensifier of love, 
just as growth in goodness, towards the Good, is growth in love:   
 
for 
the good, once it is understood as such,  
enkindles love; and in accord with more 
goodness comes greater love (Dante 1995, p.505).          
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Significantly, Dante’s poem is most beautiful when it is at its best; both in the 
sense of being good as poetry, and in the sense of being open to the Good. At its 
consummation, the fulfilment of its poetic form coincides with the culmination of the 
spiritual journey the work offers us. Indeed, the poem is perhaps most beautiful in the 
final canto, which tells precisely of Dante’s highest attainment of love and vision; his 
epiphany of the Trinity through the aid of the Mother of God, and his epiphany of the 
Incarnation, which experiences are inseparable from his own transfiguration in the divine 
light, his union with divine Love. Nor is it a coincidence, I think, that the poem’s beauty 
is greatest when it tells of Dante’s experience – not his theological or philosophical 
explanation – of divine light, grace, and love; for here, as he attains his greatest likeness 
to God, so does his poetry.  
It is important to note that Dante’s work, and Dante’s journey, can be understood 
in terms of Gregory of Nyssa’s; for Dante’s voyage-narrative is one of the expansion and 
intensification of longing, expectancy and reaching out for divine love and beauty – of 
epektasis. Dante’s eyes and his heart alike grow increasingly ‘enkindled’ as the poem 
unfurls:  
 
And I, who now was nearing Him who is 
the end of all desires, as I ought,  
lifted my longing to its ardent limit (p.538).  
 
God, here at the culmination of the poem, is variously addressed and named as 
“Infinite Goodness” (p.539), “Eternal Light”, and finally as “the Love that moves the sun 
and the other stars” (p.541).          
When, in the consolidating and concluding passages of The Life of Moses, 
Gregory seems to abandon his invocations of Beauty to again speak of God in terms of 
the Good, this is not simply a case of reverting to ‘moral language’, but rather of 
assimilating the discourse of virtue to the ‘aesthetic language’ of desire and vision; thus 
enhancing the meaning of ‘Good’, charging it with a genuine sense of God’s manifested 
glory. Thus “every desire for the Good which is attracted to that ascent constantly 
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expands as one progresses in pressing on to the Good. This is truly the vision of God: 
never to be satisfied in the desire to see him” (Gregory of Nyssa 1978, p.116).      
It is important also that Gregory does not fail to call God “the divine Giver” 
(p.116), lest we forget the gratuity of the Beauty and Goodness that inspires us; and lest 
we forget that this toward which we strain in insatiable love is not a static and abstract 
something, but a personal, living God, whose love for us is inexhaustible in turn – his 
generosity even exceeding our desire. This Dante too realises, for he tells us how  
 
That Good, ineffable and infinite  
which is above, directs Itself toward love  
as light directs Itself to polished bodies.  
Where ardour is, that Good gives of Itself;  
and where more love is, there that Good confers  
a greater measure of eternal worth (Dante 1995, p.285).    
 
Adams argues that “Each of us is called to love the good (and thus to love God, if 
my theistic account of the good is correct). This is our most comprehensive task for the 
whole of our life” (Adams 1999, p.302). To say, as I want, that we are called to love the 
beautiful, is not, I think, a less comprehensive task; for beauty is of God, and God is 
Beauty. The love of beauty does cast the idea of vocation in a different light, and it may 
thereby emphasise different aspects of the way we engage with the world.   
Adams’ “suggestion is that vocation is primarily a matter of what goods are given 
to us to love, and thus of our part in God’s all-embracing and perfect love” (p.302). The 
vocation of the Christian artist is to manifest this love in newly formed particulars; to see 
this love in the particulars of the world and to transform that vision into works, into new 
objects of vision and love. The vocation proclaimed by Christian art, therefore, is in a 
sense more constructive and transformative than the vocation proposed by Adams; for 
Christian art emphatically enjoins that the world should be re-fashioned in the love and 
likeness of God, that our task is one of regeneration and glorification.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE ONTOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN ART  
       
Christian art, as should already have become clear, is art with a profound sense of 
purpose. The calling, the prerogative, and the labour of Christian art are deeply 
implicated in a consummate regenerative vision of human life. This chapter will address 
the ontological implications of the Christian artistic project, articulating more fully the 
Christian artwork’s ambition of really transforming the world into the likeness of God.      
I will argue here that a consistent engagement with Christian art demands that the 
artwork is positioned firmly in the context of what I call a Christian ontological narrative; 
without which the work remains unintelligible and inaccessible, as the Christian art and 
Christian creative labour it is.            
A discussion of the ontological status of, and the experience thereby offered by, 
Christian art, should be pursued with constant reference to (or at least vigilant 
mindfulness of) three crucial questions: what kind of change is wrought by the artwork, 
for what kind of being, in what kind of world? The radical divergence of Christian and 
non-Christian thought on these questions gives two incommensurate approaches to 
Christian art; indeed the Christian and the non-Christian will be seen to be talking, not 
only about two completely different things, but two different (possible) worlds.  
The Christian answers to these questions yield a comprehensive, theological and 
anthropological, vision of the Christian artwork as a sacramental object deeply implicated 
in the regeneration of the world. On this model, the Christian artwork is a radically new 
object in the world, differently understood – indeed, in a world differently understood – 
than in accounts from analytic philosophy. The newness of the Christian artwork is a 
newness in the world but not of the world, manifesting the uncreated beauty and glory of 
God; the change wrought by the work is not only cultural, but also cosmic. This artwork 
is made by and for man, who is essentially ‘man the artist’ and microcosm, called to be 
the steward and transformer of creation, a co-worker with God. Crucially, the work enters 
a world created by God, where man may commune with his maker through material 
works, but also a fallen world yearning for transfiguration, where the Christian artwork 
finds its true meaning as contributing to a redeemed and regenerated cosmos.         
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4.1 CHRISTIAN ART FOR THE CHRISTIAN IMAGINATION     
 
An initially fruitful foil for the development of a distinctly Christian ontology of 
Christian art is Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley’s paper, “Religious music for godless ears” 
(2010). This is a piece which, I believe, fails to engage with Christian art on its own 
terms, and thereby provides a method for experiencing art which, if adhered to, has the 
effect of alienating us from works of inestimable value and from the vision of God 
enshrined in these works.                     
The paper, on my reading, does not have a particularly developed or sophisticated 
account of what it would mean for something to be a specifically Christian work of art; or 
how this would be significantly different from a non-Christian work. Nor do Neill and 
Ridley sufficiently account for – or even try to account for – the way in which the world 
into which the artwork enters is differently apprehended by a Christian and by an atheist 
of the kind postulated in the paper.  
On my account, however, an artwork is a Christian artwork precisely by asking to 
be seen – to be an object of vision, as well as of appreciation, as indeed of love – within a 
Christian apprehension of the world. The Christian artwork wants to disclose the Christ-
form; it wants to manifest the beauty of God; and it wants to be loved – as my next 
chapter will argue – within a love for God.  
In a view or version of the world in which such vision and such love is counted as 
an impossibility, an insidious illusion or a sinisterly harmful delusion – in the world of 
Neill and Ridley’s ‘militant atheist’, that is – the work of Christian art must be 
unintelligible, and so remain invisible as what it is or aspires to be. Christian art requires 
a Christian response. Godless ears, by my reasoning, are tone-deaf as regards the (divine 
tones of a) Christian musical work.               
 
 
4.1.1 Ontological Context  
 
As I sought to establish already in the first chapter, my discussion of art is premised on 
the assumption that the artwork is a relational object which is always contextually 
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embedded and so asks to be contextually discerned, in line with certain appropriate 
conditions and conceptions. It should be maintained therefore that the Christian artwork, 
as any other artwork, is dependent for certain contextual phenomena and certain modes of 
perception for its very existence as the kind of work that it is. In the case of Christian art, 
there is a question, of course, as to which context is the decisive one: what we may call 
the artworld or artistic culture at large, or the culture of Christianity.   
On my understanding, all art is implicated in cultural practices that extend beyond 
the narrow confines of the artworld, inescapably caught up with value judgements which 
appeal to wider practices and beliefs, aesthetic as well as moral and religious. Christian 
art, therefore, cannot be disentangled from Christian practices and meanings. Yet it is not 
the cultural context that is the decisive one, but what I like to call the ontological context.      
Others will argue, however, that only or chiefly the artworld is the relevant 
context. If we hold such a view, then we may convince ourselves that we have 
appropriately experienced the so-called Christian artwork without having to make a great 
effort at understanding, let alone sharing, the faith behind the artwork. It is easy then to 
dismiss any specifically Christian associations or values as non-essential to the 
experience and to the work; as extrinsic, incidental, or instrumental.    
If we subscribe to the first alternative, thinking that the work belongs at least as 
much to Christian culture as to the artworld, we may or may not want to say that an 
observer shares in the Christian faith in order to correctly apprehend the work of art, but 
we would at least ask that he gives serious consideration to the forms, meanings, and 
values of the Christian imagination.        
Neill and Ridley seem happy to follow a light version of this second alternative; 
that is, while they acknowledge the need for a real awareness of the Christian context 
when engaging with the work, they deny that it requires a Christian response. They deny 
that a Christian perception and experience of the work is necessary in order to 
appropriately experience it. It is possible, they think, to fully appreciate the work without 
being a Christian believer. Indeed, they propose a model in which the atheist may get 
most out of the Christian artwork by actively rejecting its Christian premises and 
meanings.           
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Neill and Riley put forth an ambitious thesis, where they hold that the sheer artistic 
qualities of a work – in their example, the musical qualities of Bach’s Mass in B minor – 
manifest a creative spirit more powerful than any creeds or opinions it may be associated 
with or used to express.  
Importantly, Neill and Ridley begin with some very sound observations. Thus 
they affirm, at one point, that the idea “that the B minor Mass is not essentially a 
religious work at all [is] sufficiently outlandish to warrant a certain scepticism, if not 
outright disbelief”; and thus propose to “take the religious character of religious music 
rather more seriously” (Neill and Ridley 2010, p.1003). They put aside several 
approaches to Christian music that do not fulfil this basic criteria; while they themselves 
offer to give an account that allows an atheist to properly experience the Christian 
artwork “for the sake of what it and nothing else is” (p.1008). To a limited extent, they 
succeed, by showing how an atheist (of a moderate kind) may, for example, appreciate 
the artwork’s formal properties and its beauty; but they concede, emphatically, that “the 
forms of engagement envisioned here fail to take seriously enough the essentially 
religious character of the musical works at issue”, and thus entails “a manner of 
engagement of the works that falls well short of experiencing and valuing them ‘for their 
own sakes’, for the sake of what they are actually” (p.1010). I agree with this – and I 
extend the same criticism to Neill and Ridley’s own more radical proposal, which they go 
on to develop.                 
Leaving the so-called “room-temperature atheist” behind, Neill and Ridley instead 
focus on the much more interesting case of the “militant atheist” (p.1016). In suggesting, 
ultimately, that such a militant atheist may still – “against what would strongly appear to 
the be the odds” (p.1016) – have a real engagement with Christian art as what it really is, 
I believe Nell and Ridley are mistaken, and indeed fail to answer to what the Christian 
artwork really is. For all their subtle reasoning around issues of aesthetic and religious 
value, they fail to address the ontological presuppositions underlying the Christian 
making and Christian perception of the Christian artwork. Of course the militant atheist 
can focus his attention on isolated aspects of the Christian work, and so enjoy, for 
example, the technical mastery or the emotional intensity of the piece, while he may at 
the same reject much of what the piece ‘presupposes’ or ‘propagates’. This is noted by 
142 
 
Neill and Ridley, but they want to make a much more radical point; namely, that he is 
able to appreciate the work as the kind of work that it is, in its integral entirety, even 
while rejecting its Christian foundations; and that he may do so, not despite, but because 
of the work’s religious qualities.         
“The Mass,” they argue, is the “unfolding of its creator’s profoundly distinctive 
understanding of and commitment to a particular vision of the world. And that makes the 
Mass a triumph not merely of human ingenuity, brilliance, or even mastery, but of the 
human spirit itself. For in articulating the vision embodied in the Mass […] Bach shows 
us what is noblest in us: the capacity to invest life with meaning, with beauty, with 
dignity, and so to make life not merely worth living, but to illuminate it with the highest 
value” (p.1019).     
We may wonder if this is not, however sincere and generous an assessment, also 
somewhat patronising; for on the Christian model, human life has indeed already been 
endowed with beauty, dignity, and meaning, as with freedom, creativity, and love. The 
project of Christian art lies very much in re-articulating this, which is not to invent or to 
invest life with these qualities but to respond to a gift. These qualities are not merely the 
end, but also the inspiration of our labours – and to conceive of them as being sufficiently 
ennobling and of the highest value without reference to their divine origin and end is, I 
believe, to negate rather than affirm the Christian project.       
While the militant atheist may very well recognise the primacy of freedom, 
dignity, and beauty, on a psychological or anthropological level, he will conceive of these 
values – as he will conceive of man himself, no less than his art – under a completely 
different ontological conception from that of the Christian artist or viewer: this, in my 
view, may amount to not seeing these things at all (as what they are). What, for example, 
may the militant atheist fruitfully mean by ‘the human spirit’ that remotely resembles a 
religious understanding of the God-given spirit that sustains and animates humankind?  It 
is the latter which Christian artworks, such as Bach’s Mass, is committed to manifesting.        
That said, Neill and Ridley continue by asserting that here, in the above model of 
response, there is something substantial for the atheist to hold on to. “So, for example, if 
his view is that the perniciousness of religion lies in the fact that it is a tissue of 
superstitious falsehoods […] then he can reflect that even in the service of a vision that is 
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flawed in these ways the human spirit is still capable of shining through [and then] he is 
surely taking comfort in the work because of, and not just despite, what it is” (p.1020).   
But what, on this view, is the work of art? Is this the same thing, or the same kind of 
thing, that the Christian artist and listener take it to be? I really do not think so.       
We must wonder about the model of creativity that is suggested here; whereby the 
purest art forms are the most abstract, non-conceptual, non-referential ones, free from the 
history of human thought and belief. This model is implausible already for musical 
works, but supposedly Neill and Ridley would wish to be able to say the same about 
painting or literature; and it is more contentious still to suggest that we can appreciate a 
Fra Angelico, not despite but because of its religious nature, if we find the triumph of 
human spirit and artistry only in the application of line and colour, while simultaneously 
considering the Christian forms and figures of the frescos, not the work’s fruition, but 
rather pernicious obstacles to it. How would we even go about looking at such art in such 
a way, refusing to be moved by the values expressed by the forms and the figurative 
content – where these forms and figures explicitly seek to reveal something about the 
spiritual import of human life – but praising the work as a triumphant achievement of 
something called the ‘human spirit’?   
This line of thought, however, is carried on as follows; and here we reach the 
central conceit of Neill and Ridley’s argument: “But perhaps his [the militant atheist’s] 
view is a rather deeper one. Perhaps his view is that religion is pernicious, not because of 
any merely cognitive or practical failings, but because it betrays and devalues the human 
spirit” (p.1020), in using notions of sin to negate our healthy animal instincts, for 
example; thus “it cultivates a rejection of the self as the site of any possible value (except 
in so far as the self rejects itself)” (p.1020). If Bach’s Mass is exemplary of precisely 
such a rejection of the human spirit, it would seem to be insurmountably objectionable to 
the atheist; but, so the argument goes, even despite this, indeed because of it, that very 
human spirit reasserts itself in the music, in the commitment to a vision that gives 
meaning to the world.       
Here again I must pause to ask: if the ‘spirit’ seeks to give meaning in such a way, 
to such a world, as is expressed or embodied in that piece (not just in the tones, but in the 
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words, in the whole plethora of association and invocation of meanings) – how is this 
spirit still something that can be set against that very vision it so triumphantly proclaims?  
In the words of Neill and Ridley, a triumph of this sort is “possible only when that 
spirit turns against itself in a peculiarly powerful and uncompromising way” (p.1020). 
But if the spirit of man is best exemplified by the commitment to a vision that ‘gives 
meaning’ – while that meaning itself can be scoffed at – then it would seem that the 
human spirit can manifest itself most gloriously, not only in the follies of Christian art, 
but even in the aberrations of Nazi art; for if the creative spirit is always at odds with the 
values it serves to proclaim, then the nature of those values is irrelevant – or rather, it 
would seem, the worse the values, the better, for the worse the values, the more forcefully 
the spirit may manifest itself in contradicting them.        
This does lead, to say the least, to an odd view of artistic creation, of art history, 
and of the traditions and transmissions of human values.      
 
Let us return our attention to the issue of ontology – of what the artwork is and what it is 
to see it as such – for it is really here that my model diverges absolutely from Neill and 
Ridley’s, and it is by considering the artwork’s ontology that we can see how widely their 
approach misses the mark when it comes to the special status of Christian works of art. 
While it is true, on one level, that what makes an artwork Christian is its embeddedness 
within a Christian culture, Christian art is committed to a much wider regenerative 
project, where the particular transformation of the artwork must not only be apprehended 
within, but also receives its full value from, the greater transfiguration of the world as a 
whole. Neill and Ridley treat these wider ontological commitments of the Christian 
artwork itself as, at best, incidental to the work’s art-qualities and work-qualities; as 
something that can be dispensed with without this entailing a mistreatment of the work. 
But such an approach is precisely a misapprehension of the Christian artwork.             
I must emphasise that the Christian nature of the work is to be located, from the 
very first, in the realm of ontology – in the ambition of its forms and its beauty to 
manifest the real – not, as appears to be assumed in Neill and Ridley’s paper, in content, 
in pedagogy, and in the evocation of religious emotional or psychological states. On my 
understanding, it is precisely the ontological commitments of the Christian artwork which 
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rescues it from any need to be elucidating, didactic or devotional in any sentimental, 
platitudinous or pragmatic sense. The artwork does not have to tell of regeneration and 
redemption in order to be Christian – though many great Christian artworks do – for it is 
itself a regenerative work, a redeemed part of creation. It is not the artwork’s capacity to 
provide comforting narratives that ensures its Christian status, but its place in a lived 
narrative of deification, and its manifestation of a divine order.     
Recalling the arguments in our first chapter, we may understand the ontological 
context of the Christian artwork as that Christ-form in relation to which – and within the 
contribution to which – the art achieves its form and meaning. Further, taking our cue 
from David Bentley Hart, and gathering the fruits of our account of beauty, we can see 
the ontological context of Christian art as being, not only the form of Christ, but the self-
revelation of the Trinity; and so we may see the whole project of Christian art – as indeed 
the whole of Christian life – as unfurling within the ‘Trinitarian distance’, as Hart calls it, 
the ceaseless unfurling and inexhaustible gift of the mutual delight and love of the Three 
Persons.   
Real art, says Hart, “repeats the gesture of creation”; that is, it responds in grateful 
creativity to God’s original gift, and so participates in creation, creating the ever new. 
Art does this, not simply by virtue of its formal configuration or its manipulation of 
matter, but rather through its nature as gratuitous variation on what we may call ‘the 
Trinitarian theme’. For, says Hart, “As God is Trinity, in whom all difference is 
possessed as perfect peace and unity, the divine life might be described as infinite music, 
and creation too might be described as a music whose intervals, transitions, and phrases 
are embraced within God’s eternal, triune polyphony” (Hart 2003, p.274).24 This provides 
an understanding of Christian art radically at odds with that of Neill and Ridley, because 
rooted in a radically different conception of the ontology of artworks and of ontology at 
large.  
 
                                                 
24 Hence Hart is able to argue that Bach, with his wondrous variations, is “the most inspired witness to the 
ordo amoris in the fabric of being [because] no one as compellingly demonstrates that the infinite is beauty 
and that beauty is infinite” (Hart, pp.282-283). Bach’s music is iconic of God’s kenotic self-revelation, of 
his inexhaustible generosity; it is, in Hart’s view, “the ultimate Christian music; it reflects as no other 
human artefact ever has or could the Christian vision of creation” (p.83). 
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4.1.2 Beliefs in and about the work  
 
The attitude we may ascribe to a kind of atheist observer (which more or less fits Neill  
and Ridley’s characterisation) would say that nothing more is asked of me, the perceiver, 
in engaging with Christian art than when I deal with art in general; that there is nothing 
about the work itself which asks of me that I revise my view of the world. A key 
assumption at work here is that Christian religious beliefs only pertain to what lies 
outside the work, to what is referenced or professed by the work, but not to anything as 
integral to the very existence of the work as to render the work itself inaccessible or 
unintelligible to a non-believer.     
The crucial point I want to make – and what Neill and Ridley do not sufficiently 
address – is this; that the beliefs to be found in the work are to a great extent beliefs about 
the work, about what kind of thing this work is. We should not be so preoccupied with 
what the artwork may have to say about theology, but rather what the theological picture 
says about the artwork – and thus in what manner it may be appropriate to engage with it.  
The problem is that the atheist does not acknowledge the Christian artwork’s ontological 
aspirations. He understands the work as something which may be used to project or 
profess certain beliefs, much like a sermon or a treatise does – but he doesn’t think that 
there is anything about the work which demands a radically different kind of engagement. 
He certainly doesn’t think that the work is capable of revealing the Christian God.        
This, however, happens to be the ambition of the work, and only if we are able to 
perceive the artwork in line with this assumption, can we be said to perceive the artwork 
as what it is – in the light of the relevant context, namely the ontological narrative of 
Christianity.       
It is true for Christian art as for any art that, as Peter Lamarque writes, “There 
have to be appropriate beliefs, attitudes, modes of appreciation, and expectations for 
works to come into, and be sustained in, existence” (Lamarque 2010, p.54). This puts a 
sharp ontological point to the Sartrean intuition that without the requisite imaginative 
effort, the work does not appear at all, properly speaking. Sartre’s view, paraphrased by 
Lamarque, is that “works (of art) per se do not even exist, strictly speaking, but are 
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projections of the imagination […] and thus their identity as pictures [or other] requires 
an act of imaginative consciousness, a ‘radical change’ and ‘negation’ that shifts 
consciousness from perception to imagination” (p.52).25      
Adding to Lamarque’s thesis, what needs to be taken into account in the case of 
Christian art is precisely what Christian beliefs say about the world into which the 
artwork is introduced. If this world is not perceived as one of objects among objects in a 
purposeless space, such as the atheist may take himself to arbitrarily inhabit, but a 
dynamic and ordered creation sustained by the grace of God, the impact of a new created 
work, freely created for the love of God, will be seen to be quite different from the kind 
of object stipulated by the militant atheist.   
The atheist, unable to adopt the Christian view of the world, will subject the 
Christian artwork to categorical and conceptual imprisonment. He may find ways to 
appropriate the work to his own world, and ways to justify this appropriation, Neill and 
Ridley’s paper being a case in point, but until he is able rather to approach the world of 
the work, to appreciate the work on its own terms, he will remain in a world apart and the 
ontological status – indeed, the very existence – of the work, not simply its values, will 
elude him.     
Adopting this line of thought, I think it is perfectly permissible to suggest that, 
contrary to the assumption of Neill and Ridley, the militant atheist really does not engage 
with the Christian work of art at all. It is not only the difference in value-system that 
keeps him at a distance, for this distance may very well be traversed by methods such as 
those suggested by Neill and Ridley, by changing the priorities of the kinds of value 
inherent in the work, placing the aesthetic or artistic achievement above the moral or 
doctrinal content, for example. It is rather that the militant atheist’s inability to inhabit the 
                                                 
25 While Sartre emphasises the ‘imaginative effort’ needed to bring a work into existence, his contribution, 
however perceptive, is insufficient for the case of Christian art – which requires, rather, the kind of 
imaginative engagement encapsulated in Blake’s understanding of the Imagination; whereby the 
Imagination is a way of seeing the divine image in all things, seeing all things related to the central 
illuminating form of Christ – to see, in effect, with and in Christ. von Balthasar, incidentally, points to the 
sense in Blake’s theory when he claims that “the theological imagination (Einbildungskraft = ‘power to 
shape an image’) lies with Christ, who is at once the image (Bild) and the power (Kraft) of God” (von 
Balthasar 1982, p.490). For the Christian, then, the Imagination is a way of seeing the real, that which 
beyond the contingent and figurative partakes and allows us to partake of the grace and glory of God. This 
is a line of thought that Sartre’s philosophical commitments – just like Neill and Ridley’s – cannot allow.   
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ontological narrative and the ontological culture of the artwork, which we may construe 
as an imaginative failure, means that this work does not exist for him.26   
In short, since the Christian work is embedded not just in another worldly practice 
but in another conception of the world, any attempt to explain or access the work’s 
existence without acknowledging that ontological narrative will not satisfy either the 
Christian artist or the Christian audience.      
    
David Jones, in the “Preface” to The Anathemata, voices his apprehensions about the 
religious meanings of his work being unintelligible to a readership weaned off the 
traditions which he invokes; with the further implication that – if the requisite cultural 
contexts, and the requisite discernment, are missing – the work may fail to come into 
existence. Jones (1952) writes: “It may be that the kind of thing I have been trying to 
make is no longer makeable in the kind of way in which I have tried to make it” (p.15). 
He fears a condition in which the specifically Christian nature and meaning of his work – 
partly as regards ‘content’, but more significantly as regards its form and its ontological 
foundations – will not be recognised.  
R. S. Thomas’ body of work can stand as a witness to a more contemporary, and 
so perhaps a yet more critical, version of the same condition. Thomas, certainly, was 
intensely and consistently pained by a culture whose language, craft, science and 
technology recede ever further from their sacramental potentials. As D. Z. Phillips writes, 
“In a culture in which the greatest respect is accorded to truths which admit of factual 
verification, is there any way of talking about God without being irrational?” (Phillips, 
p.142); and Thomas himself:  
 
 Is there no way 
not to be the sport 
of reason?  
[…] 
I return with messages  
I cannot decipher, garrulous 
                                                 
26 The situation might not be dissimilar to that of the non-baptised who may not partake of the Eucharist.           
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about them, worrying the ear 
of the passer-by, hot on his way 
to the marriage of plain fact with plain fact (Thomas 1993, p.388).   
 
Thomas’, as Jones’, is a fear about cultural conditions, in which religious 
referents have been weeded from the common language, and so become void of sense, 
but it is also an apprehension of the nature of language itself, and its inability to ever 
contain and communicate our intuitions about God.   
While these apprehensions rest on a clear understanding of the Christian artwork 
as culturally embedded, Jones – more emphatically than Thomas – also works under a 
conception of the artwork as in a very real sense a sacramental work and object. 
Therefore, in failing to engage with such a work in the requisite manner, we are not 
simply alienated from a cultural discourse and tradition, but are indeed robbed of an 
opportunity to experience the presence and transformative power of God. For the 
artwork, on a Christian understanding, is implicated in the sacramental and regenerative 
history of the world: it plays an integral part in our calling to restore the world to its 
intended beauty.            
Jones sees all human artefacture, all our making of signs and significant forms, as 
culminating in the Eucharist and the Mass. Similarly, for William Blake, every artwork is 
a brick towards the building of the New Jerusalem; while for the icon-painters, every icon 
is an instantiation of spiritualised and redeemed matter, one part of a transfigured 
cosmos. This is the relevant context in which the Christian artwork begs to be 
apprehended, in which it yields its full significance, and in which our experience of it 
may truly be an invaluable one. And this is the context that the atheist does not 
acknowledge – and does not act upon. He may acknowledge that there is a cultural 
context of Christianity, without having to commit to any beliefs, but he cannot 
acknowledge as true the ontological narrative that the Christian professes – and hence he 
fails to gain access to the Christian artwork, fails to experience it as what it is.        
The experience of Christian art entails seeing the artwork as a whole in the light 
of a Christian ontological conception of the world and its objects; just as it involves 
seeing the beauty of the object as indeed partaking of the beauty of God. We should thus 
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understand atheism in this case, not as a refusal to hold certain propositional statements 
as true, but rather as an unwillingness to undergo such an experience, and to see in such a 
way, where the claims or demands made by the artwork are not demands of consent but 
of attention and attentiveness; not of rational deliberation, but of a wholesale 
reorientation of desire and imagination, will and vision.    
It must be stressed that a kind of personal effort at imagining ‘what it would be 
like’ is not at all sufficient, nor what is asked for by Christian art. The atheist may – but I 
doubt even this – be able to apprehend the artwork as if he were a Christian, by some 
imaginative effort; but he cannot apprehend it as a Christian. Similarly, the atheist may – 
though I doubt it – perceive Christ as if he was the Son of God, but cannot see him as the 
Son of God. There is a crucial difference between these two. Moreover, even if the atheist 
were able to achieve the ‘as if’, this is something that he wouldn’t want to do – and which 
he doesn’t think necessary, on Neill and Ridley’s model, in order to apprehend the work.     
Ultimately, what is rejected by the atheist is not a certain point the Christian 
artwork is trying to make, as a kind of artistic complement to doctrinal formulation, but 
rather an invitation to enter into a Christian universe: where to see at all is to see in the 
light of God’s revelation, where to exist at all is to exist always and only in a relation to 
God.   
 
 
4.1.3 Psychological and ontological transformation   
 
In line with the above reflections, it is possible to conceive of one and the same work, 
under two different ontological models, as being a radically different kind of thing. If my 
intuitions are correct, it should matter for the very appreciation of the work, as well as for 
our conceptions of what kind of thing the work is, whether we decide to perceive it 
through Christian or non-Christian eyes. That is, two different readings do not simply 
yield two sets of meaning, but indeed two different works; where only one of these is the 
right and appropriate one for the Christian artwork.         
A good case study for these tensions would be Rilke’s Duino Elegies; where two 
different readings, one governed by Christian and the other by atheist or even agnostic 
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ontological presuppositions, would not only lead us to conceive of the work in distinct 
and irreconcilable ways, but where this ontological divergence would also inform our 
apprehension and interpretation of the work’s meanings, of the pronouncements made 
within the fabric of the work.       
Rilke’s poem, rife as it is with metaphysical speculation and musings on the 
import of artistic creation, and of art’s transformative power, is a work occupying the 
very fault lines between Christian and materialist interpretations of art and reality. As 
such, the Elegies may help us make the transition between, on the one hand, analytic and 
secular models of transformation, and on the other hand, a theologically informed 
perception of Christian artworks as implicated in the sacramental and the eschatological. 
The Elegies may appear to offer an understanding of transformation congenial to 
Christian art, but ultimately they will be seen to fall short of offering – and requiring – a 
Christian reading.         
Central to the poem is the poet’s belief that the outer world is transfigured through 
human consciousness and creativity. Thus:  
 
The world is nowhere, my love, if not within.  
Our life passes in transformation. The external world 
is forever dwindling to nothing (Rilke 2008, p.57);  
 
while it rises instead ‘within’, as memory and potentially language.  
We may see how this suggestion could chime with the visions of Jones, Blake and 
others, but we should also see, already, the problems Rilke’s ‘ontological thesis’ poses 
for a properly Christian understanding of the aims and prerogatives of our creative works. 
In short – and I will spell this out as I proceed – Rilke’s stress on the ‘inner’ and 
‘invisible’ is at odds with the Christian ambition to manifest God’s form and beauty in 
material works.         
 
Karen Leeder tells us that the Elegies enact “the struggle for humankind to accept its 
ultimate task – that of unifying transformation. The task of humankind is to sing, to 
praise the world, and thereby immortalise it, by translating visible things into invisible 
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objects of language, the imagination and spirit” (Leeder 2008, p.10). We may perhaps 
understand this idea of transformation by saying, with Lamarque, that mere objects of the 
world are transformed into works, through and for the engagement of language and the 
imagination. By subjecting the world to artistic re-formation, we address the world to a 
different set of faculties and judgements, inviting a different kind of experience. The fact 
of such a transformed relation to the things of the world seems to be empirically and 
experientially true: this is something that art perennially achieves, whether ancient or 
modern, representative or conceptual.     
The really interesting questions arise when we consider if this altered relationship 
occurs only on the level of psychology, phenomenology and epistemology, affecting only 
our knowledge and experience of the world, or if it entails also an ontological alteration 
of the very fabric of the world. We may ask of Leeder if the ‘unifying transformation’ 
and the ‘immortalisation’ of which she speaks denote only psychological or cultural 
phenomena, or if the poem is making a more metaphysical claim.     
Rilke’s project – as interpreted by Leeder in these succinct comments – does 
indeed stand on the threshold of the more radical, because more theologically charged, 
understanding of a genuine ontological reorganisation of the cosmos. Should we take 
Leeder’s pronouncements literally, as having a metaphysical content, we may find 
ourselves but a hair’s breadth from the kind of formulations found in Christian art and 
theological aesthetics.   
The experience of simultaneously wishing to praise the world and feeling called 
upon to change it, suggests a twofold understanding of the world which is deeply integral 
to Christian thought; on this understanding, the created world is first and foremost a gift, 
but it is also – as a gift imperfectly received, cultivated and realised – a fallen world. This 
twofold attitude is strongly suggested by Rilke’s poems; certainly if we accept as 
metaphysically sincere Leeder’s reading of the Elegies. Leeder herself, however, wants to 
pre-empt such a reading; for “Above all,” she claims, with surprising insistence, Rilke’s 
“is a godless poem: rejecting the transcendent and reiterating the uniqueness of the here 
and now despite – indeed precisely because of – its fragility” (p.12). This does strike me 
as a contentious, albeit not an entirely unwarranted, assertion.    
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I would note, initially, that the fragility of the particular moment and the (one 
assumes) stability of the transcendent are by no means necessarily mutually exclusive. 
After all, it is simply not the case that Christian theology and practice are unconcerned 
with the uniqueness and transience of each created thing – as Blake and Hopkins, for 
example, summarily testify – or with the frailty of each human person. An insistence 
upon and caring attention to the here and now by no means preclude either belief in, or 
indeed the existence of, a transcendent God.     
Nor is it by any means clear to me how the other themes outlined above – the 
transformative love of creation, the reverence for customs and artefacts, the humble 
acknowledgement of death – would so obviously be practices conducted in a godless 
universe; if anything, these all seem to invite the opposite assumption. That is, either 
these attitudes are the appropriate responses to the real, or they are simply the arbitrary 
reactions to the absurd. The tone of Rilke’s poems, not to mention Leeder’s introduction 
– in its lack of irony, its impassioned sense of vocation – does indeed tend to favour the 
first of these alternatives; which alternative, in turn, seems to render the mission and the 
metaphysics of the Elegies more intelligible, however incomplete. This seems to be the 
poems’ motivating force: to attempt to articulate what is true, not simply contingently or 
subjectively, but really at the root of things. Rilke supposedly wants to launch a serious 
critique of the world as well as offer real consolation, both of which are most successfully 
achieved in the light of a belief in the divine.        
This said, we must grant that the Elegies are by no means explicitly Christian 
either in intention or in meaning; though they may be fruitfully read as tending in such a 
direction – and so allowed to engage in a dialogue with texts and works of a more firmly 
religious character – they do stop (or fall) short of committing themselves to manifesting 
the Christ-form and the beauty of God.  
In particular, it is the sacramental ambitions of Christian art, and its stress on 
manifestation, which constitute a real difference to Rilke’s model of transformation. For 
there are strong idealistic tendencies in the Elegies, and a real risk of its model slipping 
into a kind of solipsism that is woefully at odds with the Christian vision.  
Martyn Crucefix observes that “whether divinity exists or not is hardly the issue 
here: the fact is there is no help in our existential dilemma from either angels or other 
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people” (Crucefix 2008, p.83). This is a bleak assessment, to be sure. However, Crucefix 
does diagnose correctly that the poem presents us with a bitter and difficult situation; our 
condition is, typically, one of alienation, both psychological and ontological, and this 
condition must be faced up to. Thus, at the same time, “Rilke urges us to reverse this 
invasive sense of ‘emptiness’ so that we might re-inhabit the world about it” (p.83). This, 
indeed, is our mission; and the interesting suggestion is that this is not simply a mission 
to be carried out for our own sake, but also for the sake of the world, which seems to 
expand the accomplishment from the psychological plane to also encompass the 
ontological.  
What we may call Rilke’s ontological thesis, is most explicitly expressed in the 
ninth elegy:   
 
Earth, is it not this you want: to arise  
in our invisible sphere? […]  
What is your urgent command, if it is not for  
transformation? (Rilke 2008, p.73) 
 
Here, so it seems, the end of our task is not merely an experience of epiphany or 
catharsis, but a genuine transformation of the state of nature. Thus our own sense of 
consolation corresponds, as it were, to an actual renewal of the world; there is a fit and 
mutuality between us and the rest of creation, which is realised in this process of 
regeneration. From a Christian perspective, however, the reservation about the ‘invisible 
sphere’ remains; for the hope of the Christian artist, as indeed of the Christian priest and 
the Christian communicant, is premised on the possibility – indeed, of the goodness – of 
experiencing God under the material forms of man-made and man-handled things.    
For this reason, we may have to settle – albeit reluctantly – for what we may call 
an ‘existential’ reading of the Elegies over the ‘ontological’. Such a reading is offered by 
Crucefix, who suggests that “Fundamentally [our task] is to seek for a more heightened 
perception and responsiveness to the world about us” (Crucefix 2008, p.83). If this is all 
the poems may offer, this is rather unsatisfying; because Crucefix does not address the 
crucial question if this heightened perception establishes the right relation to the world, or 
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if it is simply something that is poetically possible and so emotionally rewarding. I 
believe I am correct in noting this distinction, between a perfectly effective, but 
nevertheless arbitrary attitude to the world, and a responsiveness which is genuinely that 
– an attunement to the real.     
Crucefix observes that the mutuality of the earth’s desire to be transformed, and 
our transformative creativity, “culminates in the refiguring of death from its earlier 
negative aspect […] to being our ‘holiest inspiration’ […] The inevitability of death 
becomes the motivating force behind the human desire to transform the world about us” 
(p.100). Here, the claim is more clearly a psychological rather than a metaphysical one: 
there is no sincere suggestion here that death itself is somehow undone, merely its 
stultifying effects on human consciousness.     
Insofar as Crucefix hits the right note in his reading of the Elegies, Rilke’s 
anthropological mission, one feels, stops short of being properly eschatological; perhaps 
we must look to others to push the implications of creative transformation further. There 
is the possibility, of course, that Rilke did indeed go further than his commentators have 
recognised or acknowledged; there is certainly stuff in the Elegies which permits a far 
more metaphysically ambitious thesis than that proposed by Crucefix and Leeder. That 
said, however, rather than letting Rilke’s vision or mission stand on its own, it will be 
more fruitful to treat his eschatological intimations pointing the way to the more 
consistently and consciously Christian works of others – the likes of Jones and Blake.   
Rowan Williams discerns in Jones, and in Maritain before him, the “idea that the 
world’s reality is always asymptotically approaching its fullness by means of the 
response of imagination – the assumption of an ‘ideal’ fullness of perception in which 
things reach their destiny” (Williams 2010, p.154). Something like this is at work in 
Rilke, certainly, but only finds its properly ontological articulation in Christian artists; for 
Blake’s Imagination and Jones’ sacramental history deliver what Rilke’s poetics can only 
intimate, namely a vision of the fruition and transfiguration of all things in significant 
language – in ‘anathemata’ and ‘visionary forms dramatic’ – resplendent with divinity.          
There are aspects of Rilke’s vision that chime with both Blake and Jones. There 
are, for example, suggestive gestures towards the sacramental in the Elegies. Kallistos 
Ware cites this as “the distinctive feature of a sacrament: the sacraments, like the Church, 
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are both visible and invisible; in every sacrament there is the combination of an outward 
visible sign with an inward spiritual grace” (Ware 1963, p.281). While this certainly 
echoes Rilke’s central thesis, of the visible becoming invisible through conscious human 
agency, the Christian understanding does not denigrate the material and visible, but 
affirms its equal partnership with the spiritual. In beauty, moreover, God’s spiritual gift is 
made manifest. We may also ask if Rilke knowingly invokes the sacramental as the 
binding principle between man and his world, and to what end; we may assume Rilke’s 
understanding of the concept he is playing with, but it is hard to tell to what degree his 
use is subversive of theological models, and to what degree reverential.    
Nicolas Berdyaev writes that “Every creative act is a partial transfiguration of 
life” (Berdyaev 2009b, p.225). Such a statement may be read to fall, like Rilke’s work, 
somewhere between the secular and sacred. Berdyaev’s intentions, however, become 
much less ambiguous; for he holds, as perhaps Rilke fails to hold, that “artistic creativity 
is ontological rather than psychological in its nature” (p.225). It is this latter claim which 
qualifies Berdyaev as a spokesperson for Christian art.            
In the end, on balance, Rilke’s words may carry more potency if their focus is 
seen as psychological rather than metaphysical; we may find much that is incisive and 
evocative in his account of our felt relation to transience and death, but less substance in 
his speculations on the divine. Crucially, Rilke’s work and artistic ambitions remain 
intelligible on a secular reading – intelligible even to Neill and Ridley’s militant atheist, 
who may find much to admire in the Elegies – while the works and visions of Blake and 
Jones, as of Rublev and Dante, do not; these Christian works require an engagement 
within a Christian ontology.    
 
Analytic thought may prompt us to say that, regardless of the values enshrined or 
expressed by the Christian and the non-Christian work, these are still objects of the same 
kind, are still apprehended under the same concept of ‘work of art’. Thus, to see the work 
as what it is simply means being sensitive to its work-character; while a full appreciation 
of this work may or may not demand a degree of sympathy to the particular values there 
found.   
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On a Christian understanding, however – on the kind of understanding Christian 
art requires – it is not simply the case that a Christian artwork is an artwork like any 
other, which just happens to be embedded within a religious culture and so a source or 
touchstone for religious values. Rather, the creation of a Christian work of art entails not 
simply an assumption into a culture but the achievement of an actual alteration of the 
world; which world is not merely the world of object and works, but a world which must 
be seen in the light of its relation to God. We must ask, then, what impact the work has 
on this kind of world.  
We need to say that the Christian work is not only a cultural work, but also 
implicated in the spiritual regeneration of the material world; it is not a different object in 
the same old world, but a new object in a world which, thanks to this novelty, has been 
made at least a little bit newer, and so rendered more in the likeness of God.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
4.2 MAKING OTHER AND MAKING NEW 
  
As their final position makes clear, despite their avowed commitment to the indivisibility 
of the ‘religious’ and the ‘music’ in the artwork, for Neill and Ridley there is something 
inherent in the very music of works like Bach’s Mass that utterly resists any assimilation 
to a body of ideas, of whatever kind, so that a Christian artwork – entirely irrespective of 
both artistic intention and contextual embeddedness – becomes something impossible. 
There is no kind of artwork, on this conception, that so relies on a Christian perspective 
as to fail to come into existence in the absence of it.         
I believe Neill and Ridley’s argument to be misguided, as it fails to engage with 
the ontological presuppositions of Christian art. The argument remains on the level of 
cultural discourse, and even psychology, where brute artistic force clashes with ethical or 
other conceptions; it does not address the way in which the artwork is an ontologically 
altered object, a new object in the world. It fails to address, moreover, what such newness 
means – what it means to the Christian – and, indeed, what kind of world the artwork 
enters and alters.    
Christianity, of course, has something to say about the kind of world we inhabit, 
and the kind of transformations it may accommodate or undergo. Ultimately, on the 
Christian understanding, the kind of transformation the work is capable of is only 
intelligible – indeed, is only possible – in a world in which God may become man and 
wine may become blood. The Christian artwork begs to be seen in that light, as 
implicated in that kind of transfiguration, as really altering the world to become more 
assimilated to God, more conformed to his likeness. Crucially, this transformative 
ambition can be seen to be integral to the nature of man as well as to the nature of his 
artistic making.     
 
 
4.2.1 Man the artist 
 
More than invoking the confluence of ‘the aesthetic and the sacred,’ Christian art impels 
us to present a picture of man as a free being whose practices and projects of making new 
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and making other are inextricably entwined with his reaching beyond the world of matter 
and his pursuit of communion with the divine.   
Thus Jones speaks of man as “man-the-artist” and “the sign-maker”. These 
activities define us. Man, says Jones, “has, somehow or other, to lift up valid signs: that is 
his specific task” (Jones 1959, p.119) – a task fully accepted by the tradition of Christian 
art. Further, “Man is the only artist and only artists are men” (p.94); suggesting that a 
lack of (commitment to the) creative life makes us somehow deficient as men. In other 
words, that both our personality and our human nature finds its flourishing through 
creative labour, whether the child’s delighted doodling, or the building of cathedrals, but 
most properly in the kind of works that are responsive to God’s call. Blake, similarly, 
asserts that every genuine Christian is an artist:     
 
A Poet a Painter a Musician an Architect: the Man 
Or Woman who is not one of these is not a Christian (Blake 2000, p.403).  
   
Jones, meanwhile, gives us the very Blakean line, “No artefacture no Christian 
religion” (Jones 1959, p.19). He is thinking here of our nature as thing-makers, sign-
makers and makers of sacrament; a nature elucidated by – and in turn reaffirming – the 
image of man and his relation to God presented by Christianity. He is also thinking of 
how absolutely integral to the collective and private practice, to the ritual, liturgy and 
prayer of the Christian life, are the use of artefacts, symbols and aesthetic ornamentation.  
It is clear, to Jones as to Blake, that what we are doing, when we make our 
artworks, is being engaged in a regenerative, transformative work, trying to make the 
stuff of this world radiate with divine light – to manifest the form and beauty of Christ. It 
is clear, moreover, that this is what we should be doing, that this is essentially who we are 
and what we are about.     
The claim that man is essentially a maker already has implications for an 
appropriate appreciation of Christian art; for these works, Bach’s Mass among them, are 
not made simply by way of a cultural pastime, but is essentially how we work out our 
existence, our destiny. To fail to accord the work these credentials, this ontological 
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gravity – whatever the levity of the work in question, whether plaything or altarpiece – is 
to misapprehend and misuse it, as do Neill and Ridley.   
We are artists because God has fashioned us and called us to be artists. The 
Christian believer and the Christian artist proclaim, with Berdyaev, that “God the Creator 
[…] created man – His own image and likeness, a being free and gifted with creative 
power, called to be lord of creation” (Berdyaev 2009b, p.100). Moreover, the world is the 
kind of world it is because God is the kind of God that he is. As Williams writes, 
reflecting on Jones, “God makes himself other; the world is a world in which things make 
themselves other or are made other (they are more than they are and give more than they 
have)” (Williams 2010, p.82). In such a world, to be a man is to be at heart an artistic 
being. There are parallels here to the thought of Jean-Dominique Robert; as Richard 
Viladesau explains, Robert holds that “if the world can be ‘translated’ into art, if it can be 
‘recreated’, it is because the world is intrinsically suited to such operations” (Viladesau, 
p.118). Crucially, I would add, if we humans are capable of such translating and such re-
creation, this is because these operations lie at the very heart of our nature.  
As Williams notes, the uniquely human propensity for art – and all ‘intransitive’ 
making and doing – has, for Jones, “something to do with the fact that, for Christian 
theology, God’s act of creation is utterly gratuitous, describable as a kind of play” 
(Williams 2010, p.86). In Jones’ own words, “there is a sense in which this gratuitousness 
in the operations of the Creator is reflected in the art of the creature” (Jones 2008, p.153); 
and it is “the intransitivity and gratuitousness in man’s art that is the sign of man’s 
uniqueness” (p.149), of his exalted place in creation. Gratuity here means, of course, not 
that our making is superfluous and inconsequential, but that it is essentially expressive of 
our freedom to respond creatively, spontaneously, generously, to the gracious gifts and 
creations of God.      
 
It is important, for an account which is both theologically and artistically attuned, that we 
do not think of man as simply an observer of the world, or as simply an individual 
component of it, but that we characterise man as a microcosm – containing within 
himself, and mediating between, the world of matter and spirit. This lies at the very heart 
of Christian theology and experience. “Man,” writes Berdyaev, “is not a functional part 
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of the universe, a fragment of it, but a whole small universe including in himself all the 
qualities of the great universe, imprinting himself upon it and receiving its imprint upon 
himself” (Berdyaev 2009b, p.63). As such, we are co-creators with God and our calling is 
the work of restoring the fallen world to its intended form and beauty. “True 
creativeness,” therefore, to follow Berdyaev, “is theurgy, God-activity, activity together 
with God” (p.126).          
We find such an image of man consistently expressed and explored in Blake’s 
work, whose understanding of what it means for man to be created in the image of God 
centre on his account of man as an essentially artistic being.27 Blake’s poetic expressions 
resonate strongly with theological conceptions; notably with an Orthodox understanding 
of man. Thus we have Bulgakov’s arguments to the effect that man is essentially 
involved in the visionary transfiguration of the world. “Man,” Bulgakov claims, “is a 
being who sees images, zôon eikonikon, and who also creates them, zôon poiêtikon” 
(Bulgakov 2012, p.43). Precisely this dual activity is at the heart of Blake’s work: he 
consistently shows how we are called, firstly, to see the image of God in all things, and 
secondly to use our creative faculties to make images capable of manifesting the truth and 
glory of God. As such, as Bulgakov also concludes, “man is an artistic being” (p.43). 
Blake, based on this same understanding, also stresses the close affinity between our 
creative, visionary nature and what it means to be a Christian; for to be a Christian, on 
Blake’s view, is precisely to realise fully the artistic task to which we are called by God.              
For Blake, then, it is most important to stress that humans are beings of 
imagination, not simply that we are rational creatures. The elevation of Reason, so 
paramount in Western accounts of humankind’s singularity, does not satisfy Blake any 
more than it satisfies Christos Yannaras. Indeed, Blake consistently warns against the 
potentially restrictive role of reason when this is divorced from inspiration and 
imagination. The characters of Urizen and the Spectre are cautionary examples of the 
principles of division and delimitation, blind to the calling of man’s expansive, creative 
and transformative nature. Blake has a fuller conception of man’s place and role in 
creation. The language of man as a microcosm, key to Orthodox thinkers, is therefore 
                                                 
27 I will engage in more detail with Blake’s work in the section on Golgonooza; I ask here that the reader, 
for a sense of Blake’s pronouncements, also refers back to quotes already given.   
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very congenial to Blake. “Man,” as Kallistos Ware explains, “stands at the heart of God’s 
creation. Participating as he does in both the noetic and the material realms, he is an 
image or mirror of the whole creation, imago mundi, a ‘little universe’ or microcosm. All 
created things have their meeting place in him” (Ware 1995, p.49).      
Similarly Bulgakov claims that “Man is a contracted world, the anthropocosmos” 
(Bulgakov 2012, p.50). Further, developing the claims just quoted above, Bulgakov 
writes that “Man actively participates in the iconisation of being […] In and through 
himself he finds the icons of things, for he himself is in this sense the pan-icon of the 
world” (p.43). This pan-iconic nature of man means that we are that in which all of 
creation finds its synthesis and fulfilment, and through which all creation can become 
properly responsive to God.          
This conception of man, I would argue, is perfectly illustrated in Blake’s work: 
especially in the figure of Albion and in the powerful metaphor of the building of 
Golgonooza. Albion is collective man, but his fate is also inseparable from that of the 
natural (and indeed spiritual) world; thus Los’ labours, in building Golgonooza, entail 
both the regeneration of Albion and the artistic transformation of the material world.  
Yannaras, drawing chiefly on Maximus the Confessor, succinctly sets out the 
implications of man’s microcosmic character and calling – in what can stand, I believe, as 
a paraphrase of Albion’s destiny in Blake’s work: 
 
The human being, as a natural structure, summarizes the elements of the world as 
a whole, but these elements, after the Fall, humanity’s “unnatural” estrangement, 
are found both within humanity and without in the outside world in a state of 
division and separation. But since the human being remains a personal existence 
even after the Fall […] it retains the power to realize the world dynamically in its 
person, to recapitulate the logos of the world in a personal response to God’s 
invitation to communion and relation between the created and the uncreated – to 
disclose the universal logos of the world as a personal logos of praise of the 
creature for the Creator (Yannaras 2007, pp.92-93).    
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Also Berdyaev’s account of the microcosmic condition can be perfectly applied to 
Blake’s poetic narrative; for “The all-man is inseparable from the cosmos and its fate. 
The liberation and creative upsurge of the all-man is the liberation and creation of the 
cosmos” (Berdyaev 2009b, p.72) as an icon and manifestation of all that is divine is us. 
Our artistic and creative works are absolutely integral to this process of revelation and 
regeneration. Blake understands that this task is inescapably ours, by virtue of who and 
what we are.  “Being a microcosm,” Ware continues, “man is also mediator. It is his God-
given task to reconcile and harmonize the noetic and material realms […] to spiritualize 
the material, and to render manifest all the latent capacities of the created order” (Ware 
1995, p.50). While Blake illuminatingly re-enacts this destiny in the character of Albion, 
this understanding stands – I believe – as a model and motivation for all Christian art.          
 
Art and imagination, then, no less than reason, interests, rights, etc., seem absolutely 
integral to an understanding, and a definition, of the nature of man. It is certainly integral 
to the nature of man as conceived by Christianity – free, created and creative, responsive 
and responsible to its creator, a microcosm and mediator between matter and spirit, made 
in love and encouraged in turn to grow in love, to hold up the world as anathemata, 
remade as a sign of love and a gift to its original maker.   
Man and his art shares a double nature and our extra-material end; so that “man is 
a creature whose end is extra-mundane and whose nature is to make things and that the 
things made are not only things of mundane requirement but are of necessity signs of 
something other” (Jones 1959, p.150). Sign, as understood by Jones, has thus become 
necessarily part of a definition of art if art is to be understood as uniquely the making of 
man and as implicated in the very nature of man, and vice-versa. This is entirely in 
keeping with the notion that art is iconic, and translucent to the real – to the grace, 
gratuity and glory, of Christ and the Triune God.        
Williams, reflecting on Jones, writes: “As the union of material being and 
meaningful imagination, humanity alone has the gift of sign-making, and humanity alone 
cannot avoid sign-making”; with the implication that “sacramental action is the supreme 
illumination of what and who we are, and art fails to understand itself without 
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sacramental reference” (Williams 2010, p.78). In just this way, we fail to understand 
Christian art, in particular, without this reference.     
It is Jones’ meaning that our sign-making is implicated in, and so vindicated by, 
the sacramental history of Christ’s incarnation, resurrection, and enduring presence in the 
Eucharist. Indeed, for Jones, the Eucharist is the consummation of all human making, 
past, present, and future. 
 
 
4.2.2 Art and Sacrament  
 
We already and first of all discern him making this thing other. His groping 
syntax, if we attend, already shapes… (Jones 1952, p.49).  
 
So begins The Anathemata, invoking the Prayer of Consecration from the Roman Mass; 
and so all that unfurls in the poem, which is hardly less than a whole history of man the 
maker, is seen in the perspective of – indeed, unfurls within the scope of – the Mass 
itself. All human creativity and artefacture is understood in relation to the ‘making other’ 
of the Eucharistic sacrament.    
Jones’ own art, certainly, exists entirely in relation to that most central of 
Christian practices. For Jones, our artistic nature follows from, is proven by, the fact that 
the Incarnate Christ initiated the material sacrament of the Eucharist. For, he reasons, 
“unless man is of his essential nature a poeta, one who makes things that are signs of 
something, then the central act of the Christian religion is totally without meaning. How 
can there be a manual act that makes anamnesis unless man is man-the-maker, and thus 
poiesis his native and authentic mode of apperception and in the end his only mode?” 
(Jones 1959, p.13). He says further, of the Supper and the Upper Room, that “What was 
done would have been neither necessary nor possible unless man is man-the-artist [and 
Christ a man with us]” (p.167).   
On the opening paragraph of The Anathemata, René Hague comments: “We could 
paraphrase the poet’s words in this paragraph by saying that so soon as man makes that 
which is significant, which is a sign of something other and greater, we can already see 
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that his act is of the same nature as the transubstantiation effected in the Mass by a 
representation of what was done at the Last Supper” (Hague 1977, p.12). Thus Jones 
holds that “man is unavoidably a sacramentalist and that his works are sacramental in 
character” (Jones 1959, p.155). Already the roughest or most elementary of Neanderthal 
‘cup-markings’ or burial-stones support this thesis, says Jones, for here “we would appear 
already to be in the domain of sign (sacrament), of anamnesis, of anathemata” (p.156).  
His poem, therefore, traces the practice of man’s making from the very dawn of 
our history; in “Rite and Fore-time” recalling the  
 
Twenty millennia (and what millennia more?)  
Since he became  
  Man master-of-plastic (Jones 1952, p.59). 
    
On the following page of the poem, the cave drawings in “the vaults of Lascaux” 
are invoked, and recommended to us in terms recalling the Eucharist; for the paintings 
give us reality “under the species of worked lime-rock […] under the forms of brown 
haematite and black manganese” (p.60), just as the body and blood of Christ are offered 
under the species or form of bread and wine.      
Jones here performs his typical feat of understanding history, even pre-history, in 
terms of what comes after, according significance retroactively while also allowing the 
distant past to prefigure, even prepare, what follows. History on Jones’ conception has a 
Christian telos, even in pre-Christian times – indeed even in times predating conscious, 
let alone human, life, for the very geology of our planet as it were yearns and travails 
(recalling both St Paul’s proclamation and Rilke’s idea of the earth’s longing) for 
fulfilment in the transfiguration and transubstantiation achieved by Christ. Thus fore-time 
culminates in rite-time, in the rite of the Eucharist: as Hague affirms, “all the fore-times 
lead up to the daily re-enactment of the Christian mystery” (Hague 1977, p.82).    
 
The ‘extra-utile’ reaching out that artefacture and sign-making entails, already from the 
first marks on flint and stone, reveal man to have a stake in the extra-mundane. For Jones, 
therefore, “properly speaking and at the root of the matter, Ars knows only a sacred 
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activity” (Jones 1959, p.157). “A sign,” says Jones, “must be significant of something, 
hence of some ‘reality’, so of something ‘good’, so of something that is ‘sacred’. That is 
why I think that the notion of sign implies the sacred” (p.157). The reasoning here – 
which admittedly makes something of a leap of faith – relies on an understanding of the 
symbolic in which the symbol does not only invoke but indeed instantiates the thing 
symbolised. We find such an understanding expressed, for example, in the works of Pavel 
Florensky, for whom it is a crucial underpinning – and implication – of the theology of 
icons. Also von Balthasar gives voice to such a conception of the symbol, in language 
elucidating its sacramental function: “The appearance of the form, as revelation of the 
depths, is an indissoluble union of two things. It is the real presence of the depths, of the 
whole of reality, and it is a real pointing beyond itself to those depths” (von Balthasar 
1982, p.118). He argues further, in a discussion of the works and signs of Christ, that the 
symbol is “understood in the full sense of a sacramental reality which corporeally 
contains the spiritual truth in the sensible image and likeness” (p.669).   
This understanding of form and symbol, then, is wholly informed by the fact and 
mystery of the Incarnation. It is imperative that Christian art be engaged with, practiced 
and received within, such a context (both actual and conceptual). Indeed, Jones feels that 
our immemorial traditions of artistic practices must be, from the outset, connected with 
what is realised in the life of Christ and in the life of the Church; that our creative human 
nature itself is vindicated and raised up by Christ’s assumption of our sign-making, and 
that the ‘art’ of the Eucharistic sacrament is the culmination of – not a break with – all 
preceding efforts at making matter speak (of) God.       
Thus Williams, also commenting on the first part of The Anathemata, notes 
rightly that “The constant refrain of these pages is the question ‘How else?’ Without this 
human history [of making signs] how could there be a priest at the altar re-presenting in 
another form an act […] that supremely communicates to the world the transformative 
liberty of God” (p.78).  How else, Jones is asking – how else, if all our cultivation is not 
ultimately implicated in the sacramental practices and indeed the salvific history of our 
kind, in which Christ himself becomes incarnate and participates –   
 
should his barlies grow  
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who said  
I am your Bread? (Jones 1952, p.82)    
 
This understanding allows Jones to boldly suggest a difference only of degree 
between the spinning-tops embellished and used by playing boys and the things 
constituting the materials of the Eucharist, as both being things and signs made by man-
the-artist and man-the-sacramentalist as gifts to the muses and to God (pp.125-126); and, 
again, he further discusses the common denominators or all Arts, from horticulture and 
boot-making to the Sacred Mysteries (p.153). Such an approach, crucially, provides a 
forceful complement and supplement to other, analytic and non-Christian accounts of the 
ontology of artworks. On the Christian perspective, our making and making other is 
always and already implicated in our relation to God; our labours, and the things made, 
must be accorded ontological import – not as works of culture alone, but as creative 
responses of the creature, man, to his Creator, with the intention of transforming the 
matter of this world into the divine likeness – as indeed was done by God at the 
Incarnation.28        
 
In a more analytic register Lamarque asks the crucial and very stimulating question: 
“what kind of change is wrought upon the world when the artist’s work is completed?” 
He suggests, by way of response, that “An initial, if no doubt over-simple, description of 
what artists do in bringing a work into existence is that they are ‘making something out of 
something.’ In every case there seem to be ‘materials’ worked on, even if the materials 
take very different forms in different cases” (Lamarque 2010, p.39).      
This is indeed a cautious description, and one that will not be sufficient for 
Christian art; Lamarque, to his credit, does not rest at this explanation either, but pursues 
an understanding that grants much more to the real newness of the thing created. This is 
                                                 
28 We may perhaps helpfully see Jones’ Eucharistic vision in the light of Yannaras’ understanding of the 
mutually ec-static communion of God and man: “the reality of the transformation of the world into the flesh 
of the God-Logos and the transformation of humanity into a partaker of the divine nature, presupposes a 
reciprocal ec-stasy, a self-transcendence not only of the human but also of the divine nature [which] finds 
its “final” realization in the Church’s Eucharist” (p.151).     
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important. While Lamarque’s position, in the end, may still fall short of satisfying the 
demands of Christian art, it helpfully points us in the right direction.         
The move Lamarque makes is to say that the new work which comes into 
existence “must broadly be a ‘cultural’ or ‘institutional’ entity of some sort” (p.53). 
While I think he is right, and while I think it may aid us in properly appreciating 
Christian works of art as belonging to a specific culture of meanings and values, I do 
wonder if this thesis satisfactorily answers or corresponds to the kind of ontological 
claims made by, say, the icon – which, while certainly an institutionally embedded work, 
also purports to alter the material world in a much more ‘objective’ or ‘actual’ manner. 
Nor can this institutional ontology account for the artwork’s sacramental nature.      
While the new work, on Lamarque’s view is a cultural, not a sacramental object, 
he is nevertheless willing to accord powers to man, and a degree of malleability to the 
world, which might well raise a few materialistic eyebrows. This, I should think, is a 
welcome direction for Christian art. We should, therefore, before seeking to amplify or 
amend Lamarque’s account, endorse the gist of his position: “We should conclude, then, 
that to bring a work into existence is indeed to bring a new entity into the world, not just 
to reorder what is there already. The conclusion is important, if hard won, because it 
means that whenever a work is completed there has been genuine creation. All too often 
in the ontology of art that simple conclusion has been denied” (Lamarque 2010, p.55).  
For making it possible to salvage a substantial meaning of creation, Lamarque 
should certainly be commended. What needs to be understood and articulated now is the 
nature and value of that creation in the light of an ontological picture which posits the 
world itself as created, as fallen, and in need of genuine regeneration. This is to address 
the problem of the ontology of Christian art within the language of Christianity itself. 
While it is right to contrast the ‘making other’ of our artistic works with the ex-nihilo 
action of God, our activity too is a kind of ‘creation’, and not just a re-organisation of 
objects or materials. Though the Christian artist must accept the constraints of his 
materials, he works in the hope of making new, and of making the world more like unto 
God.   
For Jones, certainly, the understanding of the sacramental implication of our 
artistic labours is indivisible from a real sense of the sheer ontological newness of the 
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works we accomplish, for it is the human capacity to make new which affirms our role 
and nature as ‘sacramentalists’. Thus Jones – in words rather like Lamarque’s – claims 
that “In so far as form is brought into being there is reality. ‘Something’ not ‘nothing’, 
moreover a new ‘something’, has come into existence’ (Jones 1959, p.159).      
Blake and Berdyaev, moreover, push the concept of artistic creation to extremes 
not recognised by non-Christians who do not even allow the one divine instance of ex-
nihilo creation and therefore cannot conceive, cannot convincingly argue for, creation a 
anything but the reorganisation materials. “In the materialistic universe,” Berdyaev 
argues, “nothing is created – everything is merely rearranged and passes from one state to 
another” (Berdyaev 2009b, p.133); not so in the Christian cosmos, where radical newness 
must be possible.     
A Christian understanding of creativity presupposes God’s creation out of 
nothing; for as Berdyaev puts it, “If there had not been a divine creative act, in which 
something that had never been before was created, then the creative act in our world 
would be quite impossible” (p.128). For Berdyaev, therefore, it is essential that human 
creativity arises out of our freedom, and that this freedom, as it is not bound by the 
causalities of this world, partakes of that same ‘nothingness’ out of which God created 
the world; that is, that our freedom has its source in God’s freedom, in the uncreated, not 
in the created. “Freedom and creativity,” claims Berdyaev, “tell us that man is not only a 
natural, but a supernatural being” (p.146). 
Jones, similarly, writes that “With regard to the gratuitous quality which is said to 
adhere to Ars it is well to remember that theologians say that the creation of the world 
was not a necessary, but a gratuitous act. There is a sense in which this gratuitousness in 
the operation of the Creator is reflected in the art of the creature” (Jones 2008, p.153). 
This same freedom and creativity, properly understood, should thus alert us to the 
supernatural import and end of their use – of our free creative acts, for the regeneration of 
the word and for the glory of God.      
The kind of world that Jones takes himself and his fellow humans to inhabit is a 
world of signs, bursting at the seams with meaning; it is, in the words of Williams, “a 
universe that is inextricably both material and significative, where things matter 
intensely, but matter in ways that breach boundaries and carry significance beyond what 
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they tangibly are. [In such a world] words are material communication, things are 
material words” (Williams 2010, p.75). In such a world, in other words, artefacture and 
artistic expression almost inescapably implicate its makers and users in the 
transcendental. Indeed, such a world suggests that our artistic efforts should – because 
they could – approach the sacramental. The Christian artist, therefore, may be seen to 
respond, not just to a personal or human calling, but to the telos or prerogative of art 
itself.     
 
At the heart of the poetic theology of Ephrem the Syrian is the understanding that God, in 
his condescendence, has not only allowed himself to be handled under the form of bread 
and wine, but also to be addressed, invoked – and indeed encountered – in human 
language. “He clothed Himself in our language, so that He might clothe us in His mode 
of life,” writes Ephrem: 
 
Blessed is He who has appeared to our human race under so many metaphors  
(Brock 1992, p.60). 
 
This does not only provide Ephrem with a validation of his theological method, it 
also has the implication of rendering language – its symbols, its metaphors – something 
with sacramental potentials. So much more than speaking about God, our symbols and 
metaphors may be occasions for God’s real presence. To render language sacramental is 
also what St Ephrem aims to do with his own poetry, as in lines like these:  
 
The fire of compassion descended  
and took up residence in the Bread 
 
and 
 
In Your Wine there resides 
the Fire that is not drunk  (p.112).    
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More than providing a commentary on the Eucharistic sacrament, these words aim 
to disclose something of God’s mystery that cannot be conveyed by explanatory 
discourse, nor contained in rational thought or definition, and so aim to offer us an 
experience of God. In response to God’s descent into the forms of our language and 
making, Ephrem’s poetry seek to raise language up as a gift – and a mode of communion 
– to God. This is also the ambition of St John of the Cross, as of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 
and other Christian poets with them.        
Similar understandings can be seen to inform also the poetic labours of David 
Jones. Absolutely central to Jones’ vision is Maurice de la Taille’s saying, about Christ, 
that ‘“He placed himself in the order of signs”’ (Jones 1959, p.179). Rowan Williams, 
reflecting on Jones’ invocation of de la Taille, writes: “that human life [of Christ] that is 
most supremely charged with significance (because it speaks for the maker of all things) 
becomes a sign, a material word, lets itself be taken into the world of sign-making and 
communication by means of the institution of the Mass; and so to take your stand in the 
context of the Mass [as Jones does, as he invites us all to do; as all Christian artists do, in 
some way or other] is to be where sign-making is grounded or vindicated” (Williams 
2010, p.82).  
This would mean, for Jones, that we may look for the presence of Christ, not only 
in the wine and the bread, but indeed in the image and the word. Thus Jones’ poetic 
labours, I believe, should be seen as an attempt to render language itself sacramental. 
Hague notes Jones’ recurring “dwelling on a structure made by man that, in shape, 
material and purpose, was for him of more than earthly significance” (Hague 1977, 
p.243), such as apses, wattled fences, boats – and perhaps chief among them, I would 
venture to suggest, the structure of our language; which in Jones’ hands, under his 
inspired dedication to etymology as well as his ingenious capacity for neologism, comes 
to yield meanings of startling richness and variety.   
Indeed, though Jones’ poem pays perhaps unparalleled tribute to the import and 
sanctity of simple human craft, thing-making, culture-building, of a material kind, it is 
the ‘abstract’ object of our language that is the most immediate object of Jones’ loving 
attentions; and, in his own work, it is the English language (leavened by generous doses 
of Latin, Welsh, and other influences) which achieves that sacramental significance that 
172 
 
Jones himself observes in other, more physical, feats of human artefacture and sign-
making. We too may perceive, through Jones’ pointing to it, the significance of such 
things; but, more immediately and commandingly, more wondrously, we are also able to 
experience – be inspired, transformed by – the anathemata achieved by Jones himself.    
  Jones shares with Blake an ability to make language as it were tactile; by 
drawing attention to the thing-ness of individual words; by exegeses of etymological 
meanings; by visual representation and the use of capitals and italics; by startling turns of 
grammar and syntax.     
It is crucial to note this; that while Jones and Blake provide models for how to 
apprehend Christian artworks, and artworks in general under a Christian conception and 
experience of the world, their own works also aspire to such significance. The models 
suggested in and by their works thus have implications for how these very works may be 
understood – both as regards the kind of world in which they exist, and as regards the 
kinds of things that they are; this is something that I took Neill and Ridley to task for not 
properly acknowledging.   
In Jones’ case, therefore, we must be open to see his own Anathemata as one 
instance of the anathemata that we, as man-the-maker of signs and significant forms, 
offer to Him who made us; and as making a contribution within that ontological history 
of rendering the cultural as well as the material world a sacrament. In the case of Blake, 
similarly, we are asked to see his own work as instantiating the labour of Golgonooza, as 
constituting a building block of that city.      
As The Anathemata ends, Williams comments: “The Mass reaches its climax, the 
words are spoken and the bread lifted up, a material sign of a material sign, a sacrament 
of the ultimately sacramental humanity of Christ” (Williams 2010, pp.80-81). The poem 
ends thus: 
 
  What did he do other 
recumbent at the garnished supper?  
What did he do yet other 
riding the Axile Tree? (Jones 1952, p.243)  
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This is a poetic moment or movement in itself pregnant with that transformative 
presence; not only bringing the many currents of the work together, but also, at this cross-
section of significance, palpably invoking the power and presence of ‘he’ who makes all 
poetic realisation possible by himself being the source and fruition of all truly 
transformative works.   
  
 
4.2.3 Golgonooza  
 
Jones’ account of the transformative nature of art is primarily sacramental, but it also 
opens onto a vision of the transfiguration of the cosmos – something which is more 
comprehensively developed in Blake through his elaborate metaphor of Golgonooza. 
Jones speaks on several instances of a “will to form” as characterising human life (Jones 
1959, p.104). This “will to form” has ontological as well as eschatological implications, 
for it is Creation itself we form and re-form by our signs, things and traditions.    
One of the crucial lessons of Christian art is that the world around us, while it is 
an inexhaustible gift, is also very much of our making and our vision: it is a malleable 
world, infinitely responsive to our active presence, to our creative and perceptive powers.     
Thus, while the world is given us to inhabit, we are also called to reconfigure and 
regenerate it; this is a prerogative, and also a real power, of ours.         
The city of Golgonooza, while an elusive and intricate metaphor, deeply 
embedded in Blake’s later poetic works, is perhaps the most audaciously ambitious and 
ultimately most compelling account of how humankind’s artistic labours seek their 
fruition in a communal, cross-temporal work of art which constitute the eternal city and 
true home for our creative and divinely inspired natures.29 In Milton and Jerusalem, the 
                                                 
29 Blake’s credentials as a Christian artist may be contested, but I believe there are ample grounds for 
seeing Blake as profoundly Christian in his commitments; indeed, his dedication to Christ as the fount of 
the human imagination directly informs the particulars of his creative labours, visual and poetic. I hope the 
use of Blake in this thesis helps to bear this out; this and the following chapter will give much scope to 
Blake’s unique contribution, but I must also recall the reader to Chapter 2, where Blake’s work was seen as 
vitally supporting the Christian understanding of our call to grow in the divine likeness. It is perhaps this 
affirmation of our divine potentials – our calling to theosis – which most emphatically aligns Blake with 
traditional (indeed Patristic) Christian theology. Of tremendous importance is also his conception of love 
and mutual transformation – to be discussed at length in Chapter 5 – and of course his vision of our 
regenerative creative works, currently under discussion. I have written at greater length about Blake’s 
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central task of the building of Golgonooza entails the making of the whole world into a 
collective work of art, redeeming matter from the contingencies of the natural world, 
forming it, beautifying it, and rendering it a prototype – more than a prototype – of the 
New Jerusalem. This is a perpetual labour, to redeem time itself and restore each moment 
to eternity; thus,    
 
          They Builded Great Golgonooza Times on Times Ages on Ages  
    (Blake 2000, p.248). 
 
Blake takes seriously the intuition that there is something eternal, something 
ineffable, inviolate and imperishable, in every great work of work. Golgonooza is 
emphatically a vision of art’s consolidating and lasting power; in this city, therefore, not a 
single creative work and not a moment of regenerated time is lost:   
  
       all that has existed in the space of six thousand years: 
Permanent. & not lost not lost nor vanished. & every little act. 
Word. work. & wish. that has existed. all remaining still   
 […]   
For everything exists & not one sigh nor smile nor tear 
One hair nor particle of dust. not one can pass away (pp.310-11). 
  
What Golgonooza suggests is that all things (if good and beautiful, if iconic of 
Christ), once created, will not pass away, but will forever abide, even as time itself passes 
away, in the eternal city which is the eternal body of the Imagination, the Great Humanity 
Divine. Similarly, Jones repeatedly affirms in The Anathemata that ‘he would lose none’ 
of the artefacts made, held up as signs and handed over as gifts to God. All anathemata 
remain in the care of the God who receives them, who takes them to himself.        
            The master builder of this stupendous work, the city of Golgonooza, is Los, 
described by Northrop Frye as “the blacksmith, the divine artificer, the spiritual form of 
                                                 
relations to specifically Orthodox theology elsewhere (see my publications in Sobornost and in Language. 
Literature. Culture.)    
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time, the Holy Spirit which spoke by the Prophets” (Frye 1969, p.251). On one level, 
Los’ labour is “To Create a world of Generation from the world of Death”; to sustain a 
living form in the face of chaos and dissolution, “delivering Form out of confusion” 
(Blake 2000, p.355). At the same time, from the perspective of the world of generation, 
which we all inhabit, Los is also the active agent of regenerative works, working to  
conform – transform – our world to the divine vision; for each form in this world is made 
to manifest – to be revelatory of, and find its fruition in – the image of God.  
For Blake, all genuine creative labour tends and aims Godwards, for the realisation of the 
divine likeness30; and for the overcoming of the laws of generation, the self-righteousness 
of ‘vegetative man’. Thus, 
 
within the Furnaces the Divine Vision appeard 
On Albions Hills: often walking from the Furnaces in clouds 
And flames among the Druid Temples & Starry Wheels (p.357),  
 
where these temples and wheels constitute the moral and material universe of Bacon, 
Newton and Locke, of Rousseau and Voltaire.  It is this context we should understand 
Blake’s famous lyric: 
 
I will not cease from Mental Fight. 
Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand: 
Till we have built Jerusalem. 
In Englands green & pleasant Land (p.295). 
 
The image of a New Jerusalem, as the fulfilment of human history and human 
making, provides an archetype and ultimate hope for all Christian artistic striving. As a 
guiding metaphor, the idea is invoked, implicitly or explicitly, throughout the long 
history of Christian artifice and culture-building, and it can be taken as giving theological 
                                                 
30 Indeed, only works which tend towards God may be called truly creative; all those that tend away from, 
obscures or negates God, are ultimately destructive of the divine image, of man and of the world in its right 
relation to God.   
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validation to these material and conceptual activities. Pervasive in Byzantine art and 
architecture, the idea of a New Jerusalem has perhaps been most forcefully put to use in 
modern times by Blake; in whose vision it must be understood as the transfigured 
material world and – in the words of Northrop Frye – as “the spiritualized church of the 
imaginative, the liberty of the sons of God united in brotherhood’ (Frye 1969, p.128).  
The promise of a new heaven and a new earth lends both joy and gravity to the 
labours of every Christian artist. Blake, perhaps more comprehensively than others, is 
able to see this work in progress as the central project of humanity; it is crucial, for him, 
for an understanding of what it means to be and to exist as a creature fundamentally 
creative in nature, blessed with divine potential and tasked with stewardship of the world.  
This vision is inseparable, then, from the understanding of man as a microcosm; 
and so in Blake’s work we find that the building of Golgonooza is entirely simultaneous, 
even synonymous, with the regeneration of Albion. Frye, therefore, may succinctly  
characterise the central idea and impetus of Blake’s greatest work like this: “The 
construction of a character or identity out of life is part of the attempt of Albion to 
emerge from time into eternity as one Man who is also a City of God. Thus the 
imagination exists immortally not only as a person but as part of a growing and 
consolidating city, the Golgonooza which when complete will be the emanation or total 
created achievement of Albion, Jerusalem” (p.248).      
Blake’s vision is a total and transformative one; he calls us to communal, 
collective, and indeed cosmic labours of regeneration. As Blake’s work – as all genuine 
Christian art – again and again testifies, Christianity is about manifestation and 
transfiguration. Blake saw and professed, with fiery fervour, the artistic potentials – 
indeed, the artistic nature – of Christianity; how this religion of incarnation and 
glorification lends itself so well to be realised in works of art and beauty. As Frye 
affirms, “The central form of Christianity is its vision of the humanity of God and the 
divinity of risen Man, and this, in varying ways, is what all great Christian artists have 
attempted to recreate” (p.120).    
Even among Christian artists, Blake makes one of the most compelling cases for 
Christianity’s essentially all-encompassing and all-changing claims on each person and 
on humankind as a whole. Blake’s model of human life is Los, “with many tears 
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labouring” (Blake 2000, p.388), passionately building Golgonooza and battling the 
Spectre, for love of the sons and daughters of men, for Jesus and Jerusalem.              
In this ontological, even eschatological conception of art, Blake expresses an 
understanding that finds its closest parallel, I think, in the Orthodox vision of the 
‘iconisation’ of the world. The deepest, most ambitious implications of this vision are 
explained by Nicolas Zernov, who tells us that icons “were, for the Russians […] 
manifestations of man’s spiritual power to redeem creation though beauty and art. The 
[ikons] were pledges of the coming victory of a redeemed creation over the fallen one. 
[Consequently,] for the Russians the artistic perfection of an ikon was not only a 
reflection of the celestial glory – it was a concrete example of matter restored to its 
original harmony and beauty, and serving as a vehicle of the Spirit. The ikons were part 
of the transfigured cosmos” (Zernov 1978, pp.105-106).   
        
In a differently accented way, we find this eschatological, transformative perspective also 
in Jones. According to Hague, the second paragraph of page 106 of The Anathemata 
constitute “an unequivocal statement of the core of [Jones’] thought, as manifested in all 
his writing” (Hague 1977, p.124). In this paragraph, then, we read:     
 
You that shall spread your hands over the things offered  
make memento of us  
and where the gloss reads jungit manus count us among his argonauts  
whose argosy you plead, under the sign of the  
things you offer (Jones 1952, p.106).  
  
The accompanying note informs us that “what is pleaded in the Mass is precisely 
the argosy or voyage of the Redeemer […] on behalf of us Argonauts and of the whole 
argosy of mankind” (p.106).   
This journey is not merely historical, temporal, but indeed ontological; not a 
matter only of a transportation from then to now, from here to there, but indeed a matter 
of transfiguration, from this to that, from old to new, from death to life. It is thus a 
voyage not necessarily best recounted – or indeed effected – in narrative form, but rather 
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in the multi-layered simultaneity of poetry; where ‘is’ and ‘was’ may co-inhabit the same 
metaphor, the same mystery; where, for Eliot, history is now and England, or, with Blake, 
we may see the world in a grain of sand, or where Jones may unearth seemingly endless 
strata of etymological meaning in the words which constitute the material in which we 
commune with each other and with God.        
Jones’ concern is always with the point where artefact is inseparable from 
sacrament, culture inseparable from worship. Hague, apropos of “the argonaut theme”, 
therefore importantly stresses that “the voyages in The Anathemata stand for much more 
than an expansion of culture and civilisation” (Hague 1977, p.129); that, I would add, 
they ultimately signify – and so serve to actualise – sacralisation, spiritualization, 
divinisation.     
We gather the full import of this voyage in the section titled “Keel, Ram, 
Stauros”, where Jones builds upon, and builds with, the many maritime and timber-
related metaphors of the cross and the Church. As Hague explains, the stauros or cross “is 
seen as the mainmast of the vessel which is a symbol of the Church and of man’s voyage 
to his appointed end under the guidance of the vine-juice skipper (Christ) and his vicar” 
(p.191).    
We find similar metaphors put to profound use also by St Ephrem: 
 
Noah’s Ark marked out by its course the sign of its Preserver, 
the Cross of its Steersman and the Wood of its Sailor 
who has come to fashion for us a Church in the waters of baptism  
(Brock 1992, p.58).   
 
Importantly, the vessel which Jones invokes – and the same is true of Ephrem – 
sails both inside and outside time, present in history yet not contained by – rather, 
containing – it. Ontologically, the ship is a kind of ‘substance’ beyond the ‘accidents’ of 
time; it belongs to a sacramental order, at the intersection of the timeless with time, and it 
may symbolise and embody the ultimate purpose of man-the-maker’s labours at 
significant form. This vessel, like Blake’s Golgonooza, is the salvaging and 
consummation of all our art.     
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Blake’s and Jones’ commitment to the actual and visible manifestation of God, I believe, 
safeguards the central affirmations of Christian eschatology and theological aesthetics. 
Blake’s vision and project – as does Jones’ account of sacramental history – accords well 
with von Balthasar’s claim that “theological aesthetics culminates in the Christological 
form (taking this word seriously) of salvation-history, in so far as here, upon the medium 
of man’s historical existence, God inscribes his authentic sign with his own hand” (von 
Balthasar 1982, p.646).   
We may say that in the imaginative construction of Golgonooza, we achieve a 
realisation of the Christ-form. There is no higher form for Blake than Christ risen; the 
eschatology of his works culminate in the very concrete form of the great Humanity 
Divine, not in anything formless or abstract: the consummation at the end of Jerusalem is 
a concrete form of transformative and transfigured love. All Christian art, so my thesis 
holds, should conform to or take its cue from this model. Here, then, is Blake’s call to all 
Christians, all real artists:  
 
Let every Christian as much as in him lies engage himself openly & publicly 
before all the World in some Mental pursuit for the Building up of Jerusalem 
(Blake 2000, p.374).     
 
Drawing on the claims made in our chapter on beauty, the New Jerusalem may be 
seen as the consummation of creativity in its marriage to the uncreated. While all strictly 
human achievement may only prefigure such a state – and will always be conditional 
upon the response of God – we may also see our accomplishments as ‘the point of 
intersection of the timeless with time,’ the place where we may encounter the presence of 
God and be granted real access to his Kingdom. Crucially, the New Jerusalem is a place 
inhabited; indeed, its existence as a city is dependent upon the existence of its inhabitants. 
The building on this city therefore entails a twofold and mutual transfiguration of the 
world and humankind. This transfiguration is the prerogative of all our making other, but 
also the promise inherent in the gift of beauty. Its prerequisite and necessary condition is 
the cultivation of love.     
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CHAPTER 5: THE LOVE OF CHRISTIAN ART 
       
Love pertains to and permeates all that has previously been argued in this thesis. Indeed, 
the previous accounts of form, beauty, goodness and ontology would be incomplete 
without reference to – without being placed in the light of – the love that Christian art 
above all seeks to cultivate. It is not only that we are invited to love the form of the 
Christian artwork, to love its beauty, its goodness, and what it accomplishes through its 
sacramental and regenerative powers; we may also say that the form, beauty, goodness 
and ontological status of the Christian artwork may only be discerned in an attitude and 
engagement of love. Indeed, unless we apprehend the Christian artwork as an invitation 
to love, we can be said not to have seen or engaged with it at all. Fundamentally, also the 
making of the Christian artwork should be seen as a labour of love, in line with   
Berdyaev’s claim that “God calls men to creative activity and to a creative answer to His 
love. Our creativeness should be the expression of our love toward God” (Berdyaev 
2009b, p.9).   
For the Christian artist, whatever is true of other art, love must be realised – at 
least, attempted – in the very making of the artwork. As Rowan Williams observes, 
inspired by David Jones and others, “Central to ‘making other’ is dispossession, 
disinterested love” (Williams 2010, p.61); a love that lets what is created be, without 
imprisoning the work in self-interest, so that it may stand as a gift to others, inviting and 
rewarding their free imaginative engagement, their own second-person explorations of 
love.       
I agree with von Balthasar’s argument that, as “the meaning of the Christ-form is 
manifested as the love of God for the world and as man’s perfect love for God and his 
brother,” “any particular form (such as sacramental and hierarchical structure, 
ecclesiastical discipline, the life of the councils, and so on” – here I would add the 
tradition of Christian art – “is Christian only in so far and as long as it makes Christian 
love concrete and visible” (von Balthasar 1982, p.600). An artwork, therefore, is not 
Christian art if it does not engender love – for the artwork, and, through the artwork, for 
the beauty of God.       
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The first part of this chapter explores the conditions of love governing the 
creation, reception and experience of Christian art, in the light of an understanding of 
Christian faith which holds that love is requisite for the vision and knowledge of God, 
and that the life of faith takes the form of a loving second-person relation between the 
believer and God. The second part applies the experience of Christian art to consider our 
loving prerogatives more widely, as creative beings entrusted – not only with the making 
and keeping of art – but indeed with stewardship of the world.   
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5.1 WORKS OF LOVE  
 
Love is a requisite condition of the experience of Christian art; this understanding is 
anchored both in the nature of the artwork, understood as dialogic and second-personal, 
and in Christian life and theology at large, where any knowledge and experience of God 
take the form of an encounter with, and in, love.   
The claim that love is a necessary condition for a proper engagement with the 
Christian artwork can be defended against the background of the central claims of 
Christianity, where, in Newman’s words, ‘we believe because we love’, and where love 
is also a prerequisite for – indeed, where love is a mode of – our knowledge of God. “He 
who does not love does not know God, for God is love” (1 John, 4:8); “Love – indeed, 
love that partakes in God’s love – is the warrant of objective knowledge in the realm of 
Trinitarian revelation” (von Balthasar 1982, p.618); “And if anyone thinks that he knows 
anything, he knows nothing yet as he ought to know. But if anyone loves God, this one is 
known by Him” (I Corinthians 8:2-3).  
The Christian artwork seeks to inspire, and to exercise, a love for God; and it does 
so by being an object of love itself, receptive to a second-person engagement, in which 
the perceiver may encounter and lovingly respond to the presence of God. Thus, for 
example, love is both the subject and the ‘aim’ of Blake’s Songs of Innocence and 
Experience, the ultimate meaning of which – insofar as such exists – is perhaps best 
encapsulated in two lines from “The Little Black Boy”: 
 
And we are put on Earth a little space, 
That we may learn to bear the beams of love (Blake 2000, p.51).  
 
This meaning is shared by all Christian artworks. Crucially, however, beyond 
proclaiming or telling us about the mutual love of God and man, the Christian artwork 
seeks to be an actual occasion for such love.     
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5.1.1 We love therefore we see 
 
It is essential to theology, understood as the second-person knowledge of God (and not as 
knowledge about God) that truth is unattainable without love – because the truth of God 
is love – as St Ephrem writes:   
 
Truth and love are wings that cannot be separated, 
for Truth without Love is unable to fly, 
so too Love without Truth is unable to soar up: 
their yoke is one of harmony (Brock 1992, p.45).   
 
Insofar as the Christian artwork has theological ambitions, to disclose things real 
and true of God, it needs to offer itself as an object of love; it needs to invite, occasion 
and engender the cultivation of love for God, and to offer – through its forms, its beauty, 
its sacramental nature – an experience (intimation, presence) of God’s love.      
It is a crucial theological point that love is integral to right perception and right 
belief. We need love to also inform our perception and experience of Christian art; as the 
‘object’ or ‘purpose’ of this art is to bring us closer to God. Love informs, and perfects, 
both the Christian’s way of seeing – for, as Metropolitan Anthony writes, “it is only to 
the extent to which we become capable of loving that we become capable of seeing and 
perceiving” (Metropolitan 1971, p.115) – and the context in which the artwork is 
apprehended, namely the complex of communal relations that constitute the Christian 
life. This means, therefore, that as the artwork invites us to see in a new way, it also 
invites us to love.   
Christos Yannaras writes that “The knowledge of God does not refer to the realm 
of our objective enquiries. It refers to our inward, personal discovery and certainty that 
God’s erotic ecstasy (the gift of life) is directed exclusively towards us, that we are 
known and loved by God and consequently all we have to do is to respond positively to 
this erotic invitation, with the aim of ‘knowing’ the Person of our Bridegroom and 
Lover” (Yannaras 2007, pp.67-68). It is this ‘erotic invitation’ of God’s that Christian 
artworks aim to reveal and re-issue in ever new ways; by inviting us also to love the 
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artwork – to love it for ‘its own sake’ but also for the way that it manifests God; to love 
God in the work, and to love God in loving the work. We want to say, then, that the 
experience of Christian art entails a new mode, not only of vision, but of love as well; for 
the Christian artwork is, and asked to be sees as, an object of love – an instance of the 
love of and for God.  
As Viladesau succinctly explains, with reference to Robert and St Thomas, “Great 
works of art bring the viewer or hearer to a feeling of joy, praise and loss of self in love 
of Something: an ineffable reality that is manifest in the experience of beauty”, and so 
brings us to a state or disposition in which “we already implicitly know […] the 
supremely adorable Reality of God” (Viladesau 2013, p.119). Here we see how the 
ambition of Christian art, identified in chapter 1, to give us the real – the Reality of God – 
can only be realised in love.       
Love, therefore, is integral to both the production and the reception of Christian 
art; and we may see this attitude enshrined, in more or less explicit terms, throughout the 
tradition of Christian art, from St Ephrem, through St John of the Cross, to Tracey Emin’s 
For You. Thus we have seen, in a previous chapter, how Dante calls for his readers to 
partake of that same love which spurs and sustains the poet.  
Dante’s work, which ultimately proclaims “the Love that moves the sun and the 
other stars” (Dante 1995, p.541), is itself a work of love for God’s goodness and beauty. 
Importantly, the work instantiates that love in two senses: it is a labour and expression of 
the love which motivates its author; and it is an object of love and inspiration for us 
readers. Thus the love that is proclaimed in the poem is the same love that we, in 
engaging with Dante’s vision, may learn and be inspired to emulate.      
     
Metropolitan Anthony claims that we may know God in two ways – as Jesus and as 
Love: Jesus, “to whom I can speak personally and who reveals to me therefore that God 
is a person because only a person can become one with a person, and reveal a person”, 
and Love, which is “not simply in Biblical terminology a feeling multiplied by infinity, 
but is the fullness of life that is beyond insecurity, has conquered death, and can give 
itself as an offering of life and death without fear” (Metropolitan Anthony 1971, p.73). 
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This is the love that the Christian artwork seeks to manifest and to guide us towards, 
through the second-person experience of the artwork.     
Without love – without a loving second-person approach – the Christian artwork 
will elude us. In the case of Neill and Ridley, therefore, the most serious flaw of their 
approach is that they fail to apprehend the Christian work as an object of love. This is not 
simply an ethical, but an ontological failing on Neill and Ridley’s approach. In failing to 
observe the first and final imperative of Christian art, that it be fashioned and received in 
love, they fail – and fail in their own ambition – to apprehend it as what it is. They do not 
see that the artwork is recommended to us an occasion for an expansive love, which is 
given to the work itself but also spreads far wider. The work is not presented to us as a 
proposition requiring rational consent or agreement on the level of ideas, but is rather 
commended to our imaginative care.   
In line with the approach here suggested, the Christian artwork does not seek to 
tell us about God; it offers a religious experience, and so addresses itself, not to 
philosophers of religion, but to believers. We want to say that this God of the believers 
may be encountered, not only in Scripture or Mass, but indeed in the second-person 
experience of the Christian artwork. It is crucial that the artwork is taken to manifest 
God, not just to serve as a series of propositional statements or arguments. It does not 
seek to give us knowledge about God, but to give us an experience of God, to give us 
God.        
Previous chapters have given us models for understanding God’s presence in the 
Christian artwork, eminently in the artwork’s beauty. Thus suffused, as it were, with the 
personality of God, we may see why this artwork should offer itself as a second-person 
encounter, and we see why it should ultimately be seen as an object of love. 
Beauty, crucially, quickens our erotic energies, our self-transcending longing for 
communion with others. “Erotic ‘wonder’ in the presence of the uniqueness of a physical 
beauty,” writes Christos Yannaras, “is always an invitation to communion and relation 
[…] the satisfaction of the existential desire for communion”; an “attraction which is not 
always tied to human bodily beauty” but which may also be generated by “the physical 
beauty of a place or a work of art” (Yannaras 2007, p.83). Yannaras, as we have already 
noted in chapter 2, can therefore speak of “Ascetic self-transcendence as a presupposition 
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for knowledge of the truth of the world’s beauty” (p.84); for the personal gift and relation 
that is beauty asks that we open ourselves to personal communion. It is that the “the 
world, from being an object of the senses, an objective ‘phenomenon’ and subjective 
impression, is transformed into the second term of a personal relationship” (p.86).     
St Ephrem’s work is, again, illuminating here. Ephrem’s theological approach, as 
Sebastian Brock explains, is not that of domination or dispassionate detachment, but “that 
of engagement, an engagement above all of love and wonder”; this approach, crucially, 
“is a two-way affair, involving a continual interaction [between the theologian and his 
subject.] Only by means of such an interaction of love can human knowledge of divine 
truth grow” (Brock 1992, pp.43-44). God gives and reveals himself to him who 
approaches in the openness and readiness of love. Thus Ephrem writes,  
 
Your fountain, Lord, is hidden 
from the person who does not thirst for You; 
Your treasury seems empty 
to the person who rejects You. 
Love is the treasurer 
of Your heavenly treasure store (p.44). 
 
It may seem, from what is argued here and in previous chapters about the 
requisite conditions for the experience of Christian art, that this art may only be fully 
experienced by those ‘on the inside’, those already confirmed as believers. However, it is 
just as crucial to stress that the experience of Christian art also can be – and partly has the 
ambition, not to say function, to so be – a ‘way in’ for persons previously outside the 
community of believers. That is, Christian art possesses great potential to inspire and 
engender conversions.   
Such a conversion, arguably, entails precisely the commencement of a second-
person relation. We may find ourselves, in the course of our experience of Christian art, 
moving from an observer’s third-person vantage point to a recognition of being addressed 
directly, and invited to respond in kind; as may happen when, for example, reading the 
Bible – and suddenly feeling Christ’s words directed, with startling precision, to me (and 
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no longer to an abstract, hypothetical or ideal reader). Something similar occurs in the 
recognition that beauty is not simply there to dazzle or please, but indeed makes a claim 
upon me, the observer, in ways that engages me – and makes me answerable – as a moral 
and spiritual agent; indeed, I discover that beauty asks to be apprehended in a posture of 
love.    
The experience of Christian art, and the experience of beauty (in the Christian 
artwork or elsewhere), may thus act as a kind of initiation into the (mysteries of the) 
faith: it may give first-hand, second-personal knowledge of what faith is and is like. 
Christian artworks both inspire and reward belief, by inviting a loving second-person 
response that relies on seeing the artwork as what it is, namely, as a sacramental object 
implicated in rendering the world more in the likeness of God, and as an occasion for a 
transformative communion with God.   
 
 
5.1.2 Dialogue and metanoia    
  
A crucial way of understanding the second-person relation is to stress that this relation 
entails, not just seeing, but also being seen by another; not just addressing, but also being 
addressed by another.   
A believer before the Christian artwork wholly accepts a reciprocity, the 
mutuality of gift and response, between himself and the work. This isn’t true only of the 
engagement with icons; for also when entering the York Minster or reading the poems of 
R.S. Thomas, the Christian accepts that he stands before the eyes of God. We are thus 
answerable to the work, as we are to another person (as perhaps to any member of the 
kingdom of ends). The non-believer, however, cannot accept this reciprocity, does not 
hold himself answerable, and his experience consequently remains one-sided, a mere 
first-person or third-person affair.       
Atheism can be seen to consist precisely in the rejection of a second-person 
relation with God; and it is this same attitude which disqualifies an atheist from a proper 
engagement with Christian art. One who does not acknowledge the work’s address, its 
claims upon us, and its invitation to a mutually enriching and transformative dialogue – 
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one who does not feel answerable to the work, or to God, and who is not willing to 
change his life in responsiveness to the work’s meanings – does not really experience the 
work at all as what it is.  
 
A second-person account of faith chimes well with the understanding of artworks – 
particularly Christian artworks – as dialogic. Rowan Williams has explored the fiction of 
Dostoevsky (one of the most powerful, problematic and rewarding of Christian artists) in 
such terms, with great benefits for the understanding of both literary practice and the 
religious life. Though Williams’ emphasis is on freedom, I believe his approach is 
illuminating also for an understanding of dialogic love. Williams argues:    
 
Faith and fiction are deeply related […] because both are gratuitous linguistic 
practices standing over against a functional scheme of things. The gratuity of faith 
arises from its character as response to the freedom of the creator as unexpectedly 
encountered in the fabric of the world. The gratuity of fiction arises from the 
conviction that no kind of truth can be told if we speak or act as if history is over, 
as if the description of what contingently is becomes the sole possible account of 
language. A fiction like Dostoevsky’s which tries to show what faith might mean 
in practice is bound to be both inconclusive in all sorts of ways, and also 
something that aspires to a realism that is more than descriptive (Williams 2011, 
p.46).      
 
Fiction (as all art) takes the form of, a free response to God’s gift of the world. 
Art is the exercise of gratitude and generosity, as also argued, in different ways, by David 
Jones and David Bentley Hart. Crucially, in its appeal to freedom, art does not purport to 
say the final word about the world, about man or God, but rather encourages and 
engenders ever more dialogue and expression. No paraphrase may replace the richness of 
the actual experience of the work, and the need to revisit and re-engage with this work – 
as well as the need to re-imagine the world and ourselves.           
This inexhaustibility of the work – which has much in common with the dynamic 
nature of personhood – allows for art to be of great importance to our orientation in the 
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world and to the life of faith. We may understand from Williams that fiction is not so 
much an analogy of faith, but one of the ways in which faith is exercised, one of the ways 
in which the world becomes intelligible to the eyes of faith.  
Williams notes, perceptively, that Dostoevsky’s treatment of freedom is 
intimately bound up with, or embodied in, his narrative method. Thus “it is crucial to 
[Dostoevsky’s] understanding of what he is doing that he sees language itself as the 
indisputable marker of freedom: confronted with what seeks to close down exchange or 
conflict, we discover we can always say more” (p.11). This is all borne out in the novels 
themselves, certainly, but we can see how this understanding is applicable also to the 
reading of them.    
Not only the characters, but we too, when grappling with the often irresolute 
fabric of the novels, discover that the only path to a fuller understanding, to a more 
fruitful engagement with the themes and truths of the work in question, is the pursuit of 
dialogue – pursued at the risk of discord, in dependence on the words of others. To risk 
this path is itself an act of freedom, a promise of responsiveness and an acceptance of 
responsibility. It is a process, moreover, through which we may not only reach a fuller 
imaginative understanding of the characters in the novels, but also of ourselves and the 
world we inhabit.  
As Williams emphatically and correctly points out, this possibility of gaining in 
understanding, which entails, and which demands of us, an open-ended exercise of 
freedom, rests precisely on the fact that any need of ours for premature certainty and 
closure will be frustrated. For these reasons, it is Williams’ understanding that 
Dostoevsky’s fiction is  
 
an exercise in resisting the demonic and rescuing language. It does this by 
insisting on freedom – the freedom of characters within the novel to go on 
answering each other, even when this wholly upsets and disappoints any hopes we 
may have for resolutions and good endings, and therefore also the freedom of the 
reader to reply, having digested this text in the continuing process of a reflective 
life (p.12).  
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Here, then, we find an explicit suggestion that the fictional work indeed opens out 
onto, or cuts a path into, the life of the reader, helping to form, inform and reform this 
life. Thus our relationship with the Christian artwork may become the mode – not only 
the place or occasion, but indeed the manner and form – of our relationship with God.  
We may stress here that, not only freedom, but also love, is integral to a fruitful 
dialogue of this kind, to life lived as a dialogue; not least in the form of that trust needed 
to sustain the condition of mutual vulnerability that the openness to another entails. 
Freedom and love are intimately wedded; for we freely allow the love of and for God to 
enter into our lives, as indeed into our engagement with the work of art. Moreover, the 
aim of our freedom – even of the freedom exercised in the dialogic reading of 
Dostoevsky – should always be a deeper communion in love. Crucially, it is only when 
we learn to apprehend the artwork as an object of love – be it Crime and Punishment or 
Rublev’s Trinity icon – that we may enter into a truly transformative dialogue with it.    
It is through a lived and loving dialogue that the work fully begins to yield its 
meanings to us. It is in this dialogic nature of the artwork, then, that we should expect to 
discover the full implications of its capacity for iconicity; its manifestation of the form 
and beauty of God. We stand before an icon, after all, in a posture or a situation of 
reciprocity, which does not cease at the level of the exchange of information, but which 
rather aspires to a condition of mutual transfiguration.        
Insofar as a narrative of fiction can indeed be iconic, it is our conversion, no less 
than that of its characters, which is ultimately invited and desired by the work. If Crime 
and Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov are iconic, the implication is that we 
readers are called upon to be, not only observers, but fellow pilgrims with their 
characters. These works would ask of us, not simply that we appreciate how the 
conversions of Raskolnikov and Mitya are ‘true’ internally, so to speak, in the context of 
the narrative, but that we also acknowledge that they do indeed reveal something true 
about the world – and so provide a true model for the reorientation of the human self and 
the proper relationship between man and God. Again, this iconicity relies not only on 
freedom, but above all on love; as love is the force that impels both Mitya and 
Raskolnikov to renounce their old selves for the sake of others. Crucially, it is the love of 
others – of Sonya, of Alyosha and others – which enable Raskolnikov and Mitya to enter 
191 
 
into dialogue in the first place, by breaking down their self-enclosures; it is love that calls 
them away from their solipsistic conceptions, their pride and self-righteousness, to accept 
their second-personal relations, not only to their families and friends, but also to the 
objective goods of God.               
In the light of such an understanding, Christian art asks of us that we keep talking 
to it; that we keep rediscovering it, while at the same time interrogating and revitalizing 
our own lives, and so rediscovering in ourselves that divine image and likeness to (and 
towards) which all Christian art seeks to alert us.       
 
We should gather from the above discussion how our engagement with art, especially in 
the case of Christian art, has implications for how we live our lives. Indeed, the re-
orientation of vision and disposition is the central aim of Christian art. Christian art does 
not only aspire to reveal divine realities, but crucially invites an engagement in which 
reading (or viewing, or listening) is inseparable from repentance, metanoia, understood as 
our endeavour to reform our lives in the light and likeness of God.      
This transformation of our perceptions and persons is not only the aim, but also 
the governing theme, of the work of William Blake. For Blake, the key term is 
Imagination, which in his conceptual vocabulary denotes our ability to see the divine and 
the eternal in the things of this world. Art arises as the expressive and creative exercise of 
this imagination, and the role of art is to reveal the divine image in all things – foremost 
in the faces of our fellow men – by inviting and enabling a perspective of imaginative 
sympathy and transformative love. Blake’s idiosyncratic terminology should in no way 
distract us from his ability to phrase what we may take to be the core understanding of 
many other religious artists, Dostoevsky among them.       
Blake’s dialogue with childhood in the Songs of Innocence may be seen as 
exemplary of the metanoia involved in our engagement with Christian artworks. The 
Songs of Innocence are not sentimental or platitudinous, but both invite and reward a 
simplicity of attitude that, for the adult ensconced in the world of Experience, demands a 
radical change of perspective. The challenge of these songs is not unlike the challenge 
posed by Orthodox icons, with their two-dimensional presentation, to one habituated to 
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the naturalistic perspectives of Western painting31; and just as the icon requires a shift 
from ‘natural’ to ‘spiritual’ modes of apprehension, so Blake’s work asks that we cast 
aside the trappings of our ‘fallen’ perceptions and reclaim (a measure of) the clarity of 
Innocence; above all, that we experience the work with, and in, the Imagination.          
Childhood, to Blake, is not something to outgrow and then remember, but rather 
something to perpetually re-assimilate into our personality and our sense of personhood. 
This is a crucial aspect of our dialogic and dynamic personality; and it is one that speaks 
of our need to be, as it were, perpetually re-born. Significantly, it is part of spiritual 
maturity to realise our relation to God the Father; even the oldest and most venerable of 
believers never cease to be the children of God.       
On a first view, we are prone to misconceive the poems of Innocence because we 
see them only with the adult’s mind, mired in Experience. In Yannaras’ terms, we may 
say that these ‘innocent’ poems confront us with two different kinds or modes of 
knowledge, one objectifying and one relational; Yannaras sets out the difference between 
the two approaches (intended, in his example, to characterise the difference between 
Orthodox and Western theological approaches) as follows:     
 
On the one side, life is based on truth as relation and as existential experience; 
truth is actualized as life’s social dynamics and life is justified as the 
identification of being true with being in communion. On the other side, truth is 
identified with intellectual definitions; it is objectified and subordinated to 
usefulness [and as such] it comes to be translated into technological hype, into the 
tormenting and alienation of humanity (Yannaras 2007, p.23).    
 
It is clear in Blake’s case that we are asked, for a full appreciation of the poems 
and their meanings, as well as for the flourishing of our imaginations and personalities, to 
adopt the latter approach. It takes a cognitive leap – an epistemic transformation – to be 
                                                 
31 This metanoia is needed, not only in our experience of icons, but in art-historical theory and criticism as 
well; where, as Slobodan Ćurčić notes, Western scholarship has long laboured under false apprehensions. 
Thus, for example, Ćurčić points out that what has commonly been denoted ‘inverted perspective’ by 
Western art-historians “is neither inverted nor perspective in the Western sense [but rather amounts to] a 
totally different manner of conceptualising form and space” (Ćurčić 2010, p.6).  
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able to put ourselves in the child’s position, but insofar as we manage this imaginative 
identification we are rewarded with a real ‘injection’ – not simply recollection – of 
innocence.       
As in metanoia, we are required by these poems to undergo a change of seeing, 
even indeed a change of heart. When successful, these poems can achieve the miraculous 
in returning us to the world with new eyes, able to see God, not as an abstract entity, but 
as a caring and ever-present Father. Blake’s art may help us therefore – may show us 
how, and provide us with opportunities – to ‘become as a little child’; not by reverting to 
childhood, but by reorienting our perceptions and dispositions to achieve a real 
responsiveness, and a real relation, to God.       
 
What is granted to the Christian believer is a new mode of vision; a mode of vision like 
what Blake means by Imagination: a seeing in the light of Christ, which allows us to see 
the divine image in all things, and all things in relation to God. Crucially, this is mode of 
vision which is embodied, lived, and which makes perpetual demands upon us that we 
live up to what we see. We have already seen how Hart and Balthasar characterise the 
Christian calling to a transformative conformity to the image and beauty of God; we find 
the same understanding in the work of Blake. The acquisition and cultivation of right 
vision, therefore, is absolutely integral to the redemption and regeneration of Albion, who 
has turned away from the Divine Vision and Similitude. In order to change who we are, 
who we’ve become through alienation from the love of God and the love of neighbour (as 
Albion has been divided from Jerusalem), we need to change our way of seeing.  
It is noteworthy that Albion’s fall may be understood as a lapse from second-
person engagements to an abstracting and impersonal third-person perspective, 
epitomised in the figure of the Spectre; a figure embodying a complex of meanings and 
associations, but crucially representative of scepticism, materialism and a dehumanising 
system of law and industry insensitive to human creativity and imagination. The 
restoration of right vision, therefore, is also the restoration of a right relationship. This 
follows also from the fact that what we are enjoined to see, and to love, is personal.         
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5.1.3 Union and communion   
         
Blake is adamant that as we exercise our Imagination, we are not just seeing Christ but 
indeed seeing with and in Christ, thus by a labour of perception becoming members of his 
Body. The Imagination, for Blake, is nothing less than “the Divine Body of the Lord 
Jesus” (Blake 2000, p.302).  For Blake, then, as for all Christians, the aim is union with 
God; a consummate second-person experience in which   
 
I am in you and you in me, mutual in love divine (p.301).          
 
The Christian artwork needs this kind of seeing – and this relation – to fully come 
into existence as what it is; a right apprehension of the Christian artwork is dependent, at 
least, upon our effort at such a relation.   
The experience of union is emphatically the ambition of the poetry of St John of 
the Cross. As Willis Barnstone notes, “San Juan was a mystical poet because in a formal 
sense his poems were written, he himself states, as a result of mystical knowledge, and in 
his commentaries he endeavours to explain the poems, in great detail, as steps toward the 
mystical union” (Barnstone 1972, pp.24-25). John’s poetry conceives this union, 
borrowing licence from the Song of Songs, as the mutual erotic consummation of two 
earthly lovers; as in “Dark Night”: 
 
    O night, my guide! 
O night more friendly than the dawn! 
    O tender night that tied 
    lover and the loved one, 
loved one in the lover fused as one! (John of the Cross 1972, p.39).  
 
The Christian artwork wants us to experience the ‘living flame of love’ that is the 
presence of God. This is intensely experienced and communicated by St John: 
 
O living flame of love, 
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how tenderly you wound 
my soul in her profoundest core! (p.57); 
 
We also see this flame enfolding Albion and Jerusalem at the consummate point 
of their reunion; and its all-demanding, all-refining power is witnessed to by T. S. Eliot, 
for whom  
 
Love is the unfamiliar Name 
Behind the hands that wove 
The intolerable shirt of flame 
Which human power cannot remove (Eliot 1944, p.42).   
 
This flame is a purifier of vision, desire and disposition, inviting and preparing us 
for the transformational union with God.       
 
In Jerusalem, the labours for the regeneration of Albion find their consummation, not 
only in Albion’s union with Jerusalem, but also in Albion’s second-personal encounter 
with Jesus Christ; as rendered in image and words on plates 76 and 96 respectively. 
Blake’s work culminates, thus, with an encounter – a dialogue, a loving communion – 
between man and the Person of God, in which Jesus directly affirms the reality of mutual, 
self-forsaking love at the heart of the divine life and of God’s dealings with men. It is a 
communion which we as readers are not simply enjoined to observe at a critical distance, 
but which we are invited to wholeheartedly participate in.    
Blake’s work at this point is a triumph, not only of Christian art, but of Christian 
theology; and his affirmations are resonant with the theological thought invoked in this 
thesis. Thus, on plate 96 of the work, we read how  
  
Jesus appeared standing by Albion as the Good Shepherd 
 […]   
& they conversed with as Man with Man. in Ages of Eternity (Blake 2000, p.393)  
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This shows God’s personal address to us, and our personal response to him, at the 
very heart of our being. Importantly, a dialogic love of this kind entails mutual kenotic 
sacrifice; for Jesus, revealing God as truly a self-emptying God of love, tells Albion:
  
Wouldest thou love one who never died 
For thee or ever die for one who had not died for thee 
And if God dieth not for Man & giveth himself 
Eternally for Man Man could not exist. For Man is Love: 
As God is Love: every kindness to another is a little Death 
In the Divine Image nor can Man exist but by Brotherhood (p.393).  
  
Albion is inspired by this affirmation to act; he resolves to wholly reorient his life 
in response to the divine address, by throwing “himself into the Furnaces of affliction,” 
whereby his whole personality is transfigured; as “the Furnaces became / Fountains of 
Living Waters flowing from the Humanity Divine” (p.393). Thus the fulfilment of 
Albion’s personality is realised as he stands    
 
  before Jesus in the Clouds  
Of Heaven Fourfold among the Visions of God in Eternity (p.393).  
 
As such Blake envisions our inspired and enraptured communion in eternity: an 
infinite creative life of imagination and mutual delight. It is the aim of Christian art – 
beautifully realised in Blake, as in Dante – of offering intimations and manifestations of 
such a state. The invitation to us, as readers or viewers of Christian art, is to follow 
Albion’s example and dedicate our lives to this divine communal love.   
In these passages Blake gives a wonderfully succinct artistic expression to the 
very heart of Christian thought and life: it reaffirms the self-emptying God envisioned by 
R. S. Thomas, but also shows the revelation and realisation of love to be the ultimate aim, 
not only of his own work, but of all Christian art.    
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It is fitting and fruitful to suggest that the Christian artwork – further to the need for a 
second-person experience – should also be engaged with in the first-person plural; that is, 
not just as addressed to me the believer but to we of the faithful community, as we 
perceive and experience with the eyes, mind and heart of the Church.   
There are several reasons to suggest the move – the expansion – from a second-
person to a communal engagement. After all, the Christian artwork is a shared object of 
love; not an object for me to love alone, for something that only I can see in it and relate 
to for reasons of my own, but indeed an object whose real qualities recommend it to all 
men. As such, it is appropriate to suggest that, in loving the artwork with others, I should 
also seek to cultivate a love for these others; not least as the love manifested and re-
presented in the Christian artwork – in the Christian story – not only calls us to the love 
of God, but indeed enjoins us to love our neighbour. It is in loving, in manifesting the 
Trinitarian mutuality of persons, that we become like God.      
Thus Christian art invites, engenders, and demands, not just an I-you relation, but 
a we-you relation, where the we does not only constitute the collective receivers of the 
work, but also the real context in which the work is fully revealed and apprehended; for 
the meanings of the work are most properly disclosed within the frames of this communal 
body of shared values, practices, and beliefs.      
It should be emphasised that this first-person plural is not simply a plurality of 
first-person perspectives, but rather a singular and integral mode of perception and 
reception in itself. Blake illustrates this identity in Albion, whose fall into fragmentation 
and alienation, whose conversion to Christ, and whose final consummation with 
Jerusalem are all experiences of communal man. We may speak of the group or 
community as constituting something over and above the sum of its individuals; more 
pertinently, we speak of the Church as one body of which each believer is an integral 
member, but which also possesses an organic dynamism and an ontological status of its 
own. The Church is a transfigured community, and it is precisely membership of this 
body which transforms the individual believer.      
If the icon is one paradigm of Christian art, the church is another. In many 
respects, the church building itself is the culmination of all symbolic and sacramental 
artifice, the crowning achievement of spiritual culture, the place where all religious art 
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receives its ultimate justification. As Kathleen E. McVey has observes with regard to the 
Byzantine context, churches and other religious buildings “became, in effect, 
sacramental. Not only the rites performed […] but also the architectural elements and the 
structures in their entirety assumed the task of mediating between the everyday and the 
sacred, the finite and the infinite” (McVey 2010, p.39). Here is a Christian work which 
comes into existence only as a collective creative act and a communal experience, which 
is indivisibly second-person and first-personal plural; and which offers a more 
commanding and consummate experience of the presence of God than any other 
individual artwork may. Indeed, we may consider the church – which incorporates icons, 
painting and sculpture, poetry, hymns and liturgical music, as well as the architectural 
work of the building itself – as the fruition of all Christian arts come together. Thus, as 
McVey affirms, “Architecture, liturgy, and hymnody, as well as vestments and liturgical 
furnishings, processions, icons, relics, and reliquaries were created to echo and amplify 
one another as palpable founts of holiness so that worshippers might fully enter into a 
holy realm” (p.39). We may, I believe, see the church as a microcosm, iconic not only of 
the whole believing community, but of the whole world in its right relation to God – the 
loving, committed and transformative, second-person relation of the Bride to its Groom.      
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5.2 IMAGINATIVE CUSTODIANS 
 
This final part of my thesis will offer an approach to the love of art more generally, not 
Christian art alone, drawing upon and departing from the arguments above, but will also 
further explore the implications of the love that Christian art cultivates; I will show how 
this love may be directed through and beyond the artwork to the world, the cosmos, at 
large, and to the beauty of God. In particular, the models here proposed will provide a 
fuller application of Christian art’s ontological prerogatives. For, as microcosms, we 
humans are the custodians of the created world, tasked with its imaginative care and 
transformation. The love of art and particular artworks may intelligibly be placed, and 
find its purposes, within such a picture.       
I propose a model for the love of art, therefore, which is other-regarding, outward-
reaching and culturally embedded, attentive to worldly particulars and attuned to 
transcendent goods. Just as it is in the nature of a work of art to accommodate an almost 
infinite variety of perspectives and associations, so too the love of the artwork will both 
draw on other attachments and open out to embrace other values. The love of the 
particular that is the work of art may thus fruitfully be exercised within, informed by and 
contributing to, more general ends of love.    
I identify two such kinds of love: oikophilia and philokalia. The former denotes a 
cultural love of home; the latter a theological love of beauty. Oikophilia is a concept used 
to great effect by Roger Scruton in seeking to characterise and motivate a proper care for 
the natural and human environment; and it is a concept that I think wonderfully suited to 
embrace our love of art. On this view, the work of art, as a thing fashioned and sustained 
by both craft and care, and as a focal point of affections and associations, is loved for its 
capacity to render the world emotionally and spiritually our home, a place of culture, 
shaped by human hands and enduring human values. This can be a real Christian 
sentiment, but we shall also see how the Christian commitment to philokalia creates 
tensions to home-love.   
Adopted and adapted from the Orthodox Christian monastic and theological 
tradition, the concept of philokalia is here used to denote a love of beauty, where this 
beauty is seen as in some sense an attribute or gift of God; as on the account of beauty 
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given in chapter 2. Such a theological account of beauty is not only, to my mind, the most 
metaphysically compelling, it also gives the most commanding reasons to see beauty as 
an object of love.  
 
 
5.2.1 Art and oikophilia  
 
In his Green Philosophy (2012), Roger Scruton sets out to identify, and to articulate, the 
motives that engender, and that may reliably be appealed to in order to sustain, a deep 
and urgent concern for our human and natural habitats. “I describe this motive (or rather, 
family of motives),” he writes, “as oikophilia, the love and feeling for home” (Scruton 
2012a, p.3). These are motives and feelings which are not addressed to the natural 
environment alone, but which underpin our cultural efforts as well; indeed, they are 
integral to the making, appreciation, and preservation of art.          
It is important for Scruton that the oikos “means not only the home but the people 
contained in it […] the place that is not just mine and yours but ours” (p.227). I would 
say immediately that works of art possess this extraordinary quality: that they do not only 
speak of or describe such a place, but that they indeed help to establish and furnish such a 
place – of commonly held ideas, of shared experiences, and of shared objects of love. I 
stress from the outset, therefore, the communal character of both art and the love of art.   
Though we may easily conceive of a kind of connoisseurship or love of ‘art for 
art’s sake’, there are several reasons for not advancing such a model – as it would fail to 
account for the reach and richness of the affections and commitments that artworks invite 
and engender.      
For one, a love of art for art’s sake would seem to rest on presuppositions of so-
called aesthetic autonomy that I cannot condone. On my understanding, art is not only 
embedded in a culture or institution of (however implicitly) recognised standards of 
value, but is also implicated in cultural practices that extend beyond the narrow confines 
of the artworld. I argued extensively for such an understanding of art and Christian art in 
chapter 1. Thus, pregnant with meanings, artworks are inescapably caught up with value 
judgements which appeal to wider practices and beliefs, aesthetic as well as moral and 
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religious. The love of art, for this reason, will be similarly multifaceted, and what 
affection is concentrated on the particular artwork will draw on many sources and will in 
turn reflect back on those other aspects of life.           
Further, a love of art for art’s sake, where no considerations are given to the 
shared environment in which the artwork is situated, and where we (with an emphasis on 
the first-person plural) encounter it, may all too easily amount to, or degenerate into, a 
kind of love of self – a love of my taste, of my expertise, of my collection. It is right, I 
believe, to ask of the love of art – as of all love – that it is directed outwards, away from 
self and subjectivity, towards other and objective goods. The lovable artwork is situated 
in, and shared among, a community – indeed, an oikos – of lovers.    
For this reason, it is also crucial to emphasise that, if the love of beauty should be 
considered as a valid candidate for a greater arena of the love of art, this must entail a 
‘high’ conception of beauty. If we submit, as many do, that beauty is nothing but a 
subjective sensation of pleasure, this would risk resulting only in a solipsistic and 
decadent love of pleasure for its own sake. On my model, of course, beauty is not only 
objective or transcendental, but indeed the beauty of God. 
Scruton, significantly, invokes some of the enduring masterpieces of Western art 
– from Homer’s Odyssey to Reitz’s Heimat – as one kind of empirical evidence for the 
attitude of home-love that animates our human efforts at settling, and that pervades our 
cultural accomplishments. While it is quite right to note this emphatic artistic testimony 
to oikophilia, the further point I want to make is this; that while on one level these great 
artworks illustrate, and instruct us in, this love of the oikos which exists in some measure 
independently of their contribution, even more crucially these very poems and paintings 
contribute to build the oikos, and are in important respects the enduring bricks and mortar 
of our deepest affections and most fully developed concepts and desires. We are, as 
persons of culture, at home in these artworks.            
In an English context, the paintings of Turner and others furnish us with ideas 
(and ideals) of landscape, but they also constitute the landscape of our ideas. These 
artworks are home to our ways of seeing, and thus our ways of relating to, our 
environment and our neighbours who inhabit it with us. These works inform our habits of 
perception and conception, so that it is hard for us not to see England – as England, with 
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all the cultural associations accompanying this name – through the lens of Wordsworth, 
Constable, Vaughan Williams, and the like32; through their renditions and re-creations of 
landscape, the landscape becomes articulate as much more than mere nature, and so 
acquires new modes of meaning, even new ways of being – of being ‘for us’, of being 
ours. In this way, art of this kind is indissolubly linked to oikophilia. Indeed, landscape as 
it addresses us through the form of art invites a loving response and renders the landscape 
(as a human landscape, as our landscape) an object of love. The perceptions that inform, 
and are formed by, oikophilia, are those that allow to us to see – with Bridges – how  
 
man’s skill had made  
a fair-order’d husbandry of that native pleasaunce (Bridges 1934, p.2).  
       
Heidegger, whose thinking may be seen to profoundly underpin Scruton’s, makes 
similar claims – albeit in a different idiom – for the artwork’s integral role in the forging 
(and unfolding) of a cultural home and ‘world’. Thus, in The Origin of the Work of Art, 
regarding the Greek temple, “It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same 
time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death 
[…] acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing example of this 
open relational context is the world of this historical people” (Heidegger 1978, p.106).   
Of great significance, in this context, is Scruton’s (as indeed Heidegger’s) 
consistently Burkean stress on the importance of the unborn and the dead in our sense of 
identity and belonging. Art, I maintain, ensures such a bond, by communicating, across 
generations, ways of experiencing the world; moreover, art enshrines important ways of 
relating, by allowing us to tap into the emotions and beliefs of others, dead or distant, 
with sometimes startling poignancy and precision.         
I would say that art bequeaths to us a language – a repertoire of attitudes and 
articulations, concepts and emotions – without which we cannot relate to each other, let 
alone our ancestors and descendants, with the kind of depth and clarity that we both 
deserve and desire. For such successful transmissions of meaning and value, community 
                                                 
32 Of course there are other possible versions of, and other ways of feeling at home in, England. The same 
goes for any country or culture.     
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is needed; at the same time, it is such transmissions which form and confirm a 
community, or an oikos.33 The custodianship of art has much in common, therefore, not 
only with environmental stewardship, but also with religious tradition.     
Importantly, it is part of a tradition of values to also pass on the perception of 
beauty; this is evocatively proposed in poetic form by Bridges, suggesting that the  
 
 birds not only act and enjoy 
[their wonderful] music, but to their offspring teach it with care, 
Handing on those small folk-songs from father to son 
In such faithful tradition that they are familiar 
Unchanging to the changeful generations of men […] 
The same notes that woke poetic eloquence   
Alike in Sophocles and the sick heart of Keats 
– see then how deeply seated is the urgence whereto 
Bach and Mozart obey’d (p.5).    
 
Love, arguably, is the motivating force for all such successful transmission of 
cultural capital; it is a necessary precondition, while it is also the ultimate end of our 
mutual works.     
It remains important that we love, just as we judge, art as art – poem as poem, 
portrait as portrait – and not simply as means to something else; however good that other 
cause, and however efficient a means the artwork may be to it. Hence, if a poetic work – 
say, Eliot’s Four Quartets – serves to inspire or affirm wider affiliations (to England, to 
Anglicanism, or to something else) it is important that we see that it does so as the poem 
that it is, and that the values it champions are integrally tied to its poetic qualities; so that 
the poem does not only espouse the love of home, culture, or creed, but so that in loving 
                                                 
33 For Heidegger, “language is at once the house of Being and the home of human beings” (Heidegger 
1978, p.179); building on what has been said, therefore, we may say that language does not merely speak 
‘about’ our home, and our condition, but indeed constitutes both a mode and a place of our habitation. As 
such – going further, anticipating some of the discussion ahead – our task of home-preservation and home-
transfiguration (not least through our works of art, literature and poetry) may be understood in terms of our 
calling – as Heidegger sees it in The Letter on Humanism and elsewhere – ‘to bring Being to language’ 
(p.179).      
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this poem we practice at the same time these wider loves. In this way, the artwork may 
not only encourage practices of love which are in some sense external to it, but itself 
becomes an instantiation of such loves. Such is the case, I propose, with an artwork’s 
relation to both oikophilia and philokalia. At the same time, and just as importantly, we 
may bring our existing love for home and beauty to bear on a proper and full appreciation 
of such works, where this experiential, second-personal knowledge is called for.        
On this model, then, we may say: I love the painting because it is beautiful; and I 
love beauty in it and through it. I love the painting because it is home (to my values, 
dispositions, visions), and I love my home in and through it.            
    
 
5.2.2 Conservation and transfiguration    
 
For Scruton, a right response to the environment, and to its current crisis, is allied with a 
kind of cultural conservatism, where “The goal is to pass on to future generations, and 
meanwhile to maintain and enhance, the order of which we are the temporary trustees” 
(Scruton 2012a, pp.9-10). His oikophilia, thus understood, is eminently suited to the 
attitudes and practices of our love of art; for the kind of care that Scruton calls for 
extends to embrace also the conservation of cultural artefacts – to protect our sources of 
enduring value and ever-new inspiration from the harm inflicted upon them, and the 
values which these objects house and nurture, from the forces of social and spiritual 
entropy.      
The concept of entropy is important here. Scruton’s oikophilia, by his own 
admission, may be judged a vain “attempt to escape the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics” (p.10); but this, he argues, is not a reason to consider the effort at 
consolidation inherently futile, nor does it detract from the moral import of the response. 
“Moreover,” he writes, “as thermodynamics also teaches us, entropy can be contained 
indefinitely at the local level by injecting energy and exporting randomness” (p.10). This 
is what we should do in caring for our social capital, our customs, and our civic and 
cultural accomplishments. The love of art, I would argue, is not only engaged in this 
struggle, but is indeed one of its most valuable weapons.          
205 
 
The making of a work of art is itself an affront to entropy; taking, as it does, 
indefinite matter to fashion a determinate and significant form and to imbue this with 
vital meaning. The transformation of material or object into a work is an accomplishment 
of metaphysical implications – as explored, in analytical terms, by Peter Lamarque in his 
Work and Object (2012), and as expressed in a theological key by writers on icon 
painting, from John of Damascus in the 8th century to Lossky and Bulgakov in the 20th. 
Further, the artwork entrenches its resistance to entropy as long as it is held in existence, 
as an object of regard, by informed readers, viewers or listeners; and so, crucially, it also 
serves to inspire new works of transformation.   
 
With some reservations, we find a credible, commendable vision of custodianship in 
Rilke’s Duino Elegies, poised somewhere between Scruton’s cultural conservatism and 
the vision of transformation embodied in Christian art, as epitomised in Blake’s 
Golgonooza. Rilke’s seventh elegy, in particular, may be seen to issue a forceful call to a 
celebration of our cultural and artistic achievements, the monuments of our fragile 
victory over time’s attrition. Thus Leeder argues that, “if the Elegies attack the world of 
functionalism and mass production, it is to plead for a world where we act as custodians 
of a living continuity, valuing the forms that we know, the ones that have withstood 
change” (Leeder 2008, p.11).      
Rilke suggests that our feats of art and civilisation must be repeatedly urged upon 
us, entrusted to our care and consciousness, lest they fade entirely from collective 
memory and practice, as from the natural world. A failure of perception and 
receptiveness, therefore, entails also a failure of care, to the detriment of our own 
flourishing as well as that of our culture:   
  
Many no longer see it, so they miss the chance 
to build it again, to build within themselves 
the pillars and the statues, yet greater still (Rilke 2008, p.59).  
  
Rilke’s call, in response to such a condition of forgetfulness, is that we should not 
be numbered among “those disinherited ones who do not possess their past, / nor yet what 
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is to come,” that “we should not become / confused by this, rather strengthened in 
preserving / the still-recognisable form” (p.59). We may gather from this the 
understanding that we are the custodians of our cultural capital; that gratitude is our 
proper response and continued care our task. This, to be sure, chimes with the call to 
custodianship that I discern in Christian art and theology.       
However, my apprehensions about Rilke’s approach, as put forward in the 
previous chapter, apply also here; for the emphasis on a transformation that takes place 
‘within’ risks, I believe, undervaluing the need we have for the actual things that 
consolidate our attachments, our sense of history and community.34 Hence my own 
approach puts emphasis on our need for shared objects of love, not simply ideals and 
reminiscences – which may so easily become internalised, invisible, and self-contained. 
While the Elegies do suggest that ‘we’ may find solace for our alienation in past 
achievements and cultural precedence, there is not a sufficient emphasis on the 
communal nature of either our predicament, nor on the need for our regenerative efforts 
to be directed to making new by making actual things – not artefacts alone, to nurse our 
nostalgia and hold the powers of entropy at bay, but anathemata to God, to restore the 
world to the divine likeness.     
With these reservations in mind, the Elegies may still inspire our works of home-
love and transfiguration. When Rilke writes that      
 
 we have not, after all 
failed to make use of these generous spaces, 
these spaces of ours (p.59),  
 
we may read this as celebrating a right and fitting response to creation, the right use and 
cultivation of the talents given and materials allotted to us.   
                                                 
34 It should also be clear that there can be no entirely ‘inner’ language; not only on Wittgenstein’s model, 
but also on Jones’ and St Ephrem’s understanding of language as sacramental. Not only is language shared, 
open and outward, but it is also material – it has significant form – and so may re-present and manifest 
divine realities. Rilke, being a poet, would of course be aware of this, but the Elegies themselves provide 
suggestions which may undermine this understanding.     
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The elegy ends on a note of wistfulness, aware of the passing of all old 
monuments –  “For my call is always full of leaving” (p.61) – and it is right to remind 
that our task should be informed by the fact of loss, not over-infused with a false 
optimism. At the same time, this should not preclude joy – for “Just being here is 
glorious!” (p.57) – and the awareness of the perpetual threat of cultural entropy should 
serve to spur us to more committed custodianship and creative effort. Such is Scruton’s 
message, and – in more fiery tones – such is Blake’s.       
 
In the work and vision of Blake, we must not forget that Albion is a country, too, and so a 
home; indeed, as a communal and collective man, he is a living oikos. On Blake’s model, 
the only real way of regenerating the land and home that is Albion is by turning, 
communally, to Christ. This goes further than Scruton’s oikophilia, but it is entirely in 
keeping with philokalia. From a Christian perspective, Blake’s response to Albion’s fall 
may be seen as exemplary of the kind of motives and actions needed for a home and 
community to flourish in the face of dissolution. Blake’s is a call to imaginative 
custodianship.   
On Blake’s model, our home-building is ultimately exemplified by the building of 
Golgonooza, which is built to resist and reverse the laws of entropy; indeed, to 
spiritualise and redeem the entire material world in which entropy proliferates. 
Golgonooza is the home we make for ourselves, not only here and now, but also after 
death; the place of enduring art and beauty that we inhabit after all earthly homes have 
passed away.   
With its eschatological dimension, Blake’s work, as all Christian art – and, in 
some measure, Rilke’s Elegies as well – alerts us to a tension between the need to 
conserve and the urge to transfigure; a tension which is less pronounced, though not 
absent, from Scruton’s oikophilia.     
Scruton invokes T.S. Eliot’s reflections on time in Four Quartets, to argue that 
“oikophilia leans naturally in the direction of history and the conservation of the past: not 
from nostalgia, but from a desire to live as enduring consciousness among things that 
endure […] To exist fully in time is to be aware of loss and to work always to repair it” 
(Scruton 2012a, pp.233-234). This is indeed something that Eliot seeks to do through his 
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poetry; not simply in the experiences and sentiments he seeks to conjure, but in the very 
crafting of the poetic work, putting word to word in pursuit of a lasting structure of 
significant forms, capable of containing a rich inheritance of meanings. Moreover, it is 
through great works of art, of Eliot’s kind, that most of us are able to develop an 
admiration for past accomplishments, for enduring feats of artefacture and for timeless 
insights into our condition. Through works of such quality, we come to be at home in 
world of abstract concepts as well as concrete things.        
Four Quartets is a work that testifies to, and moreover makes possible, a love of 
place and a love of a particular cultural history: not by refuting the timeless or 
transcendent, but by affirming its particular and definite manifestation, and by stressing 
the need for – and the validity of – our tireless, and so timeless, love for the here and 
now. In some of the poem’s most powerful and resounding lines, we are enjoined “to 
kneel / where prayer has been valid” (Eliot 1944, p.36) and is valid still; we are asked to 
partake in a practice recommended by precedence, at a particular place pregnant with 
historical significance, and so a place where both hope and thanksgiving may be 
concentrated. It is Eliot’s profound oikophilia that allows him to write that “History is 
now and England” (p.43).    
The work is thus a testimony to oikophilia, but as a Christian artwork it also 
always reaches out towards philokalia – not least in its invocation of Dante, Julian of 
Norwich and others – and it proclaims, through the contingencies of cultural crises, the 
unchangeable glory of God as the ultimate object of our love – even of our love of here, 
of now, of home. As Eliot strives always to voice that which takes place at “The point of 
intersection of the timeless / With time” (p.30), so the poem’s resolution is not only 
cultural, but theological in tone and import; it seeks the transfiguration of things historical 
in the light of the eternal verities of God’s revelation, where ultimately   
 
the tongues of flame are in-folded 
Into the crowned knot of fire 
And the fire and the rose are one (p.43).   
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This transcendental and even eschatological tendency in Eliot can serve to bear 
pressure on our conception of oikophilia. It is right to stress the conservative element of 
our love of home, but I believe that the tendency towards conservation is only one aspect 
of this love; just as significantly, it leans in the direction of, and lends its motivational 
power to, transfiguration. Here, in is transformative aspects, is also where oikophilia 
most clearly leads towards the love of beauty. For beauty transfigures, redeems, glorifies. 
Though one crucial task of conservation is to safeguard the beauty of old things, it is 
fundamental to beauty’s power that it makes new. A beautiful thing always addresses us 
with the delight of new life.         
Scruton’s oikophilia does, I believe, have much in common with the 
understanding of stewardship enshrined in Christian theology, and thus, by extension, 
with the cultivation of philokalia. “Oikophilia”, says Scruton, “tells us to love, and not to 
use; to respect, and not to exploit. It invites us to look on things in our ‘homescape’ as we 
look on persons, not as means only, but as ends in themselves” (Scruton 2012a, p.253). 
As such, it absorbs and accommodates also our “love of beauty and respect for the 
sacred” (p.253), which for Scruton – as for Burke, Schiller, Heidegger and others – are 
intimately connected. These sentiments and conceptions are developed, in a theological 
key, by Kallistos Ware, who writes that man’s ‘vocation is not to dominate and exploit 
nature, but to transfigure and hallow it’ (Ware 1995, p.54). On Ware’s theological model, 
our stewardship is inseparable from our calling to also beautify the world through works 
of art; and the motivations of oikophilia thus find themselves informed by, and 
transmuted into, our cultivation of philokalia.  
We may say that to be a custodian, a steward – a shepherd of sorts – is our mode 
of being at home (as far as we can ever be at home) in the world; as on Heidegger’s 
understanding (in The Letter on Humanism) “Man is the shepherd of Being” (Heidegger 
1978, p.167). This role of ours, then, entails not only the stewardship of a particular place 
and a (de)limited cultural capital, but indeed constitutes an ontological predicament and 
prerogative. To care for and to create things of beauty is, I argue, no small part of this 
task.               
To propose philokalia as a motive to environmental stewardship is not, as some 
may fear, to ‘aestheticise’ our care for the natural world; for beauty, on this 
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understanding, is revelatory of the intrinsic value of nature, not simply an ornamental 
aspect of it. Bridges makes the point,      
 
since ther is beauty in nature, mankind’s love of life 
apart from love of beauty is a tale of no count (Bridges 1934, p.113).   
 
Love of the natural environment may be embraced within and draw upon the love 
of beauty, not simply because nature may happen to be picturesque or sublime, but 
because philokalia sees in a beautiful world the intended glory of creation. The desire to 
beautify, therefore, is not simply a wish to make the natural world pleasing, to satisfy 
human hedonism and comfort, but a real response – a calling, a felt responsibility – 
towards its perceived dignity and divine potential; and to love the beauty of the natural 
world is to see it as beautiful in itself, not simply for our sakes.         
When Berdyaev claims  that “Art must become a new, transfigured nature” 
(Berdyaev 2009b, p.249), this is not only for the sake of the internal purposes of art, but 
for the fruition of the world’s yearning for transfiguration, as also proposed by Rilke. 
Beauty is integral to the restorative and regenerative aims, not only of art, but of our 
stewardship of the world; “For,” as Berdyaev affirms, “beauty is a great force and it will 
save the world” (p.250).    
  
Heidegger – through a characteristic etymological exegesis – tells us in Building 
Dwelling Thinking that ‘dwelling’ should be considered no less than our mode of being in 
the world, and that this entails, essentially, care and cultivation. “The way in which you 
are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is buan, dwelling. To be a 
human […] means to dwell [and] also means at the same time to cherish and protect, to 
preserve and care for” (Heidegger 1978, p.245). On such an understanding, oikophilia 
can indeed be said to be (a) defining (motive) of humanity. But the Christian wants to say 
that also philokalia is constitutive of humankind. In this respect, Christos Yannaras’ 
departure from Heidegger is fruitful.        
We may learn from Christos Yannaras that the world – understood as the divinely 
fashioned cosmos – is not simply an empirical object but personal and relational in 
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nature. “Cosmos,” Yannaras explains, “is the appearance of the personal universality of 
Being, of the mode by which beings are as disclosures of a personal uniqueness and 
decorum, as presences of beauty” (Yannaras 2007, p.81). On this understanding, the 
cultivation of beauty is integral to stewardship because the world as cosmos is by 
definition an ordered, beautiful and personally related thing; it is not given in the value-
neutral gaze of empirical enquiry, but demands a personal relation. All this recalls the 
second-person engagement necessary for Christian art, argued for above, and places that 
engagement in its right context and perspective. Stewardship, on Yannaras’ conception, 
entails caring for the world, and for the oikos, as for another person, responsive to its 
divine potentials; to care for it as a thing and revelation of beauty, and to respond in love 
to its unique disclosure of personal energy.        
In Blake’s work, importantly, Los creates the world of form on such a conception. 
Los, we should understand, creates the world as a home for us – a merciful shelter from 
dissolution and chaos – but also as the place where we are to encounter the Divine Vision 
and Similitude and commune with Jesus. The world is the ‘imaginative home’ for us as 
creatures of imagination; and we, on Los’ example, are its stewards. To create art is 
therefore to re-imagine, to re-energize the oikos, to make it manifest and partake of the 
divine.    
The world, in the tradition Yannaras represents, “is the second term and logos of a 
dialogue (dia-logos), a personal relation directed towards the realisation and disclosure 
[…] of Being” (p.96); within which dialogue our role as microcosm and steward is 
exercised and fulfilled in responsive, loving and creative transformation of our own and 
the world’s mutual potentials, not in a one-sided exploitation of the world’s resources for 
its ‘usefulness’ and our winnings. Our task, as artists and custodians, is to respond to the 
“personal logos of ‘things’, to disclose the personal dimension of the world” (p.149). 
Yannaras argues that we recognise the world as cosmos only insofar as we 
recognise its beauty and its personal relational mode of being. Hence to see the world as a 
home is to see it as beautiful; indeed, the world is a home to us only insofar as it is 
beautiful. 
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5.2.3 Love against the machine  
 
Love of home and love of beauty will always have a common foe in practices that disrupt 
the ‘human scale’ and the interpersonal rhythms of settled life. Hence Scruton writes in 
scathing terms about our modern ‘technophilia’, while Christian art provides emphatic 
support for critiques of the impersonal and de-humanising, as well as ecologically 
harmful, implications of mechanisation and industrialisation.    
René Hague observes that what we may call sin is, for David Jones, “the 
application of man’s faculties to purely technical achievement, directed to profit and 
power, at the expense of that culture which is both creation and worship” (Hague 1977, 
p.2). Thus Jones bemoans the “utile infiltration” (Jones 1952, p.50) of the modern age. 
We find a similar indictment of technocracy, perhaps more impassioned still, in Blake, 
illustrated in Los’ perpetual battle against the Spectre.           
We may see a real affinity here with Scruton’s lamentations on the functionalism 
that pervades modern culture; but of course Blake’s and Jones’ apprehensions and 
indictments run deeper still – for what they lament is the neglect and misuse of our divine 
potential and our essential nature as beings called to render the things of this world 
anathemata to God: “the things lifted up and the venerated trinkets” (Jones 1952, p.50).  
Jones, as no doubt Blake, would fully endorse Eric Gill’s contention (as here 
articulated by Rowan Williams) that “the bulk of post-Renaissance art is a disaster”, 
precisely because it has misunderstood or neglected the fundamental ontological 
prerogative of art and has “encouraged us to think of painting not as sharing in the 
creative labour of God for the world’s eventual fulfilment but as the record of a particular 
individual sensibility looking at the world from outside” (Williams 2010, pp.47-48). This 
entails a misunderstanding, not only of the potentials and prerogatives of art, but indeed 
of the nature of man and of the world we inhabit.   
 
Man the artist is also man the labourer; this is true in Jones, in Blake and, in more tersely 
realistic terms, in R. S. Thomas. For all these poets, a concern for the nature of language 
and creative expression goes hand in hand with a concern for the realities and 
213 
 
implications of human craft and manual work, and the threats posed by the technocratic 
age are seen as directed against the dignity of language and labour alike.   
Thomas’ persistent critique of ‘the Machine’ evokes the threat such ‘technophilia’ 
constitutes to our religious conceptions, practices and language, how it encroaches upon 
our waiting on God, supplanting the personal and sacramental with abstract and sterile 
means of communication; for example, in “The Tree”:   
 
We have set one up, but 
of steel and so leafless that 
he has taken himself 
off out of the reach 
of our transmitted prayers (Thomas 1993, p.417).    
 
Thus Thomas speaks of the devastating fact of language’s decline and the 
concurrent lapse of our spiritual perceptions and conceptions; language, in Thomas’ 
perspective, has become the language of the Machine, and so a source of alienation and 
destruction. We see this yet more clearly in “Brother”:  
 
It addressed 
objects, preferred its vocabulary 
to their own […] 
forged  
for itself wings, missiles (p.428).     
 
The lament and critique of these poems rest on an understanding of language and 
human making as inherently, potentially, divine in purpose and nature; and so the misuse 
of these powers constitute, not just an affront or attack directed at the human world and 
the language users, but indeed a perversion or negation, ultimately, of divine 
communication.      
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It may seem that technology itself poses an inherent threat to art and poetry; because 
technology, as Heidegger points out in The Question Concerning Technology, “is a 
means to an end” (Heidegger 1978, p.218); and, as Jones and others assert, the 
instrumental, the utile, the functional – not just its objects and instruments, but its view 
and way of life – is inimical to the gratuitous and sacramental realities of our ‘making 
other’. Insofar as ‘the essence of technology’ is instrumentality, then, this would indeed 
seem to be negating the aims of art, and perhaps of Christian art in particular.  
Yet if, as Heidegger’s complex thesis suggests, both art and technology have their 
essence in a bringing forth and disclosure – if “Technology is therefore no mere means 
[but] a way of revealing” (p.222) – then it would be premature to posit a fundamental rift 
between the two. We should be cautious here; in keeping also with David Jones’ 
celebration of all our making – including craft and manufacture – as potentially 
revelatory of our relation to God. Insofar as a conflict remains, therefore, this should be 
diagnosed in terms, not of categorical or essential differences, but of practice and 
application; where technology may be understood as revealing directed towards 
instrumental ends, and art as revealing dedicated to gratuity – and where technology may 
therefore bear with it a risk, though by no means a guarantee, of falling into a purely 
functional order.     
Heidegger is aware of this risk, and he sees it realised in what he calls ‘modern 
technology’; for “the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not 
unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiēsis [but is rather] a challenging” directed 
at the earth; such technology does not cultivate but rather “sets upon nature […] in the 
sense of challenging it” (pp.223-224). It is this incarnation of technology that we may 
recognise as ‘the machine’ in R.S. Thomas poetics, as the menace of the strictly utile in 
Jones’, and as the target of Blake’s fiery indictment of the spectre of ‘industry’.             
Christos Yannaras, building on Heidegger’s analysis also criticises the technology 
of today on ontological grounds (seeing this modern condition as an inheritance of the 
western philosophical tradition), calling it “the most radical undermining of the personal 
truth of the person and of the world”, due to its proliferation of “goods”, as opposed to 
“things” (such as artefacts and artworks), ‘which does not aim at relation but only at the 
subjection of the world […] to impersonal individualistic need and desire” (Yannaras 
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2007, p.37). This is in contrast to art, craft and labour, which express, manifest and 
realise personhood, and which also – this, I believe, is implicit in Yannaras’ argument – 
are iconic of God’s creation of humanity and the world, stamped with his image. The 
machine, the technological condition, negates this personal aspect, and so renders the 
world opaque also to God.    
Yannaras argues that “The whole phenomenon of modern technology is founded 
very clearly on [the] attitude” (p.79) of treating the world as an autonomous object for the 
human will and intellect. By objectifying the world, and also objectifying God, we banish 
God as a personal presence from the world, leaving the world to be exploited for self-
serving human purposes. Thus Yannaras cites the modern environmental crisis as a sure 
symptom of “some fault in humanity’s relation with the world” (p.103), brought about by 
a false idea of the world no less than by a wrong use of it.  
We may understand Blake’s Golgonooza as the attempt to reverse this trend; and 
we can see how the building of Golgonooza is symbiotic with the flourishing of 
personality and the personal nature of humanity and the world. The accomplishment of 
this entails creatively overcoming the inner pains as well as the outward obstacles of our 
broken condition, as Los himself testifies:  
   
I took the sighs & tears & bitter groans: 
I lifted them into my Furnaces; to form the spiritual sword. 
That lays open the hidden heart: I drew forth the pang  
Of sorrow red hot: I worked it on my resolute anvil (Blake 2000, p.306).  
 
Blake laments the decline of craft, the rise of mechanisation and, with it, the 
militarization of industry and manufacture, in the strongest terms: “And all the Arts of 
Life. They changed into Arts of Death in Albion” (p.362). The change, which may seem 
a social and material one, to Blake has the profoundest spiritual implications. It has dire 
consequences for our apprehension of reality, rendering opaque the divine vision, making 
us look only to the world of empirical ratio and utility; and moreover making it easier to 
commit wrongs against the divine image on a collective scale.     
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It is worth quoting a long excerpt from Jerusalem, for Blake’s devastating and 
penetrating assessment of the new order; an assessment closely apposite, I believe, to 
both R. S. Thomas’ and David Jones’ own diagnoses and apprehensions:    
  
Then left the Sons of Urizen the plow & harrow, the loom 
The hammer & the chisel […] & the water wheel 
That raises water into cisterns broken & burnd with fire: 
Because its workmanship. was like the workmanship of the shepherd. 
And in their stead, intricate wheels invented, wheel without wheel: 
To perplex youth in their outgoing. & to bind to labours in Albion 
Of day & night the myriads of eternity that they may grind 
And polish brass & iron hour after hour […]  
  that they may spend the days of wisdom  
In sorrowful drudgery, to obtain a scanty pittance of bread: 
In ignorance to view a small portion & think that all (p.362).  
 
This state of affairs is a mockery and negation of human potentials, of creativity, 
of art and craft, and of our regenerative calling.   
If we identify the real danger of technology as that so-called ‘enframing’ 
proposed by Heidegger, we can see how this tendency – which is both objectification and 
ordering, both conceptual entrapment and practical delimiting of possibilities – does 
constitute a real threat to the gratuitous and sacramental. For all its revelatory potentials, 
therefore, Heidegger suggests that technology as (and under the sway of) enframing 
“blocks poiēsis” (Heidegger 1978, p.234). Heidegger may be seen to echo the 
apprehensions of Jones, Blake and Thomas, therefore, when he claims that “enframing, is 
the extreme danger, not only for man’s essential unfolding, but for all revealing as such” 
(p.235).  
Yet, crucially, Heidegger’s analysis, significantly, opens onto a cautious 
affirmation of the redemptive potentials of technology; as he acknowledges that “the 
essential unfolding of technology harbours in itself what we least suspect, the possible 
rise of the saving power” (p.235). Still, this saving power, so-called, is to be understood 
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in terms of poiēsis, and so is to be sought and cultivated above all in the arts. It is, 
ultimately, to art – poetry chief among them – that Heidegger enjoins us to look for “the 
revealing of essential unfolding into the beautiful” (p.237). In this assessment, I feel, he is 
joined by the poets here discussed; who also affirm that technology may be a mode of 
regeneration, insofar as it aligns with the aims of art and poetry for the bringing forth of 
beautiful things.    
For a nuanced response to technology, we may look to Robert Bridges. Bridges, 
also apprehensive of the machine’s incursions into our labour-communion with the earth, 
suggests that agriculture by its new methods “hath lost as much of beauty as it hath saved 
in toil” (Bridges 1934, p.97). But he also affirms that there is occasional beauty – even 
grace – in our mechanised labour:  
 
Or what man feeleth not a new poetry of toil, 
whenas on frosty evenings neath its clouding smoke 
the engin hath huddled-up its clumsy threshing-coach 
against the ricks, wherefrom labourers standing aloft  
toss the sheaves on its tongue; while the grain runneth out, 
and in the whirr of its multitudinous hurry  
it hummeth like the bee, a warm industrious boom 
that comforteth the farm, and spreadeth far afield 
with throbbing power; as when in a cathedral awhile 
the great diapason speaketh, and the painted saints 
feel their glass canopies flutter in the heav’nward prayer (p.97).  
 
Love of home and love of beauty both enable this way of seeing, which is 
forgiving of the machine’s disruption or variation of the old natural rhythms, and 
perceptive to its sacramental and regenerative potential if used with right care for the 
right ends. Thus we can see how also new technologies may be recruited for the building 
of Golgonooza, and how – as David Jones was aware – we may encounter the presence of 
God ‘at the turn of a civilisation’; the challenge also faced, and deeply felt, by R. S. 
Thomas.  
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5.2.4 The challenges of love  
 
Not only the claims on behalf of art’s redemptive power that we find in Christian art and 
theological aesthetics, but also Scruton’s appeals to a love of home, may, I grant, seem 
problematic in the face of much modern art and of modern understandings of both the 
artworld and the world itself. Very few works and artists may seem to conform to these 
kinds of conceptions.    
But the model I am proposing does not want to ignore works of a difficult or even 
disturbing nature; works which conceptually, formally or on the level of content pose a 
challenge to ideas of settlement, transcendent values and the aim of beauty. Indeed, as 
many of our greatest works may seem to issue some such challenge to our settled 
conceptions, no serious account of art can afford to ignore these aspects.  
To the question, how oikophilia may adapt as we move from the familiar to the 
unfamiliar, from the comforting to the critical, from the likes of Constable’s Salisbury 
Cathedral and Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey” to the likes of Paul Nash’s We Are 
Making a New World and Eliot’s The Waste Land – in short, from the somewhat idyllic 
or poignant to works which cannot, or refuse to, offer a safe image of home – three kinds 
of response can be given.   
Firstly, we may observe that even works that manifest or give voice to a real sense 
of alienation, often derive their power from – and often appeals to – precisely that 
longing for home which most, if not all of us, inescapably harbour. There is Houseman’s 
A Shropshire Lad, for example, which derives its enduring poignancy from precisely 
these tensions; where homely rhymes envelop meditations on mortality and lost youth, 
where the resilience of local loyalties is hard-won in the face of experiences of 
displacement and despondency, and where the repeated affirmations of home-love always 
threatens to be undone by the pessimism that pervades many of the poems.       
Secondly, we may stress the crucial point made earlier, that while our artworks 
may offer images of a home external to the works, it is more interesting to consider these 
works themselves as constituting a home for our conceptions and values; and for this to 
successfully and significantly be the case, arguably, the engagement with matters – and 
the exploration of artistic forms – that pose a threat to our home-building may seem 
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something of a necessary condition. We do not want to be too settled in our conceptions, 
as it were; as creative and enquiring beings, we want an art that is responsive to the often 
critical conditions of the world we inhabit. The Waste Land is a particularly apt 
illustration of this point, on the level of formal structure no less than the level of content.      
Thirdly, we may emphasise again that it is not home, but beauty, that has the final 
claim on our efforts and desires – and beauty of a transcendental, even divine order; and 
we should make it clear that this beauty may be manifested in artworks, as in real places 
and situations, that offer no consoling idylls and no earthly shelter.  
As a fourth option, of course, we may simply concede that not all artworks are 
engaged in the cultivation of either oikophilia or philokalia. The model I am here 
pursuing does not seek to be all-inclusive, and indeed would not wish to accommodate 
certain works that seem rather to be in the business of subversion, negation and 
desecration – or, for that matter, those that seek simply to divert or entertain.  
With these responses in mind, then, we may briefly consider some works that 
seem paradigmatically to manifest the challenges of – not necessarily to – the love of 
home and beauty.      
Eliot’s The Waste Land, for one, testifies to our deeply engrained, often 
inescapable, anxiety and fretfulness, and to the fractured character of our lives and the 
world we so often fail to comfortably inhabit. At the same time, however, it is precisely 
the tensions between the home and the exile, the oikos and the desert, the assurance of 
meaning and the sense of desolation, that provide the strongest motives for, and that offer 
the most powerful experiences of, our great works of art. If we were indifferent to home 
and beauty, even works that pitilessly illustrate the difficulties of attaining those objects 
of love would have no appeal, would lose their hold on us.     
Thus, on one level, Eliot’s poem stands as a testimony to us not being at home in 
the world, and shows that our alienation is a real source of spiritual turmoil and 
dissatisfaction; while on another level, the poem’s exposure of alienation draws implicit 
attention to, and draws great pathos from, our enduring search for a sense of home. This 
striving is Eliot’s own pursuit also beyond the bounds of the waste land. In The Waste 
Land, the best Eliot can offer is a gathering of fragments, shored against the ruins of what 
was once, or maybe never was, a real oikos; but by the end of the Four Quartets, which 
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in many ways is a consummation of the longings explored in the earlier poem, he is – as 
we have seen – in a position to affirm something far more substantial.  
Paul Nash is fascinating case from the visual arts; for his avowed inspiration from 
such lovers of home and beauty as Samuel Palmer and William Blake may be discerned 
even in the searing renditions of the battlefields of the Great War. The uncommon beauty 
of these works, in contrast to their pitiless subject matter, offers a commanding challenge 
to our conceptions and commitments. Nostalgia may figure in the response to Nash’s 
landscapes – nostalgia for what is no longer there, what is absent in the landscape – but 
more appropriately attuned to the works’ unflinching gaze – which is unclouded by 
naiveté, and which gives us the world as it now is – would be a sombre and urgent sense 
of the need for both lament and regeneration. These are works which call for, and which 
call forth, a love that remembers, a love that restores, and a love that transforms.    
I would also single out Marc Chagall as an artist whose work is exemplary for its 
palpable quality of love. Chagall was by his own proclamation motivated by love alone, 
and he does seem to be in love with every inch of his paintings. A great oikophile, 
Chagall never tired of re-imagining and re-creating his native town of Vitebsk, even 
during his long years abroad, and his love is palpably manifested in the very brushwork 
of the paintings, in the generosity of their colours, and the attentiveness to particulars, 
where even non-human creatures and inanimate things become radiant with personality, 
as for example in I and the Village (1911). Nor did Chagall shy away from evocations of 
suffering, cruelty and destruction; in his late painting War (1964-66), the strength of his 
love of place and people is evident in the tenderness with which he renders these figures 
who find themselves in the very throes of terror and loss. Undoubtedly we have here also 
a lover of beauty; of the beauty which animates the imagination and the heart alike, in 
moments of joy as in times of trial and tribulation.          
It is crucial to bear in mind that we want to be at home, not simply in the human 
world, but with the idea of being human. This will involve, on any mature conception, a 
lived familiarity with doubt, death and destruction. Some artworks may be more difficult 
to love than others, and this may partly be because these works remind us how difficult it 
is to love; and such challenging works may in time secure a place as the most enduringly 
and deeply rewarding objects of love – of a love hard-won in the face of all that assail it.     
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It is a value of art, I believe, that it may help us – through exposure to such issues 
and through imaginative involvement with real and fictional characters and situations – 
not only to achieve this familiarity, but also to conceptualise, to come to terms with, even 
perhaps to overcome some of the suffering, desolation and dissatisfaction that will, in the 
course of a lifetime, befall us. Hence, arguably, the enduring appeal of tragedy, of 
thrillers, of memento mori in its various forms; and hence art may often rise to its 
summits of perfection and beauty in works dealing with human suffering or even marking 
the occasion of death – as exemplified, for example, by the Requiems of Mozart and 
Fauré.           
Another exemplar in this respect is Rembrandt’s famous portrait of his mother. 
This is a painting, interestingly, to which Scruton appeals in his account of the 
significance of the human face as the revelation of self and personhood, and one which he 
suggests contains “one of the greatest smiles in all painting” (Scruton 2012b, p.82). The 
smile, and the portrait at large, is remarkable for its ability to transform an ostensibly 
gloomy subject into a source of genuine light. Bearing all the marks of advanced age, 
Rembrandt’s mother is by no means a conventional beauty, and the portrait could be 
construed, at first glace, as rather sad and disturbing – for its dark tones, the partial 
obscurity of the face, and the unmistakable signs of physical decay. Yet the evident 
mutual tenderness and understanding between the painter and the sitter, rendered with all 
the master’s skill, turns this painting into a triumph of human love. As much other great 
art, here is a work which reminds us that death is not only the greatest challenge of art, 
but indeed the greatest test of love. In The Artist’s Mother, Rembrandt, I believe, proves 
himself victorious on both counts; and the mark, the prize, of that victory – is the work’s 
beauty.      
As a parallel case, explicitly Christian in its commitment, we may look to El 
Grecos’s half-length figure of Christ Blessing (‘The Saviour of the World’) (ca. 1600), 
currently in the National Gallery in Edinburgh. This painting shares with Rembrandt’s a 
subject and sitter that may, at first glance, deflect the viewer’s gaze away from the face 
and eyes that meet him. For there is no conventional comeliness about El Greco’s Christ; 
on the contrary, as is to be expected from the artist, there is something unearthly, 
potentially uncanny, about the sallow features of the figure. However, if we are prepared 
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to place ourselves in a relation to the subject that, in some measure, partakes of the 
experience of the painter, we may become acutely and intensely aware of the real 
qualities of the person before us. Indeed, as in Rembrandt’s case, it seems clear that the 
painting is rendered in, and for, a deep mutual love between the artist and the person re-
presented there.  
There is something piercingly arresting, and profoundly moving, about El Greco’s 
Christ; of a person whose power is not subverted by, but precisely resides in, the 
weakness of his physical form, and whose seemingly feeble gesture is charged with 
grace. Recalling the God of R. S. Thomas, this Christ is no coercive presence, but a 
kenotic one; incapable of commanding submission, his power is synonymous with his 
self-offering in love, and he invites a freely loving gift of self in return. This is the aim of 
the artwork: to realise a mutually transforming second-personal relation. We, the viewers, 
are invited to partake of this communion with Christ, present under the form and beauty 
of the painting. The fact that this invitation calls us, ultimately, beyond the borders of this 
world, is reflected in the gaze of Christ, whose eyes glance off past the viewer instead of 
confronting us full-on.          
Further, in the case of Christian art, there are many images – of the Crucifixion, 
for example – which are stark reminders, to viewers attuned to this tradition, that this 
world, with all its error, cruelty and injustice, is not our real or final home; and so – while 
they bring out the tensions between oikophilia and philokalia – they may serve to quicken 
a different kind of home-sickness in us. More interestingly, these paintings are objects of 
love, on many levels; and if this is difficult to comprehend or to accommodate within our 
customary notions of love, this is entirely appropriate – for these images may be said to 
both manifest and invite the most difficult and demanding kind of love there is – a love 
defeating death.    
 
We may have to concede that not all art needs to be beautiful; that beauty is not a 
criterion of some kinds of artwork. At least, so contemporary art practice, aesthetics and 
critical theory tell us. The Christian artist, however, will rather affirm Berdyaev’s claim 
that “There can be no art without an impulse to beauty” (Berdyaev 2009b, p.238). To my 
mind, beauty’s capacity to engender wider affiliations speaks for re-instating beauty as a 
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core value and aim of art. It may be said of art that does not aspire to beauty that it does 
not seek to be an object of love. If, by neglecting beauty in art, we lose an opportunity to 
learn how to love art and to love beyond art, then this would be a catastrophic loss.          
If beauty is dismissed or dispensed with, so is the appeal to the aspiration of our 
better nature towards transcendent goods. Art that sets itself up against beauty, as some 
modern art does, does not seek to engender or accommodate our love, either for beauty or 
the oikos – indeed, it may be directed against the very idea of a shared habitat of enduring 
values. In such cases, not even the particular artwork is offered as an object of love, but 
rather as a sensory assault, a conceptual riddle, or an intellectual challenge. The kind of 
model I am here proposing is set squarely against such tendencies.          
For Scruton and for many writers on theological aesthetics, the denial or 
destruction of beauty amount to nothing less than an act or attitude of desecration; while 
in Blake’s work this denial can be identified with the fall of Albion and his division from 
Jerusalem:   
 
I saw the limbs form’d for exercise. contemn’d: & the beauty of  
Eternity. look’d upon as deformity & loveliness as a dry tree (Blake 2000, p.306).  
 
On the theologically committed understanding of beauty which informs 
philokalia, beauty is a quality of God’s self-revelation and a manifestation of the mutual 
love and delight of the Trinity; and the beauty that we encounter in the world may be 
seen as a gift bestowed by God. The beauty of each beautiful thing, partaking of God’s 
infinite beauty, is therefore appropriately seen as a source of delight and gratitude, solace 
and inspiration. It is easy to see why this would make the beautiful artwork lovable, an 
appropriate object of love – the love of art, of beauty, and indeed of God.         
It must be emphasised, however, that there are great demands involved in this 
engagement with, and love of, beauty. As I have previously argued, we are asked, not 
only to respond with due gratitude to beauty’s bestowal, but to reorient our dispositions 
and desires in recognition of its objective value. Indeed, we are asked to conform to the 
reality that beauty reveals – by becoming beautiful ourselves. The appropriate response to 
the beautiful is therefore to grow, through love, ever more receptive and nearer to it.  
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On my model, the beautiful artwork is a touchstone for such experiences, and may 
thus claim a central place in the deepening and developing of our spiritual life. 
Importantly, as regards the beautiful artwork, we do not simply love the beauty of the 
work, but indeed the beautiful artwork itself; we love it for giving particular form to, and 
being a unique manifestation of, a beauty which is divine. Moreover, we love it for being 
a lasting witness to that beauty, in the face of so much entropy, ugliness, and desecration. 
Thus the artwork is not just an object of the love of beauty, as one instance of beauty’s 
manifestation; rather, our love of art – our love of a particular work of art – is elevated to, 
and accommodated by, a love that is directed towards the glory of God.      
It follows from the claims of beauty upon us – and indeed from the claims of the 
oikos – that the lover must conform fully to the end he hopes to realise. Thus we have 
seen Maritain argue that “The artist must be in love with what he is doing, so that his 
virtue becomes in truth, in St. Augustine’s phrase, ordo amoris” (Maritain 1943, p.48). 
We may add that he must also be in love with what he is doing it for – with art, of course, 
but beyond that with the human home and with the beauty of God. We must accept that 
this love is not easy either to acquire or sustain; yet for the lover of art, as for the artist 
himself, it is a prize well worthy of our greatest effort and commitment.        
 
 
5.2.5 A home in but not of the world  
 
Some works in the vast treasury of art may be singled out as speaking more resolutely 
than others of such love, and manifesting such love more clearly. There are, for example, 
the paintings of Fra Angelico and the music of Bach; and there is Dante’s Divine 
Comedy. Dante’s narrative, of course, is one of pilgrimage, and one born of the poet’s 
own exile from his hometown of Florence. It can be seen, simultaneously, as an attempt 
to reclaim that home and as charting a search for a homecoming of a different order. It 
isn’t only the order and grandeur of a human settlement that is the spur and object of 
Dante’s desire, but rather “Divine Love” (Dante 1995, p.60), the glory of God, and those 
beloved persons, Beatrice and the Saints, that live, move and have their being in His 
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presence. It is to this divine love, not only to the love of our earthly home, that Dante’s 
beautiful work of art wishes to guide us.     
Christian art, for this reason, may not rest content with affirmations of home-love. 
While Roger Scruton acknowledges the tensions within oikophilia, therefore, my model 
also points to another tension – between the love of home and the love of beauty – which 
may take us beyond the limits of the oikos into the practice of philokalia. Indeed, the 
experience of beauty on my understanding already contains this tension, by kindling a 
desire that calls us beyond our earthly home; for, as Berdyaev observes, “The beauty 
which is born in the creative act is already a transition from ‘this world’ into the cosmos, 
into another form of being” (Berdyaev 2009b, p.165).      
For all the emphasis on dwelling, belonging, and homecoming, Scruton too is 
aware also of the restlessness and homesickness of us humans, in our search for shelter or 
salvation. He takes seriously, I believe, Heidegger’s claim that “Homelessness is coming 
to be the destiny of the world” (Heidegger 1978, p.165)35; and he favourably quotes the 
words of Augustine: “’Our hearts are restless, until they rest in You’” (Scruton 2012a, 
p.238).  
This tension is central to Heidegger, who stresses – in Building Dwelling Thinking 
– that to dwell “’on the earth’ already means ‘under the sky’” (Heidegger 1978, p.246). 
Heidegger, importantly, conceives of homecoming and the home (this time in The Letter 
on Humanism) as “nearness to Being” (p.164), thus locating our predicament in the realm 
of ontology (more emphatically and consistently than does Scruton), and not in a socio-
cultural context alone. Indeed, it may be that no such worldly context may satisfy or 
appease our homesickness; that it may even be wrong to look for such belong among 
temporal things and beings at all, as it is Being itself we thirst for. Consequently, what we 
suffer from is “a homelessness in which not only man but the essence of man stumbles 
about” (p.164). Christian art and theology, of course, suggests that this condition may 
only be assuaged beyond this world, and that our true home must be understood as 
nearness, not to abstract Being, but to God.   
                                                 
35 This is taken from The Letter on Humanism. Scruton’s treatment of this topic may also be seen to draw 
on Heidegger’s analysis of the unheimlich in Being and Time (¶40 and elsewhere); his diagnosis of 
Dasein’s “fallenness” into a state of being “not-at-home” (Heidegger 1962, pp.233). This is a condition also 
recognised by Christian theology, as my discussion will bear out.    
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From the Christian perspective, Heidegger’s approach is commendable in that it 
encourage us to view our homesickness, as well as our home-building, in more than 
psychological and pragmatic terms – indeed, in more than terrestrial terms – as something 
that tends to Being itself, and thus cannot primarily aim at or, nor ultimately be satisfied 
by, a particular oikos or heimat; even though the nearness of Being (as indeed the 
presence of God) may indeed be felt and effected in and through such local and finite 
belonging. Scruton can be seen to heed this tendency in Heidegger’s thought, in his 
commitment to the category of the sacred; but, as neither Scruton nor Heidegger allow 
for seeing the sacred in explicitly Christian terms as being-for and being-with God, their 
diagnoses can only take us thus far in understanding the ‘apophatic love of home’, so 
called, that underpin Christian art and theology.    
We can relate this discussion back to the apophatic method of R. S. Thomas, 
pertinently epitomised in the metaphor of ‘Abercuawg’; as a place (non-existent in time 
and space), the presence of which cannot be sought in the way we usually seek to locate a 
particular site or answer, but which, as D. Z. Philips observes, “can only be grasped in the 
form of absence” (Phillips 1986, p.92). Thomas writes: 
 
An absence is how we become surer  
of what we want. Abercuawg  
is not here, but there. […] 
  I am a seeker 
in time for that which is 
beyond time, that is everywhere  
and nowhere; no more before  
than after, yet always  
about to be (Thomas 1993, pp.340-341).  
 
Significantly, Abercuawg points to the levels of analogy involved in all our 
searching – and making, and building – for God; the conditionality of all our efforts and 
accomplishments, which are always made other by and in God, and the real fruition or 
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consummation of which is always other than what is realised here on earth, or what is 
made by human hands.      
Reaffirming the tensions between oikophilia and philokalia, the Christian faith 
proclaims that, while the earth is entrusted to our care, and in need of our loving 
regenerative efforts, we have no abiding home in this world, but are perennially pilgrims 
for God’s glory, as St Paul proclaims: “For here we have no continuing city, but we seek 
the one to come” (Hebrews 13: 14).       
Gregory of Nyssa enables us to see this in terms of our dynamic reaching out, and 
our insatiable hunger, for God’s inexhaustible beauty. Indeed, as we have seen, Gregory 
says that our homesickness, as we may call it, “belong[s] to the soul which loves what is 
beautiful. Hope always draws the soul from the beauty which is seen to what is beyond, 
always kindles the desire for the hidden through what is constantly perceived” (Gregory 
of Nyssa 1978, pp.114-115). Scruton, of course, does seek to connect oikophilia with his 
enduring concern for beauty. However, he calls the love of beauty a “subsidiary motive” 
(Scruton 2012a, p.253) to our more encompassing need for home. On the theological 
understanding of beauty, however, no motive could be stronger than our calling to 
commune with the beauty of God; and God’s beauty, on this model, is also our one true 
home.        
If, for Scruton, oikophilia incorporates the love of beauty, on my understanding 
philokalia encompasses the love of home. We are at home in this world, arguably, only 
insofar as it is beautiful; for we are native to beauty, and beauty’s withdrawal or 
banishment from the world only serves to render this world alien to us, and us exiles on 
its barren surface. Such is the feeling of Christian art and of the theology it both 
expresses and inspires.  
  
While Scruton emphasises the inestimably beneficial role that the love of beauty has 
played in conservation movements around the world, he also draws attention to beauty’s 
force as a consolidator of community; since a shared love of beauty, and collective 
aesthetic agreements on behalf of the common good, help to render settlements enduring 
places of culture: the examples of Florence, Prague and Salzburg feature in Scruton’s 
account, as does the traditional English village, as models for how an acknowledgement 
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of beauty’s objective value, as a check on short-term plans and commercial interests, is 
an essential element in any right approach to culture-building.    
We may transpose this model – under the influence, not only of the theologians 
already invoked, but also of such uncompromisingly visionary artists as Dante and Blake 
– to consider our stewardship and beautification of the world at large. For I think this is 
precisely the ambition of the Christian tradition of art to which the likes of Dante, Blake 
and Eliot belong. The Christian artist is committed, not only to a local habitat and home, 
but to creation as a whole; and the visionary care they enjoin us to cultivate pertains not 
only to the conservation of cultural artefacts, customs and communities, but to the 
glorification of the material, mental and spiritual world in which we humans live, as 
creatures called to grow in the image and likeness of God. When Zernov claims that icons 
are “part of the transfigured cosmos” (Zernov 1978, pp.105), he gives voice to a 
worldview in which we are all called to the practice of philokalia.           
It would seem that philokalia makes the kinds of claims upon our desires and 
commitments that will tear us from our local affections and allegiances; but it may also 
return us to the heimat and the oikos with more ardour and a yet greater sense of 
responsibility. Indeed, philokalia may serve to add greater urgency to local cares; for the 
local is resonant and radiant with the sacred, and truly invaluable – even for the exile – 
for its unique embodiment or imaging of the transcendent and eternal. We may construe 
philokalia as a kind of love exercised chiefly by pilgrims, and not by patriots, but these 
two need not be in opposition, as long as the local home, the point of origin (and not 
seldom also the point of return, as Eliot reminds us in Four Quartets) is loved for its 
particular manifestations of God’s glory and for being the familiar ‘arena’ within which a 
more than local love is learned and nurtured. For the love of God may not only be 
exercised through love of neighbour and family, but may indeed be learned through 
homely practices of care and sacrifice, as well as from the artworks and artistic traditions 
that constitute such a vital part of the home.       
Insofar as a degree of irreconcilability remains between oikophilia and philokalia, 
this may be explained partly by Scruton’s idea of the sacred, which plays a crucial role in 
his thinking and which underpins his account of home-love. The sacred, on Scruton’s 
model, is really an anthropological, not a theological category; it is by definition 
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identified with local customs and communal beliefs, while it also remains theologically 
non-committal, even though Scruton works within broadly Christian conceptions. 
Philokalia, on the contrary, makes definite ontological commitments; it confesses the 
Trinitarian God of Christianity, and it is cultivated in response to the manifestation – both 
rapturous and sometimes rupturing – of a beauty not of this world.              
 
The concept of philokalia should invite us to consider the iconicity of our works of home-
building as well as our artworks. Golgonooza is illustrative here, as constituting a kind of 
‘culture-building’, the aim of which is not simply an earthly establishment of practices 
and values, but rather the manifestation of divine realities. As such, Golgonooza 
prefigures a realisation and reality which is always beyond and other than the cultural 
accomplishment – but which nevertheless is really present there, manifested here and 
now.        
At the grandest scale, a whole society may be taken to embody such iconicity; and 
we have a historical example of such a project in the empire of Byzantium. Thus 
Kallistos Ware identifies “the great vision by which the Byzantines were inspired: to 
establish here on earth a living icon of God’s government in heaven” (Ware 1963, p.50). 
This culture-building was carried out on the same theological assumptions about the 
spiritual use and redemption of matter that underpinned the defence of icons. Thus Ćurčić 
incisively suggests that re-presentations of architecture in Byzantine art “enjoyed a 
meaning and status equivalent to those of the saints depicted on icons as primary objects 
of religious veneration” (Ćurčić 2010, p.3). For all its failings, then, notably the 
temptation to confuse the temporal and earthly kingdom with the eternal one, Ware 
argues that “Byzantium in fact was nothing less than an attempt to accept and to apply the 
full implications of the Incarnation” (Ware 1963, p.50). In some way and some measure, 
this is the defining ambition that animates all Christian making.    
What Christian art and Christian cultural accomplishments more widely seeks to 
achieve is a cultural condition where God is encountered and the new world is both 
prefigured and actually instantiated; not a static culture, but a dynamic, sacramental, and 
regenerative one. Crucially, it is foremost to the new, not the preserved, that our love is 
owed and directed. In this light, this emphasis on transfiguration over conservation, 
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Berdyaev offers the startling and significant insight that “In the strict sense of the word 
[…] Christian culture is impossible”; for the Christian creative task is the transformation 
of “culture into being, science and art into a new heaven and a new earth” (Berdyaev 
2009b, p.126).   
  
Oikophilia tells us that art ought to remake the world in the image of man; to help make, 
from the raw materials of nature, a settled and cultured world imbued with human values, 
and to speak of all that is enduringly ennobling in our nature – of dignity, sacrifice, love 
of home. An artwork, on this understanding, thus serves as a model of care; of a care 
which is owed to the world as to our natural, cultural and spiritual home. The artwork 
shows us how such a love is possible, not least by itself being an object of love. 
For the Christian, of course, and for Christian art, ‘the image of man’ is 
intelligible only as a divine image. Our dwelling, no less than our making, must be 
pursued and understood with reference to God; and the home we are enjoined to build 
and care for must be conceived as the home of man-the-artist and man the microcosm.    
Thus philokalia, going one step further than oikophilia, asks of art that it remakes 
the world in the image of God; that it becomes iconic of God’s glory. The beauty of the 
particular artwork should serve to kindle in us a thirst for more and more of beauty’s 
bestowal and manifestation; loving the beautiful object, we may learn to direct our 
desires towards the infinite beauty of God, as the ultimate object of our love.              
The beautiful work of art, therefore, stands at the very intersection of home-love 
and love of beauty, and may simultaneously be an instance of and inspiration for both 
practices; at times harmonising these two, at other times serving to awaken us to their 
diverging claims. In the case of Christian art, its ultimate allegiance is with the practice of 
philokalia above that of oikophilia.     
Prompted by the experience of Christian art, then, we can issue the call for art to 
restore its dedication to beauty; not simply because we want our oikos to be beautiful, but 
because beauty is our true and abiding home – as imaginative custodians, entrusted with 
transformative stewardship of creation, called to attain the likeness of God.       
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